Political Representation in Portugal: the years of Socialist majority 2005-2009

André Freire
José Manuel Leite Viegas (eds.)
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Foreword

Hermann Schmitt

A quarter of a century ago, in June 1986, the Belknap Press of Harvard University Press published a voluminous book co-authored by Philip E. Converse and Roy Pierce. Its title was Political representation in France. At the time, the book was a landmark study (and remains today a point of reference for many of us). No matter whether one agreed or disagreed with the methodology and the main findings—no scholar interested in the empirical assessment of the process and the effectiveness of political representation could ignore it.

Around 25 years later, a new book, Political Representation in Portugal: The Years of the Socialist Majority, 2005-2009, has been published by Freire and Viegas. The very choice of the title symbolises the ambition of the volume. And indeed, this book is a comprehensive account of the most impressive empirical research programme into political representation we have seen in a long time. Surveys of voters and members of parliament, and later of candidates standing for office in national parliamentary elections, were designed in such a way that their comparative analysis can shed light on the support base of representative democracy among both elites and the mass public in modern Portugal (Part I of the book); on the effectiveness of the ‘representational bond’ between electors and the elected (Part II); and on the institutional and behavioural foundations of the democratic process in contemporary Portugal (Part III).

Let me just add to this a brief overview of theoretical and empirical foundations of the book and some more specific remarks on the individual papers included in each part of the volume.
To some extent, the present book follows the model proposed by Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, and later adapted by Philip E. Converse and Roy Pierce, among others.

The perspective applied, as Freire states in his introductory chapter, is incompatible with the extreme positions of both the mandatory view (the delegate model of representation) and the independence of the elected representative (the trustee model of representation). Indeed, the model used here is the one proposed by Philip E. Converse and Roy Pierce, it is realist in the sense it combines the mandatory view with that of the (relative) independence of those who are elected. Moreover, the core of the matter—issue congruence between voters and their representatives—is considered here to be simultaneously a theoretical and a methodological task, leading to the application of analytical models with a significant heuristic capacity.

As hinted at above, all of the chapters of the book are based on an analysis of data from surveys of voters (and non-voters) and candidates and deputies. Both of these surveys were integral parts of two international research networks (Parliamentary Representation at the European and National Levels, headed by Olivier Costa and Eric Kerrouche at the IEP, Bordeaux, and the Comparative Candidate Survey, headed by this author).

The first part of *Election, leadership, and political representation in Portugal* contains three chapters examining the role of deputies in establishing the link between voters and their elected representatives. The first is entitled ‘Decline, transformation and confidence in parliaments: A longitudinal and comparative perspective’ and is by Conceição Pequito Teixeira and André Freire. Among other things, the authors conclude that the trust Portuguese citizens have in their parliament (Assembleia da República) as an institution is greater than the trust they have in their deputies as individual agents. Moreover, they
note that there is a significant relationship between confidence in the Assembleia da República and the ‘specific support’ given to many other of the regime’s institutions, which has significant implications for any reform of the political system (a timely topic in Portuguese politics).

The second chapter is entitled ‘New media, citizens and parliament in Portugal: The continued e-democracy gap and lessons from the Obama experience’ and is written by Carlos Cunha and Filipa Seiceira. Age is presented as the main explanatory factor in terms of the use of information and communication technologies by Portuguese deputies, with younger deputies more likely to take advantage of the technology than their older peers. However, it is also noted that Portugal still has a long way to go if it wants to take full advantage of the possibilities these new technologies offer to reform the political representation process and improve efficiency in meeting the citizens’ demands.

The third chapter is entitled ‘The participation of citizens and parliamentarians in voluntary associations’ and is by José Manuel Leite Viegas and Susana Santos. Overall, and to briefly summarise a very rich and complex chapter, we could say that the major finding is that it shows the involvement of Portuguese voters and deputies in voluntary associations is an important aspect of both the political representation process in Portugal and of the social anchorage of ideologies and party identities of both voters and deputies.

The second part of the book, ‘Ideology, European integration and political representation’, focuses on the congruence between voters and elected representatives, not only in matters of ideology in a more narrow sense, but also in terms of the preferences regarding the normative principles that public policy in both Portugal and the EU must adhere to. It consists of three chapters.
The first chapter is by André Freire and Ana Belchior and entitled ‘Ideological representation in Portugal: Congruence between deputies and voters in terms of their left-right placement and its substantive meaning’. The authors have found that in many situations the results for deputies-electors congruence are different when left-right self-placement is used and when substantive issue preferences (either economic left-right issues or authoritarian-libertarian issues) are used. The differences resulted either from divergences in terms of degree or direction or both. For the authors, these mismatches mean some problems in political communications might arrive with the left-right language but also that left and right might not be a well-suited indicator to measure issue congruence, at least in particular cases like the Portuguese.

The second chapter is entitled ‘Political representation in Portugal: Congruence between deputies and voters in terms of policy preferences’, and is co-authored by Ana Belchior and André Freire. Through principal components analysis, Belchior and Freire conclude there are very important similarities in the structure of preferences of both voters and deputies. This is because they found the presence of two dimensions (among both represented and representatives) very strongly organised around the role of the state (and of the private sector), in education and health and also around libertarian-authoritarian themes. Moreover, among the right-wing (deputies and voters) congruence is greater in terms of the substantive libertarian-authoritarian divide; while among left-wing partisans (voters and deputies) congruence is greater in socio-economic terms.

The third chapter, ‘Assessing voter and elected representative support for Europe: The case of Portugal’, is written by Catherine Moury and Luís de Sousa. Moury and Sousa show that in Portugal there is greater polarisation on European issues among deputies than there is among citizens, a result that is also found in terms of the left-right
divide. The greatest difference between the more pro-
European citizens and the more Eurosceptic deputies is
within the radical left-wing parties. Additionally, it is
argued that on European issues the differences between
Portuguese deputies and citizens are largely due to
differences in the respective levels of information and
political interest.
The third and final part of the book is concerned with
institutional reform and deliberative democracy.
The first chapter is entitled ‘Institutional reform in
Portugal: From the perspective of deputies and voters’, and
is written by André Freire and Manuel Meirinho.
There are three major findings in this chapter. First, the
high levels of citizens’ dissatisfaction with the Portuguese
political representation process (high in comparison with
35 CSES countries) are positively correlated with support
for institutional reform, particularly with support for the
eventual personalisation of the vote (preferential vote,
mixed systems with SMDs, etc.). Second, within the large
parties there is an incongruity between the electorate and
the elected representatives in terms of preferences
concerning the type of government (majoritarian, for elites;
more consensual/power sharing, for voters) which can
cause problems should the case for reform move in the
direction favoured by the elites rather than that of the
electorate. Third, the authors show that deputies from the
two largest parties (which have the power to change the
electoral system—a two-thirds majority is required by the
constitution) are divided in respect of the most desirable
route to electoral reform, and this divide is clearly a major
reason for the many failed attempts at electoral reform.
The second chapter is entitled ‘Portugal’s 2006 quota/parity
law: An analysis of the causes for its adoption’ and is
written by Michael Baum and Ana Espírito-Santo. The
authors conclude that while the Portuguese are largely in
favour of the system of quotas, the subject held no great
salience for them, and for this reason public opinion played a limited role in the process, as did the weak Portuguese women’s organisations. On the contrary, the role of the institutional context (proportional representation systems are the rule in Portugal, particularly in parliamentary elections) of the political parties (especially the Left Bloc and the Socialist Party and their international sister parties) and of the mass media were all crucial.

The final chapter of the book is entitled ‘Democratic deliberation: The attitudes of deputies and voters’ by José Viegas and Sandra Carvalho. They conclude that both Portuguese deputies and voters are mainly in favour of the procedures and principles of democratic deliberation (especially in terms of the dimensions of deliberation usually labelled as ‘respect and consideration’ for the opinions of others). However, Viegas and Carvalho also show that Portuguese deputies and citizens are more divided when deliberation concerns ‘defending the common good’.

Two sets of words are still due to end this forward note. First, the reader should bear in mind that some of these chapters have already been published in The Journal of Legislative Studies (chapter 5), Pôle Sud – Revue de Science Politique (chapter 8), Revista IberoAmericana de Estudos Legislativos – Ibero-American Journal of Legislative Studies (chapter 2), Portuguese Journal of Social Science (chapter 7) and West European Politics (chapter 9).

Second, for my part, let me finally say that this book is a ‘must read’ for any scholar of Portuguese politics and of electoral democracy more broadly, in Europe and beyond. It offers stimulating new insights into the Portuguese electoral process and suggests new avenues for comparative studies. It is exactly this kind of scholarship that one would wish to see realised more often.
Hermann Schmitt
9 June 2012
Chair in Electoral Politics
University of Manchester
Manchester M13 9PL, UK
hermann.schmitt@manchester.ac.uk
Research Fellow and Professor
MZES, University of Mannheim
A5, 6 (Gebäudeteil A)
D-68159 Mannheim
hermann.schmitt@mzes.uni-mannheim.de
Acknowledgements

André Freire

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Last, but by no means least, I would like to thank the Studies in Sociology Research Centre at IUL-Lisbon University Institute, and in particular its director, Fernando Luís Machado, and his administrative staff (especially Carla Salema, Neide Jorge, Ana Ferreira and Sara Silva) for the excellent research facilities provided for the realisation of this project. In the case of the Studies in Sociology Research Centre we would also like to express
our gratitude for their financial support for the translation and revision of many of the papers in this book.

A final note is due here. Although the book was positively evaluated by two experts on political representation, Professor Hermann Schmitt and Professor Olivier Costa - the two supportive reviews are in the Annex-, who clearly and enthusiastically recommended the book for publication, for reasons beyond our control publication of this book was delayed.

Lisbon, February 9, 2015
André Freire
ISCTE—University Institute of Lisbon (Department of Political Science and Public Policies), and senior researcher at CIES-ISCTE—University Institute of Lisbon.
Notes

1. Andres Malamud was an original member of this project’s coordinating team; however, for reasons beyond our control, Andres was forced to abandon the project while it was in its early stages. However, we would like here to acknowledge the important contribution he made to the project.

2. The researchers included Goffredo Adinolfo, Maria António Pires de Almeida, Michael Baum, Ana Belchior, Carlos Cunha, Cristina Leston-Bandeira, Manuel Meirinho, Diogo Moreira, Catherine Moury, Conceição Pequito, Ana Espírito Santo, António José Seguro, Luís de Sousa and Tiago Tibúrcio, and also Isabel Estrada Carvalhais and José Palmeira of the University of the Minho, who agreed to participate as commentators at the international conference that took place in the Assembly of the Republic in 19-20 June 2009. The scientific consultants were professors Pedro Tavares de Almeida, Olivier Costa, António Costa Pinto and Hermann Schmitt. The universities represented within the project were ISCTE-Lisbon University Institute’s Studies in Sociology Research Centre, Dowling College (Long Island, New York), the Social and Human Sciences Faculty at the New University of Lisbon (Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas da Universidade Nova de Lisboa), the Science and Technology Faculty and the New University of Lisbon (Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia da Universidade Nova de Lisboa), the Social Sciences Institute at the University of Lisbon (Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa), the Higher Institute of Social and Political Sciences at the Technical University of Lisbon (Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas da Universidade Técnica de Lisboa), the European University Institute, Florence, the Mannheimer Centre for European Social Research at the University of Mannheim (Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung), the University of Hull, the University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth, the Bordeaux Institute of Political Research and the University of the Minho.

3. This group included Joana Alegre, João Cancela, Inês Carneiro, Sandra Carvalho, Inês Lima, José Nuno Matos, Hernâni Pereira, Susana Santos and Maria Matilde Stoleroff.

4. The parliamentary leaders were Alberto Martins (Socialist Party), Pedro Santana Lopes and Paulo Rangel (Social Democratic Party), António Filipe e Bernardino Soares (Portuguese Communist Party),
Heloísa Apolónia (Ecologist Party “The Greens”), Paulo Portas and Diogo Feyo (Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party) and Francisco Louçã and Luís Fazenda (Left Bloc). We also thank the contribution of the independent deputy Luísa Mesquita, and that of the deputies from the smaller parties (the People’s Monarchist Party and the Movement of the Earth Party) who were elected on the Social Democratic Party’s list. The heads of office were Eduardo Quinta Nova (Socialist Party), Conceição Frutoso de Melo and Gonçalo Vilasboas (Social Democratic Party), Pedro Ramos (Portuguese Communist Party), Natividade Moutinho (Ecologist Party “The Greens”), Mariana Ribeiro Ferreira (Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party) and Cláudia Oliveira (Left Bloc). While we are far from receiving the 90 per cent response rate obtained in three surveys of members of the Swedish parliament (Riksdag) conducted in 1968, 1986 and 1988, we nevertheless obtained the good response rate of around 62 per cent from deputies serving in 2008 (only the response from the Social Democratic Party was relatively low). See Peter Essaiasson and Sören Holmberg, 1996, *Representation from above: Members of parliament and representative democracy in Sweden*, Aldershot, Dartmouth.
In his review of the literature on political representation, at the level we can call empirical political science, Powell (2004) divided the research on this topic into two main groups (see also Wessels 2008 and, in Portuguese, Meirinho 2008 and Belchior 2007).¹ The first group mainly includes works analysing the relationships between the distribution of the electorate’s preferences, which are expressed through their votes for parties in (national) elections, and the distribution of parliamentary seats to these parties.

This type of research into political representation includes several other topics—particularly the proximity between the electorate and those they elect, as well as the territorial anchorage of the latter, which is more or less facilitated by electoral regulations—among many other topics that analyse the relationship between elected representatives and those they represent mediated through the electoral and party systems. A great deal of this type of research has been undertaken in Portugal (both as case and comparative studies)—particularly Freire, Meirinho and

The second group of studies of political representation presented by Powell follows the path laid out by Warren Miller and Donald Stokes in their celebrated article in the *American Political Science Review* (1963). These authors established a tradition of empirical research into political representation in which the underlying assumption is that the congruence between the political preferences of the elected representatives and those they represent, particularly when the preferences of the elected representatives correspond with the behaviour of the legislators in parliament, is a key part of the quality of political representation.\(^2\)

That is to say—although within certain limits and without necessarily violating the principle of the ‘non-imperative mandate’ (as we will see below)—the greater the degree of congruence between the preferences of the electorate and the deputies, the greater the probability the electorate will feel themselves to be well represented and the greater the probability the legislators (and the government) will act in accordance with the people’s preferences, which is a basic axiom of any representative democracy (Dahl 1998; Lijphart 1999).

The model for studying these links between the preferences of the electorate and their representatives is described in Figure 1.1. According to this model, however, the connection between the preferences/attitudes of the electorate and the behaviour of the deputies in parliament is mediated by the attitude of the representatives as well as by the way they interpret the directions of their constituents.
Moreover, these last two elements are interdependent (as the direction of the arrows in the figure indicates): that is, the attitude of the representatives and the perception they have of the electorate’s position have a mutual influence. Consequently, the electorate’s preferences not only inform the representatives’ attitudes, they are also subjacent to the perceptions the representatives have in respect of their electorate’s position.

**Figure 1.1: Links between the attitudes of constituents and the behaviour of their representatives in parliament**

![Diagram]

*Source:* Miller and Stokes (1963)

In European political systems, especially those with proportional list systems, the political parties play a much more central role than they do in the United States. Consequently, while in America analysis of the agreement between representatives and the electorate takes the form of a comparison of the electorate’s preferences and attitudes in each uninominal constituency (single-member district) with those of their representatives, in Europe these comparisons
usually focus on the segmentation of the electorate and their representatives by party (see, for example, Belchior 2007–10; Dalton 1985; Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999; Miller et al 1999).

**Figure 1.2: Links between the attitudes of constituents and the behaviour of their representatives in parliament (by party)**

In the latter case the preferences of those who vote for a particular party are usually compared with the positions taken by the deputies of that same party, with these analyses being repeated for all the parties with enough parliamentary seats to make the statistical analysis relevant. In the American case, comparisons between the attitudes of those elected and of the electorate usually involve relating the preferences of the elected representatives and of the electorate by electoral constituency or by comparing the preferences of a number of legislators with the views of the ‘average voter’ (among others, see Wessels 2008, who uses
both procedures with the same data; Converse and Pierce 1986, who analyse the French majoritarian system that tends to follow the American model (see also Costa and Kerrouche 2007).³

This second group of political representation studies is almost non-existent in Portugal. That is to say, there are several studies of political representation, but what is analysed is exclusively the electorate’s point of view and its attitude towards both the political system and the political class (Freire, Lobo and Magalhães 2004; 2007; Lobo and Magalhães 2009). There are also many studies of political representation analysed exclusively from the elites’ point of view, including their profiles, the underlying patterns of recruitment and their attitudes and behaviour (Leston-Bandeira 2000; 2004; Freire 2001b; Pinto and Freire 2003; Almeida and Pinto 2007; Teixeira 2009).

Studies of political representation that follow the line established by Miller and Stokes (1963) are practically unknown in Portugal, with the exception of the work carried out by Manuel Meirinho (2008) (although this is entirely theoretical) and Ana Belchior (2007; 2008; 2010), who adopts the same empirical approach we use here.

As far as I am aware, Belchior’s work, which is an empirical examination of the agreement between the positions taken by the elected representatives and those taken by the electorate, is unique in Portugal.⁴ Nevertheless, they remain rather limited with respect to the range of topics they cover (the complete questionnaires, including their respective databases, were published in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira 2009). Moreover, in Belchior’s study, the size of the sample of deputies is very small, a fact that introduces
serious limitations with respect to the multivariate statistical analysis, particularly in relation to the smaller parties.

For all that has been said, the many studies presented in this book are pioneering in Portugal and, we hope, will encourage the establishment of a new line of political representation studies. In order to examine the congruence between the preferences of the electorate and of the Portuguese parliamentarians in relation to a wide range of matters (preferences on matters of public policy, ideology, institutional reform, European integration, participation in social pressure groups, democratic deliberation, etc.) in the project underlying this book we make use of two surveys conducted during 2008: of deputies in the Assembly of the Republic and of Portuguese voters.\(^5\)

The survey of the electorate was based on a probabilistic multi-stage sample of Portuguese citizens aged 18 and over and resident in continental Portugal (N=1350). In order to ensure the sample reflected the structure of the population as accurately as possible, data was analysed in terms of age, gender and education level.

The fieldwork was conducted by TNS-Portugal under the scientific direction of the project team. A very similar questionnaire dealing with the same topics was elaborated for the survey of parliamentary deputies. The fieldwork for this survey was conducted by social science post-graduate students under the supervision of the project’s coordinators.

Both questionnaires reflected the comparative surveys used by the research networks in which the project is involved (Comparative Candidate survey and Parliamentary Representation at the European and National Levels).\(^6\) Since the response rate to the survey of parliamentary
deputies (143/230 = 62.2 per cent) represented a deviation in relation to the composition of parliament in 2008, the sample was weighted by party and gender variables in such a way as to improve its representativeness.

It should be noted, therefore, that many important questions were raised in the same way with the surveys of both electors and deputies, allowing the study of political representation through an analysis of congruence in the attitudes and preferences of both the elite and the voters.

It has already been noted that the empirical approach adopted by Miller and Stokes (1963) was based on the presumption the congruence of the political preferences of the electorate and the deputies—particularly when the latter are also congruent with the performance (voting behaviour, etc.) of the legislators in parliament—are key to the quality of political representation; however, not only is this presumption problematic (as we will demonstrate below), the model itself has been criticised.

Before we examine some of the main criticisms of the ‘model of congruence between the electorate and the elected’ (a designation we have adopted to synthesise the model outlined by Miller and Stokes, and which has been followed by researchers of the most varied hue in the subsequent literature on political representation), it is important to remember another model underlying many studies of political representation: the responsible party model (Pierce 1999: 9; Thomassen and Schmitt 1999: 13–19 and, in this volume, the articles by Freire and Belchior on ideology and political representation and by Belchior and Freire on preferences on matters of public policy and political representation).
According to the responsible party model (as Freire and Belchior confirm below): ‘1 Voters reconcile positions in relation to political matters contained in different manifestos; 2 Voters compare their positions in relation to the political matters raised by the political parties competing in each election; 3 Voters cast their vote for the party whose manifesto is closest to their own positions; and finally, 4 After their election to parliament, deputies remain cohesive and seriously seek to apply the set of guidelines that were presented to the voters during the election, through their inclusion in public policies.’

However, as Thomassen and Schmitt note (1996: 16), this model has also been subjected to criticism. First, from a more normative perspective, the model has been criticised for resorting to a ‘populist theory of democracy’, ‘sacrificing essential democratic values, such as the division of power, checks and balances and the protection of minorities on the altar of majority government’ (Thomassen and Schmitt 1996: 16). Second, and from a more empirical perspective, some researchers regard the model to be ‘totally unrealistic’; particularly in respect of the knowledge voters will have of the party manifestos and, consequently, the extent of their ability to influence the election result.

Despite these problems, which are often noted in the literature, we agree with Thomassen and Schmitt on the model’s merits, which leads us to use it as a guide here: ‘the merit of the model is that at least it helps to study the role of different actors in the process of political representation in a systematic way, and that each of the requirements of the model can be used as a benchmark to
evaluate the effectiveness of a particular aspect of the system of political representation’ (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999: 16).

As with the responsible party model, the congruence model can also be accused of presenting a populist theory of democracy, particularly because of the bottom-up perspective it adopts in respect of the political representation process, which places a great deal of emphasis on the electorate’s preferences and on the need for congruence between the actions of the deputies and their constituents as a crucial aspect of the quality of political representation.

Some empirical studies have shown there is also a structuring of policy preferences made from the top down—that is, by the elected representatives and the political parties (and not always the other way around), —which is a type of ‘representation from above’, as noted in the title of Esaiasson and Holmberg’s 1996 study of Swedish political representation.

From a more theoretical perspective, the congruence model seems to provide an antagonistic perspective of the ‘non-imperative mandate’, and because of this it seems to suggest the elected representative is a kind of delegate of the voters, bringing into question the extent of the independence and autonomy usually associated with the concept of a ‘non-imperative mandate’ and the fundamental idea that deputies are elected to represent the nation and not just their constituents.

Before contextualising these criticisms it is worth briefly discussing the main threads of the ‘independence-mandate controversy’.
As Converse and Pierce note (1986: 493–5), the ‘mandatory view’ (of political representation) has deep roots in democratic values. This view perceives the elected representative as a kind of delegate who is expected to act on the explicit instructions of their constituents. In its most extreme form, the legislator is expected to limit their activities to the explicit instructions they receive from their constituents, serving thus as a passive vehicle for the expression of constituents’ opinions. According to this radical view, representation and the need to have elected representatives derive from the logistics of a situation in which the constituents are unable to meet regularly in assembly.

In a more realistic interpretation of the ‘mandatory view’, elected representatives are authorised to use their own judgement within limits, whether because the instructions from the electorate cannot anticipate every event, or because in some matters (quite often of great importance) the constituents are not able to formulate even the most general instructions. The central point remains, however, even in relation to the most realistic view—the constituents’ instructions (when supplied) take precedence over all other considerations.

The idea of the independent mandate (of the representative in the political representation process) associated with the concept of the ‘non-imperative mandate’, is fundamentally derived from the views expressed by Edmund Burke in his speech to the electors of Bristol. Before an audience more inclined to accept the idea of an elected representative as a delegate, Burke argued that once elected (good) representatives will use their reason
and judgement to make their decisions as a legislator, based on the rules of a deliberative assembly.

In an extreme view, the perspective placing the emphasis on the independence of the deputy assumes them to be free of any particular obligation towards their constituents: the electoral process is only an administrative expedient for the selection of some ‘good men’, whose goodwill and experience are recognised by their peers who therefore, and for these reasons, choose them as their representatives.

From the more realistic position defended by Burke, while the representatives have private obligations towards their constituents, they are trustees of their constituents’ true interests, which they are perfectly capable of interpreting. Out of interest, we ought to note that the congruence model (Figures 1 and 2) refers precisely to this interpretative role of the elected representatives (‘the legislator’s perception of their constituents’ attitudes) in gauging the will of the electorate (‘attitudes of the constituents’) and also in their translation into effective public legislative/policy behaviour.

One of the main points of Burke’s speech was that the judgement of elected representatives in relation to the ‘true interests’ of their constituents could at times differ from their combined will. And when these differences emerge the elected representatives’ obligation is to follow the dictates of their conscience rather than the instructions of their constituents.

Hanna Pitkin (1967: 155) recognises the difficulty in taking a definitive position in favour of one or the other view of political representation, particularly when the force
and the good sense of the arguments put forward by each of the two visions (‘mandate’ versus ‘independence’) are taken into account. The supporters of the autonomy of the elected representatives highlight the fact they are specifically chosen as specialists by voters who do not have the time to dedicate to deep reflection on public policies. On the other hand, advocates of the ‘mandatory view’ ask if (democratic) political representation worthy of the name can ever exist if the trustee systematically votes against the wishes of their constituents.

The congruence model seems to come closest to the mandatory vision, the deputy an important role in the interpretation of their constituents’ desires. However, this must be put in perspective since, as Converse and Pierce (1986: 494) note, ‘what each of these supposedly devastating critiques lacks is the recognition that as the circumstances vary it is probable that not only the Real, but also the Good, also vary with them’.

As Converse and Pierce note, some of the decisions have to be made urgently—or involve detailed technical knowledge that even the strongest supporter of the mandatory view do not argue against the need for a ‘trustee’. In the real world, ‘voting chains’ (from the constituents to the representatives) do exist that are so obvious that even the most determined defender of the view legislators are independent have little difficulty in admitting that if the position is so clear and obvious this independence is blatantly contradicted by the behaviour of the legislator and that the defence of independence in extremis could put the basic fundamentals of representative democracy at risk.
Added to this is the fact the proximity of the congruence model with the mandatory view may be more apparent than real.

This is so because, first, while it gives priority to the electorates’ preferences as a basic rule of democratic government, the model gives the elected representative a key mediation role in the relationship between the electorates’ preferences and the elected representative in their role as legislator.

Second, this model is incompatible with the extreme positions of both the mandatory view and that of the independence of the elected representative. Indeed, after all that has been said, this model is closer to the realist position of the mandatory view without being incompatible with the view, also realist, of the (relative) independence of those who are elected. In any event, it is necessary to note that in this book the use of the ‘model of congruence between voters and elected representatives’ is mainly the result of an option that is simultaneously theoretical and methodological: it is the application of analytical models with a high heuristic capacity (as demonstrated in previous studies) to perform an empirical analysis of political representation.

In other words, we are speaking of the option for conceptual tools with a large degree of analytical and methodological value without necessarily implying any primordial valuation of either the mandatory vision or of the independence of the elected representatives in the political representation process.

Additionally, and from a more empirical perspective, the simultaneous surveys (of voters and deputies), as those
that we use in this volume (and in the underlying project), to ask the voters (and their elected representatives) about the generic guidelines on public policy that voters are (as a rule) perfectly capable of formulating, while the elected representatives know what they must take into consideration as they vote in parliament or as they assess whether or not the government is acting in accordance with the election manifesto (or manifestos) it is supposed to implement.

The issues (which are contained in the questionnaires) are sufficiently generic to suggest pathways for governance/‘navigation’ (mandatory view), but without questioning the need for the political representatives to have the autonomy necessary to pilot the ship (independence of the legislator view).

Having described the theoretical framework underlying this book and the set of contributions contained within it, it is worthwhile moving on to the presentation of the structure of the chapters. Before doing so, however, it is important to note that all of the chapters are based on an analysis of the data from the surveys of voters and deputies discussed above.

Both these surveys were integral parts of two international research networks (Parliamentary Representation at the European and National Levels, headed by Olivier Costa and Eric Kerrouche, and the Comparative Candidate Survey, headed by Hermann Schmitt), although some of the studies focus only on one survey (Conceição Pequito with André Freire, and Carlos Cunha with Filipa Seiceira), while several others use both surveys in association with other (earlier) surveys with
comparable data allowing greater historical depth and comparison in their analyses.

Before turning to the presentation of each of the chapters, and noting that this book is targeted at an international audience, we feel a short introduction to the Portuguese political and party system is required.

A stable party system quickly emerged after the 1974 democratic transition in Portugal (following 48 years of a right-wing dictatorship, 1926–74), and by 1976 four parties represented almost 90 per cent of the electorate. Apart from a brief period during the mid-1980s when the centre-left Party of Democratic Renewal emerged and disappeared, the party system remained relatively stable. The general tendency (1987–2005) was for the vote to concentrate on the two centrist ‘catch-all’ parties: the centre-left Socialist Party (Partido Socialista), and the centre-right Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata). The latter is not, as its name suggests, a social democratic party, but rather a liberal party (more in economic terms than social issues, where the party is more conservative than liberal: see Freire 2005 for an explanation of this classification).

Alongside the Socialist Party and the Social Democratic Party, the Communist Party (Partido Comunista Português) and the conservative (although with significant Christian democratic influences) Social Democratic Centre (Centro Democrático e Social) have become the system’s main parties.

Following its defeat in the 1991 legislative elections, the Social Democratic Centre changed its leadership, its ideological profile and its name, becoming the Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party (Partido Popular) (Freire
Some smaller parties, such as the Left Bloc (Bloco de Esquerda), have also obtained seats in parliament during the democratic period. This left-libertarian organisation was originally a coalition (two parties and one political movement) formed to compete in the 1999 elections, but over the years it has evolved into a single political party.


The 1985 election is associated with several significant features, some of which only became clear at the 1987 realignment election and after (Freire 2005, 2009; Bruneau et al 2001). Perhaps the most significant was the concentration of the vote in two major parties—a majoritarian trend in the political system (Bruneau et al 2001). The change from ‘consensual’ to ‘majoritarian’ democracy has several features: from a fragmented to a kind of bipartisan party system, from coalition (or minority) and unstable governments to single party majorities (most of the time) and rather stable governments, and from a strong parliament (and president) to a strong government (and prime minister).
(see also Freire 2005 and Bruneau et al 2001). A significant return to the ‘consensual’ pattern occurred in the 2009 legislative elections (Freire 2010 and 2012).

As mentioned above, another major change associated with the majoritarian trend is that since 1987 cabinet stability has substantially improved (Freire 2005: 2009; Bruneau et al 2001). During this period only one Socialist Party government (1999–2002) and the Social Democratic Party-Popular Party coalition (2002–05) did not complete their terms. On 30 November 2004, following a succession of problems with the new cabinet’s performance, the president announced his intention to call elections in February 2005, which the Socialist Party won with its first majority. A long legislature (54 months) followed, with the Socialist Party leading a single-party majority government. It was this legislature—the tenth—that was directly or indirectly under scrutiny in the 2009 election cycle (Freire 2010).

We turn now to the presentation of this book, which is divided into three parts. The first part contains three chapters examining the ‘link between voters and their elected representatives and the role of deputies’. It opens with ‘Decline, transformation and confidence in parliaments: A longitudinal and comparative perspective’ by Conceição Pequito Teixeira with André Freire, which analyses citizens’ attitudes towards the parliament in Portugal and several other European countries. From the longitudinal and comparative analyses it concludes the confidence the Portuguese electorate has in its parliament declined between 1980 and 2008, and that this decline has been identical in the other European countries analysed.
This means there has been a reduction in trust in parliaments in general and that the Portuguese experience is not even the most pronounced.

In the present decade, while the level of trust in the Portuguese parliament is below that found in southern, central or northern Europe, it remains much higher than in eastern Europe and is also higher than the rates encountered in some countries with a long democratic tradition (such as the United Kingdom and Italy). Apart from the presidency, the parliament is the institution in which the Portuguese place most trust (ahead of the government and, particularly, the political parties).

The authors also note the trust the Portuguese have in parliament as an institution is greater than the trust they have in their parliamentarians, which is also confirmed for the other political institutions analysed. Noting also that there is a very important relationship between confidence in parliament and the ‘specific support’ given to many of the regime’s institutions, to the extent, they conclude, that any reform of the political system (with the intention of improving the relationship between the citizens and their elected representatives) must extend to the entire political system and not just involve parliament as an institution.

Finally, improved trust in parliament is associated with reduced support for single-party governments and greater support for coalitions. In other words, those who place most trust in the Assembly of the Republic are also those who wish to see that institution play a greater role in the operation of the political system.

In the second chapter, ‘New media, citizens and parliament in Portugal: The continued e-democracy gap
and lessons from the Obama experience’ by Carlos Cunha and Filipa Seiceira, the authors address two types of question.

Based on the 2008 survey of deputies that is compared with a 2001 survey with the same questions, Cunha and Seiceira analyse developments in the use of information and communication technologies by Portuguese deputies. They conclude that between 2001 and 2008 there was an increase in the use of these tools both for horizontal (parliamentary staff and party members, etc.) and vertical (voters) communication, although the use of these tools for horizontal communication was much greater than for vertical (in both 2001 and 2008). Age, rather predictably, seemed to be the main differentiating factor in the use of information and communication technologies by Portuguese deputies, with younger deputies more likely to take advantage of the technology than their older peers.

As noted in the second part of the chapter, which analyses the use of information and communication technologies Barak Obama’s election campaigns, Portugal still has a long way to go if it wants to take full advantage of the possibilities these new technologies offer to reform the political representation process and improve efficiency in meeting the citizens’ demands.

In final chapter in this first part, ‘The participation of citizens and parliamentarians in voluntary associations’ by José Manuel Leite Viegas and Susana Santos, examines the links between voters and their elected representatives from the aspect of connections with different voluntary organisations (professional organisations, trade unions, employers’ groups, recreational, cultural, religious or
philanthropic associations and civic and political organisations, etc.).

The analysis is based on a comparison of the results of the 2008 surveys. After separating the many voluntary associations into three basic groups (‘new social movements’, ‘social integration’ and ‘pressure group’), and analysing the trends in participation in these associations between 2001 and 2008, the authors compare voters and elected representatives in respect of both the extent of their participation and the differential associative anchorage of citizens and elected representatives according to their ideological or party identity/membership.

In respect of the differential participation of voters and elected representatives, the authors confirm the latter participate in voluntary associations to a much greater degree than the former.

Differences in the levels of education is only one part of the explanation for this difference, and even when we compare elected representatives only with those citizens who have completed higher education, the deputies are still more likely to be involved in voluntary associations than voters. Nevertheless, the authors argue this result can only be fully understood if to the level of education is added the social and political capital participation in voluntary associations provides members of parliament—particularly as political representatives. For this reason participation in voluntary associations is very important for their political development and careers.

As for the connection between ideological identity and participation in voluntary associations, the statistically significant relationships are related to participation in trade
unions (more associated with the left: citizens and elected representatives), ‘civic action organisations’ (more associated with the left: elected representatives) and religious associations and sports clubs (more associated with the right: elected representatives). However, the authors demonstrate that the involvement of voters and elected representatives in voluntary associations is an important aspect of both the political representation process and of the social anchorage of ideologies and party identities.

The second part of the book, ‘Ideology, European integration and political representation’, focuses on the congruence between voters and elected representatives (following the model presented by Miller and Stokes)—not only in matters of ideology in its true sense (the position of citizens and elected representatives in a left-right dimension, but also on the ‘libertarian versus authoritarian’ axis), as in the case in the chapter by André Freire with Ana Belchior, but also in terms of the preferences regarding the basic guidelines that public policy in Portugal must follow, as in the chapter by Ana Belchior with André Freire.

The first chapter of the second part is titled ‘Ideological representation in Portugal: Congruence between deputies and voters in terms of their left-right placement and its substantive meaning’. While concentrating on the Portuguese case Freire and Belchior examine a fundamental question that has been unresolved in the empirical literature on political representation: to what extent can the study of congruence resorting to the use of the placement of the voters and elected representatives in a
left-right dimension (scale) be taken as a good indicator of congruence on matters of substantive political preferences?

To answer this the authors compare both the ideological placement of the electors and deputies on a left-right scale (making use of the two surveys carried out in 2008), and their placement on several themes of a more socio-economic nature (social inequalities, the role of the state in the market, etc.), or of a more socio-cultural nature (themes normally associated with libertarianism versus authoritarianism, the liberalisation of customs, attitudes towards immigration and authority, etc.).

The aim of the chapter is to ‘ascertain whether the levels of congruence (or lack thereof) are similar across both measures: when using self-placement on the left or the right scale and when opting for substantive political preferences’. As a consequence of its particular characteristics, the Portuguese case is able ‘to indicate up to what point we may or may not use congruence in the left-right self-placement as a valid alternative measure in the assessment of congruence in relation to political preferences’ in a general sense.

The chapter concludes there are significant differences between the ideological placement of voters and elected representatives on the left-right scale and on preferences on matters related to public policy, whether on the extent and pattern of competition/conflict (socio-economic themes) or on the degree, pattern of competition/conflict and direction (socio-cultural themes). Moreover, the correlation between the ideological placement and the meaning of the left-right division are different for voters and deputies. Consequently, the authors conclude the use of the left-right
scale as a proxy for the analysis of congruence between voters and elected representatives on public policy matters is not entirely adequate.

The following chapter, ‘Political representation in Portugal: Congruence between deputies and voters in terms of policy preferences’, is an examination of congruence on public policy rather than on political placement.

In this chapter Belchior and Freire undertake analyse the preferences of Portuguese voters and elected representatives on several substantive policy topics grouped into socio-economic (traditionally linked to the left-right division) and socio-cultural themes (traditionally associated with the libertarian-authoritarian division).

The authors conclude that despite the differences between voters and the elected representatives in the structure of preferences the truth is that there are very important similarities—notably with the presence of two dimensions very strongly organised around the role of the state (and of the private sector) in education and health and also around libertarian-authoritarian themes.

Generally speaking, on socio-economic matters there is a greater degree of polarisation between the elected representatives (than between voters), while in socio-cultural matters the elected representatives are much closer to the libertarian end of the scale and the voters closer to the authoritarian pole. As for an explanation for the preferences on public policy matters, the authors note ideology weighs heavier with the elected representatives than with the represented: even when the latter’s level of political involvement is taken into account.
The authors conclude that ‘These findings generally correspond to a positive perspective on political representation, showing that elected representatives and voters share similar perspectives over the political map in Portugal in terms of policy preferences, although their respective causal explanations rest sometimes on different grounds’.

The final chapter in the second part focuses on the congruence between voters and elected representatives on European matters. Using data from the 2008 surveys, ‘Assessing voter and elected representative support for Europe: The case of Portugal’ by Catherine Moury and Luís da Sousa analyses linkages on European matters (European policy, enlargement, the Reform Treaty, etc.). Their study confirms elected representatives are generally more pro-integration than voters; however, it also reveals the degree of difference is much smaller than is generally believed and that among both the elected representatives and the voters there is a great deal of support for the process of European integration. Further, voters are more in favour of European enlargement than deputies.

In general there is greater polarisation among the elected representatives than among voters on European matters, a result that is also encountered in relation to ideology (left-right). The greatest difference between voters (more pro-European) and the elite (more Euro-sceptic) is within the radical left-wing parties (the Left Bloc and the Portuguese Communist Party), also evident at the ideological level, as the representatives of these parties are much further to the left than those who vote for them. Overall, Moury and Sousa find that on European matters
the differences between the elites and the voters are largely a result of information and political interest.

The third part of this book is concerned with ‘institutional reform and deliberative democracy’. The three chapters forming this section, based on the two surveys carried out in 2008 while making use of other survey material, focus on the attitudes of voters and their elected representatives towards deliberative democracy and the reform of political institutions.

The first of these chapters, ‘Institutional reform in Portugal: From the perspective of deputies and voters’, by André Freire and Manuel Meirinho seeks to analyse the electorate’s involvement in the process of reforming political institutions in general and of the electoral system in particular.

While existing literature on electoral reform deals primarily with processes led by elites, the truth is dissatisfaction with the operation of the political system in general and the electoral system in particular is often behind calls for electoral reform—at least as the touch paper beginning the process (the ‘input’ in the systemic model of the production of public policies). In effect, projects for reforming the Portuguese electoral system have always noted the discontent and criticism expressed by the Portuguese people in relation to politics and politicians, and to the growing disinterest in politics (abstention, etc.) many voters betray in relation to many political matters as some of the reasons for embarking upon institutional reform.

Based on a comparison of around 35 countries, this chapter notes the degree of dissatisfaction with the
Portuguese political representation process is very high, comparatively speaking. It also finds this dissatisfaction is positively correlated with support for institutional reform, particularly with support for the eventual personalisation of the vote (i.e. to vote for the person rather than the party: preferential vote, etc.).

The chapter also notes that within the large parties (the Socialists and the Social Democrats) there is an incongruity between the electorate (which favours consensual democracy resulting in coalition governments, etc.) and the elected representatives (who favour majoritarian democracy resulting in strong one-party majority governments), which can cause problems should the case for reform move in the direction favoured by the elites rather than that of the electorate.

In Portugal’s tenth legislature all parties represented in parliament gave their overwhelming support to proportionality, which although contrary to the stance previously taken by deputies of the large parties, could eventually help impede the emergence of any majoritarian temptation.

Finally, this chapter notes that deputies are very divided in respect of the most desirable route to electoral reform, which is particularly true for deputies of the Socialist and Social Democratic parties, and which may be the reason for the many failed attempts at reforming the electoral system.

The following chapter, ‘Portugal’s 2006 quota/parity law: An analysis of the causes for its adoption’ by Michael Baum and Ana Espírito-Santo, which makes use of a wide range of data in addition to the 2008 surveys and focuses
on the reasons for the 2006 adoption of the ‘quota’ or ‘parity’ law.

The authors test several hypotheses relating to the many potential sets of factors explaining the change: the role of publicists and the debate in the mass media, the role of agents of civil society, the role of party leaders, the effect of international influences, and the role of national constitutional or political factors.

Baum and Espírito-Santo conclude that while the Portuguese are largely in favour of the system of quotas, this subject held no great importance for them and for this reason public opinion played a limited role in the process, as did the women’s organisations, which are known to be very weak in Portugal. On the other hand, the part played by the Left Bloc and the Socialist Party, and the international influences exerted by their sister parties, was crucial. Similarly, the institutional context (the closed list system of proportional representation) and the mass media (which in 2006 was mainly in favour) were also important factors.

The final chapter of the book, ‘Democratic deliberation: The attitudes of deputies and voters’, by José Viegas and Sandra Carvalho, examines the question of congruence between the electors and the elected representatives in respect of democratic deliberation.

Making use of the 2008 surveys, then presenting a typology incorporating several dimensions of democratic deliberation anchored in the literature on the topic, Viegas and Carvalho conclude ‘both the deputies and the citizens showed themselves to be mainly in favour of the procedures and principles of democratic deliberation,
particularly in the dimensions of respect and consideration for the opinions of others. On the other hand, they also show themselves to be more divided when defending the common good. With respect to the scale of the accommodation neither group seems to have a predominant position.

However, there are many incongruities between the voters and the elected representatives from the different parties: incongruities that vary in accordance with the scale of the deliberation. For example, in relation to ‘respect and consideration for the opinion of others’ the biggest difference is between Socialist Party voters/sympathisers and deputies, with the latter holding views that are much closer to supporting deliberation than the former.

In relation to the principle of ‘protecting the common good’, once again there is a discrepancy between the Socialist Party’s deputies—who are more in favour of giving this principle priority in the deliberative process—and those who vote for the party; moreover this discrepancy between the elected representatives and the electorate is also found—albeit to a lesser degree—with the Social Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party.

As for the principle of being ‘open to participation (listening to others)’, deputies of the left-wing parties (Socialist Party, Portuguese Communist Party and the Left Bloc)—and particularly those from the Left Bloc and the Portuguese Communist Party—are much more in favour of ‘listening to the people and the associations’ during the deliberation process than their sympathisers.
Finally, the majority of deputies on all sides of parliament—with the exception of the Left Bloc—are opposed to an ‘opening up to participation (independent lists for the Assembly of the Republic)’, which is an idea that has found much favour among the electorate. On this it is the Left Bloc’s deputies who have more in common with will of the electorate, and particularly with the opinion of their own voters. In a transversal form, there are many points of convergence between the voters and their elected representative on many other issues.

It has already been noted that in Portuguese political science this is a pioneering work introducing a new fundamental dimension to the study of political representation.

The conclusions drawn do not differ much in important and comparable material from the results obtained in many other countries. Despite the many significant differences between the countries, the structure of the preferences of the elected representatives and the electorate is almost identical. Ideologically, there is greater congruity between voters and elected representatives on socio-economic matters than there is on socio-cultural issues. In respect of ideology and substantive policy preferences, the greatest gap between electors and the elected appear within the smaller parties integrated into the so-called ‘radical left’. Pro-Europeanism is generally more pronounced among deputies than it is among voters.

Nevertheless, there remain several elements to be examined and explained through future research. Let us see here what remains to be done.
First, there needs to be a systematic comparison of the political representation process—particularly in terms of the congruence between voters and their elected representatives—that compares what happens in Portugal with what happens in other European countries. We hope this work can begin soon, especially given the integration of the present project in the Parliamentary Representation at the European and National Levels and the Comparative Candidate Survey networks.

Second, it is necessary to understand (also through comparative study) the impact of institutional and political conditions (particularly the electoral system) on the attitudes and behaviour of deputies, as well as the way in which they relate with their electorate. That is to say, it is necessary to engage in a comparative study of the impact of institutional and political conditions on the political representation process.

Third, chapters five and six show there is generally greater congruity between the electors and their elected representatives on socio-economic matters than on socio-cultural ones. In relation to the former, where the Portuguese electorate demonstrates a clearly left-wing inclination (with a very large percentage of voters favouring policies to combat social inequality, the equalisation of living conditions and opportunities, and the state’s primary role in society and the economy, particularly over matters of health, education and social security). The parties of the left (the Socialist Party and to a lesser degree the Left Bloc and the Portuguese Communist Party) are closest to their electorate (than the parties of the right), and even to the average voter.
On the other hand, in relation to the majority of socio-cultural matters, the Portuguese show a tendency towards conservatism (closer to the authoritarian end of the scale). On these matters it is generally the parties of the right (the Social Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party) that are closest to their electorate and to the average voter.

Nevertheless, for both the former and the latter set of themes, the differences between the voters and their elected representatives are not very large (although they do vary according to topic and the ideological camp to which the parties belong), and it is therefore possible for us to state that, taken as a whole, the quality of political representation in Portugal is very reasonable. However, having said this, we are left with a puzzle future research must seek to solve: despite the comfortable levels of congruity between voters and their elected representatives on matters of public policy (and ideology), it remains a fact the level of dissatisfaction felt by the Portuguese electorate in respect of the functioning of the democratic regime had by 2008 reached its highest level since 1985 and was above the average level of the approximately 30 countries with which it has been compared (see chapter eight).

Here we can suggest some explanatory hypotheses that can assist with future research in this area. First, despite the reasonable degree of agreement on matters public policy and ideology, there is also a large degree of discord between the voters and their elected representatives on institutional matters (type of government: the former prefer coalitions, while the latter prefer majority administrations), which may in some way explain some of the dissatisfaction
with the political system. This problem is particularly important for the left since although left-wing voters want the parties of the left to come to an understanding, they have not been able to form governing coalitions (most significantly in the present 11th legislature) (see Freire forthcoming; 2011).

Second, the closed list system of proportional representation used in Portugal (and which has been criticised by an electorate that has to date been unable to change the status quo on the part of the parties) is associated with strict voting discipline and the submission of the deputies to their respective party leaderships, particularly to the prime minister (in the case of the party or parties supporting the government). As a result of this system it is possible the deputies’ preferences on matters of public policy do not have as much force in the determination of policy as would be desirable (and expected), resulting in a significant discrepancy between the parliamentary deputies’ preferences and the policies effectively pursued (and guided through parliament by the party leadership and the government).

Third, we need to be aware the questions used to measure the agreement between the voters and their elected representatives on political (and ideological) matters may contain some methodological weaknesses that requires revalidation in future studies: the questions are records of statements of preferences (sometimes adjusted by respondents to the socially desirable) and are not necessarily effective guidelines. Some questions relate to political goals while others are concerned with the means of achieving them, with the political competition
concentrating on the latter (the means of achieving goals) rather than on the former. These are all things that need to be studied and clarified.

Fourth, we examine representation largely from the congruence point of view, saying nothing about the causal nexus (bottom-up or top-down) dominating the representation process. In other words, we need evolutionary/diachronic analyses of the political representation process if we are to understand if the Portuguese process is bottom-up—from the voters to the representatives—or top-down—from the representatives to the voters—or, indeed, a combination of both. Such an undertaking will quite clearly require a new version of this project.

Finally, although this list of suggestions for further research is very far from exhaustive, a fifth idea that would be interesting for further research is an expansion of the analysis of the processes of the political representation of legislators (deputies) within the national parliament and, eventually, to the regional and/or local representatives. To do this in the future will require a completely remodelled version of this project.
References


PART ONE
Introduction

In this chapter, we will analyse both the trends in levels of trust in national parliaments across Europe and the individual determinants for trust in the Spanish, Italian and Portuguese parliaments.

To do so, we seek to integrate two theoretical and research perspectives not normally associated with the study of parliamentary institutions. The first concentrates on the study of the citizens’ attitudes and political behaviour to understand the causes and consequences of the growing erosion of public support for democratic institutions. The other concentrates on studying the role of parliaments and is concerned with the decline and transformation of legislatures. Given the more detailed and more readily available empirical information for the Portuguese case, we will attempt to discover if, and to what extent, the trust Portuguese citizen’s place in their
parliament is associated with their views on its roles and functions.

**The triumph of the democratic regime and the erosion of public support for political institutions**

As the wave of democratisation spread to new countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, during the last two decades of the twentieth century, there was a renewed and growing optimism about the democratic process in general.

This was so even when it was only possible to talk about half of the countries in the world possessing genuinely democratic institutions and procedures (Freedom House 2007). It is possible to speak of ‘formal democracies’, those with a set of basic rules establishing who is authorised to make decisions affecting the political collective and by what means, and ‘substantial democracies’ in respect of the content and application of these rules and procedures—while accepting that, given their essential identities, these two concepts have a common connotative element.

Some authors soon expressed concerns about the chances for the survival and consolidation of the new Eastern European democratic regimes—recalling their ‘Leninist legacy’ and their ‘weak democratic political cultures’ characterised by an ostentatious cynicism and deep scepticism towards the actors and the political institutions (among other things). Others, however, attracted by the perceived failure of liberal democracy’s rivals, preferred to see the hypothetical ‘end of history’ in
the emergence of these regimes (Rothschild and Wingfield 1993; Mishler and Rose 1994; Fukuyama 1992).

Whatever the reason, and regardless of the differences between the new democracies of Eastern Europe and the established ones in the industrialised West, by the end of the 1990s there was also—and apparently paradoxically—growing concern within the social sciences on themes of popular trust in political institutions. This was accompanied with a debate on the ‘quality of democracy’ within advanced democracies, in which it was argued they faced serious challenges and opportunities at the beginning of the millennium (Dalton 2004; Diamond and Morlino 2004a; 2004b; Diamond and Morlino 2005). Many authors effectively argued the advanced industrial democracies—largely because of the structural changes associated with the transition from industrial to post-industrial societies and because of the changes in values, attitudes and individual political behaviour that were taking place—were faced with a ‘malaise of the spirit’ that was confronting them with new challenges and threats.

According to some more recent studies, the causes of this ‘malaise’ were neither endogenous nor exogenous to the democracies, as had been the case at the beginning of the twentieth century. Rather, it was associated with their citizens, who were increasingly suspicious and critical of the way in which their political institutions operated and were equally cynical about the performance of their elected representatives (Dalton 1996).

If it is true these attitudes of institutional mistrust and political scepticism are at least partially due to the fact democracy is an essentially open and dynamic political
system, it is no less true that many of these attitudes are today the result of the citizenry’s increased critical consciousness and greater discontent before what Noberto Bobbio (1998) called ‘democracy’s failed promises’ and what Gianfranco Pasquino (1997) believes to be the specificities of a ‘demanding democracy’.

However, it is important to note that if, as Bobbio claims, many of these promises could not be delivered objectively (since they were mere illusions from the outset), there were other promises that either went unanswered or which encountered unforeseen obstacles. This being so, rather than talking of the ‘degeneration of democracy’—as those who share the Rousseauian notion of the ‘perfect fusion’ between democratic form and content—we must first examine the ‘quality of democracy’. We must seek whether, and to what extent, the translation of the abstract principles of democracy to the real world is not now accompanied by an increasing and worrying erosion in public support for it (Dalton 1999; Norris 1999).

Does this justify Russell Dalton’s comment that ‘we seemingly live in the best of times … and the worst of times for the democratic process’ (Dalton 2006: 245)?

**Between institutional centrality and functional decline: An equivocal opposition?**

Given the decline in trust citizens have for parliament in particular, the paradox Dalton identifies in relation to democracy can—and must—be extended to include this institution (Pharr, Dalton and Putnam 2000). This is so precisely because if there is a consensus parliament is an
institution that is central to modern democracy, with responsibility as the collective body and representative assembly to express the people’s will and hold the executive to account, then it is no more controversial to say this centrality to democratic political life has been frequently questioned by authors, essayists and political commentators who note and lament the decline of its traditional authority and status (Norton 1990).

It is important to begin by recognising that, in respect of the central role parliaments play within democratic regimes, it is also true they are not the only representational bodies and that there are other structures that are institutionalised to a greater or lesser extent. These range from the government to the parties and from the civil service to interest groups, all of which take part in the representative process or form independent representational circuits, the importance of which cannot be ignored. However, it remains true that parliament’s specific representational function means it is difficult to replace it within the democratic model.

The importance parliament has within democratic regimes is not only a consequence of its elected and representational nature, since given its structure as an assembly these constitute the most propitious institutional context for the expression of a plurality of interests, opinion and points of view, while also providing mechanisms for the limitation of plurality, to the extent it tends to impede the development of more radical forms of contestation—either by contributing towards the ritualisation of the conflict or by encouraging cooperation (Barbera 1999; Di Micheli and Verzichelli 2004; Pasquino and Pellizo 2006).
It is also necessary to note that in addition to the institutional centrality of parliaments within contemporary democracies the contiguity that exists between these concepts and the reality, which helps explain why through the successive transformations and metamorphoses of democratic government, it has always sought—and in a very particular fashion—the parliamentary institution, declaring the risk of its decline to be its perennial crisis (Manin 1998).

During the period of transition from ‘liberal parliamentarism’ to ‘party democracy’ many authors lamented what they believed to be the end of the parliamentary ‘golden age’, noting with pessimistic and disenchanted voice the sign of their decadence and their many illnesses (Bryce 1921). This criticism became more incisive and acute during the inter-war period, reaching its most systematic form in the works of such writers as Carl Schmitt (1998 [1923]).

The debate about the decline of parliaments continued through the second half of the twentieth century (Packenham 1970; Kornberg 1973; Loewenberg and Patterson 1979) and is still alive today, with new arguments being added to the old (Norton 1990; 1998; 2002; Burns 1999; Bandeira 2005; Pasquino and Pellizzo 2006). Obsessed with the role of the political parties and the predominance of the executives, a significant part of the literature is almost entirely concerned with the decline of parliament in modern democracies, insisting they have progressively (and worryingly) lost many of their traditional roles (Norton 1990).
In this area of political theory and research, which experienced renewed momentum as a result of the spread of democratic institutions during the last decade of the twentieth century, there are two frequently asked questions: what purpose do parliaments actually serve, and to what extent do parliaments contribute to strengthen democracy within contemporary political systems?

The responses to these questions have addressed the functions attributed by the specialist literature on modern parliaments, frequently leaving to one side the necessary debate between normative and empirical theory, or in other words, ignoring the debate between the analysis of the functions prescribed by the former and the actual functions observed by the latter.

Our starting point should be to acknowledge both that parliaments do not just make laws and that laws are not only made by parliaments (Pasquino 2002; Pasquino and Pellizo 2006). As Pasquino notes, the ‘complete identification of parliaments with the legislative role is as misleading as the complete identification of governments with the executive functions’, to the extent we risk overlooking the other important roles exercised by parliament and speak unreasonably about its supposed decline because we underestimate its real significance within modern democratic systems (Pasquino 2002).

In respect of the legislative role, although the liberal tradition of the separation of powers has remained unaltered in the constitutional texts, it must be recognised that today it is mainly governments that make laws in order to realise the promises they make in their election manifestos, leaving parliament with the task of keeping
some form of control over the legislative output; that is, over the laws submitted for its approval, which thus assume a more important role in the final deliberation phase.

Indeed, given the government normally forms the parliamentary majority, legislative activity must largely be understood as a tool for the application of a political programme, the responsibility for which lies with the government and which is the result of manifest promises by the party or coalition that won the election (Norton 1998). This means if the government cannot make (or unmake) laws without parliamentary approval, then parliament cannot make its own laws without the support of the government or, except in very exceptional cases, against its wishes.

Hence, and in relation to the legislative role, instead of asserting modern parliaments do not legislate and reiterating the thesis of the ‘legislative government’, it would be more accurate to accept they do both. This is particularly so when the actual circumstances of the ‘party government’ presuppose the governing party or parties impose discipline upon obedient deputies in order to ensure the success of the government’s legislative programme and manifesto promises, while the opposition also manages to secure the continued and disciplined support of its deputies, and thereby present itself as an organised alternative to the government (Bowler, Farrell and Katz 1999; Blondel and Cotta 2000).

Recognising the production of laws is neither the most important nor the most distinctive function of contemporary democratic parliaments (except in the case of the United States Congress and other similar presidential
regimes)—regardless of the historical changes that have taken place—is far from advancing a particularly new and original theory. It should be enough to recall that towards the end of the nineteenth century Walter Bagehot (1995 [1867]) claimed the production of laws was the least important of the British parliament’s roles.

However, it is possible the decline of parliaments can be measured by the production of laws, although this may not be the case when assessing their other basic roles, especially their ability to oversee government. It should be remembered the significance of parliament’s role in supervising governments is to an extent influenced by the historical context that gave rise to the modern parliament, which was marked by the problems of limiting and controlling monarchical power, with this latter being either formally or substantively separated.

With the ‘entry’ of government into the parliamentary sphere in Europe at the end of the nineteenth and the early decades of the twentieth centuries, continuing to view parliament and government as two distinct entities ceased to make sense when what was being demonstrated in reality was their inter-penetration rather than their separation. Thus, it became important to ask how the role of parliamentary supervision should now be interpreted.

First, in parliamentary systems the government should have the trust—explicit and implicit—of parliament, with the establishment of very close ties between it and the parliamentary majority (or the victorious minority). It is in this way the government becomes the expression of (the majority in) parliament, through the leadership it exercises
over the majority and, through them, over parliament as a whole (Parlement et gouvernement 1979).

It is from this that parliament’s oversight role—understood to be the public examination of the government’s activities—has become the main function of the opposition. This being the case, if it is the majority’s duty to publicly support the government, then it is the role of the parliamentary minority, using the instruments of supervision at its disposal and exercising its duty to publicly oppose the government—insofar as it seeks to prevent its re-election—to oversee and supervise the executive.

Having said this, it is perhaps worth noting it is both precipitate and inaccurate to claim the fusion of the parliamentary majority and the government removes from parliament its supervisory role. It is important to note that this is not the only place in which the majority can demonstrate its support for the government, and that it is also the place from which the opposition is able to exercise critical and active supervision.

In addition to the executive’s preponderance, the excessive authority extra-parliamentary party organisations exercise over the organisation and operation of parliament has also been seen to be one of the causes of the supposed and declared decline of the institution. In effect, in many democratic systems both the electoral procedure and the process of selecting candidates is controlled by the parties, which allows them to shape the representational role by allowing them to manage and discipline parliamentarians. However, here too we cannot ignore the fact the political class of a significant proportion of these parties, who were
born outside of and were often against parliament, have been progressively ‘parliamentarised’ (Best and Cotta 2000; Freire 2001, 2003; Teixeira 2009). Nor can we ignore the current tendency pointing towards the primacy of the parliamentary facets of many party organisations over their extra-parliamentary facets (Katz and Mair 1993; 2002).

From what has been said here we must conclude the thesis that parliaments are in decline, which has for so long dominated the specialist literature on this theme, has many insurmountable weaknesses. This is because from the outset it has been based on an ideal model constructed on a foundation of doctrinal conceptions dating back to the parliamentary ‘golden age’ rather than on empirical observations—and even when empirical observations are taken into account, the number of cases is limited and insufficient, to the extent it is wrong to use it to imply the existence of a general and transversal trend that invariably affects all European parliaments equally.

The weakness of this thesis becomes even more evident—as we will see—when we ask ‘who are the ‘beneficiaries’ of the decline of parliaments?’ Or, to put it another way, what exactly do we mean when we speak of the decline of parliament in favour of parties or government, when both the parties and the government (at least in parliamentary regimes) are not bodies clearly distinct from the legislative institution, since both are present and operate within parliament?

**From trust in the democratic institutions to trust in parliament**
Given the manifest scientific limitations of the thesis of the decline of parliaments that has occupied a large part of the literature on legislative studies during the last century, it is now crucial we understand what the new roles are these institutions perform within their present political systems, as this will help us explain their significance for democratic political life.

Rather than insisting on the excessive power of the parties and in the hegemonic position of the government within parliament—and consequently in the erosion of their traditional role—the most recent studies tend to pay attention to other functions that have until recently been neglected, but which are now believed to be central to the political system.

We refer of course to the ‘pedagogic role’ Bagehot spoke of in the nineteenth century. It is the role contemporary parliaments assume through the work they carry out both in plenary session and in commissions to educate the public to better understand the complex nature of politics, of the decision-making processes and in the choices between alternative public policies (Bagehot 1995 [1867]).

We are also referring to the legitimation role as conceived by Robert Packenham (1970), Michael Mezey (1979) and Philip Norton (2002), and which has become parliament’s most important role both in terms of the mobilisation of consent during the period between elections by providing a permanent channel of communication between government and the electorate, and by providing a means for the direct and indirect resolution of problems and
appeals of society by legitimising decisions that have been made elsewhere.

This change of paradigm in the analysis of the role of parliament is missing one essential aspect related to the citizens’ support of parliament as an institution. This new understanding of the function of modern parliaments, which today are considered essential institutions in the creation of a support base for the democratic regime and for ensuring citizen consent to the resolutions of the executive—since the trust that is deposited with legislatures can reinforce the ‘diffuse support’ for the government. This begs the question: how can any parliament fulfil its essential role—legitimisation—if it cannot secure the support and trust of its citizens?

It is precisely this new understanding of the role of parliaments that places what had been a fundamental theme in the literature on political attitudes and behaviour at the centre of the literature on legislative studies: public support for democratic political institutions. Firmly on the agenda of researchers studying the institution of parliament is the need to integrate two previously distinct perspectives: the analysis of the role of parliament and public support for parliament (Leston-Bandeira 2002a; 2002b; 2003).

This chapter is just such an attempt to combine these two perspectives. Here we are principally concerned with discovering what explanations are presented in the literature in respect of the feeling of mistrust in political institutions in general and in parliament in particular.

We believe the literature can be divided into three theoretical approaches—or currents—each concerned mainly with either the importance of cultural attitudes and
values, diffuse support as opposed to specific support or the institutional rules. Below we provide a brief overview of all three.

**Institutional trust and political culture**

Some authors contend the erosion of trust in political institutions in advanced industrial democracies is a consequence of structural changes in political culture that are necessarily reflected at the level of the dominant pattern of political socialisation, and which consequently contribute to changes in the behaviour and the attitudes of citizens in relation to the political institutions and authorities.

From the ‘culturalist perspective’, developed largely by Ronald Inglehart, this demonstrates how the processes of socio-economic and cultural modernisation—which has affected all of Western Europe through its transformation from a set of industrial to post-industrial societies—has been responsible for some significant changes in the priorities and values of the citizens.

In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War this ‘silent revolution’ led to a decline in the materialist values found in societies affected by economic precariousness and physical insecurity, and which were consequently more concerned with economic well-being, order and authority, and a growth in the so-called post-material values shared by large sections of a population that had been socialised during a period of remarkable economic prosperity, physical security and peace, and
whose main concerns were the quality of life, freedom of expression and individual achievement (Inglehart 1997; 1990; 1977).

However, what most interests us is that, according to Inglehart, the transition between these two value systems has implications for many aspects of political life, particularly the better educated younger generation that is increasingly politically mobilised and aware and which tends to be more mistrustful and critical of traditional sources of religious or secular authority, believing them overly formal, hierarchical and bureaucratic.

The emergence of a ‘new participatory impetus’, which takes the form of demands for greater individual autonomy and expression in public life, and which makes increasing recourse to forms of political participation that are more independent and based less on external political mobilisation. The elite led and controlled political mobilisation thus tends to give way to a form of mobilisation led by citizens seeking to control the political elite.

It can be seen why, according to Inglehart, this structural change in political culture is at the root of a type of political participation that is increasingly expressed in non-conventional political activity, such as illegal demonstrations and strikes, claims and petitions, etc.

Institutional trust and social capital

Another explanatory thesis for the erosion of trust in democratic political institutions that can be said to fall within the ‘culturalist approach’ was developed by Robert
Putnam in his books dedicated to social capital, *Making democracy work* (1993) and *Bowling alone* (2000). Revisiting a concept that has been present in classical sociology from Weber to Durkheim and from Tocqueville to Bourdieu, Putnam’s approach shares the view the norms of reciprocity, interpersonal and institutional trust, and both the formal and informal civic networks existing within any given society will take on a decisive role in ensuring its democratic institutions function well. In short, Putnam believes ‘interpersonal relations count’, and that they can make all the difference to the democratic government performance.

In effect, what is being proposed is a type of virtuous circle social capital—in order to encourage mutual aid, to strengthen trust in each other and in institutions and to promote active involvement in voluntary associations—that contributes towards learning and adopting certain ‘civic virtues’ that will help improve the legitimacy, responsibility and efficiency of democratic institutions.

Putnam argues that over the last decades there has been a decline in the level of social capital within advanced industrial societies that can be explained by the break-down of the traditional family, uncontrolled urbanisation and the continued weakening of neighbourhood and community ties caused by the increasingly frenetic lifestyles imposed upon us by the requirements of modern societies, which is responsible for people’s growing isolation and the irreparable loss of social cohesion and solidarity. He also blames technological innovation, and in particular the harmful effect of mass communication and information technologies such as television and the internet, which have
contributed to the substitution of civic activities for ‘privatised’ and ‘individualist’ forms of leisure.

It is a series of causes aggravated by the important influence exposure to television assumes in the creation of a profoundly negative and highly critical view of political life, since it tends to concentrate on the type of information that is commercially appealing—meaning that in order to attract large audiences and to ensure it attracts advertisers, it yields easily to ‘political spectacle’ and clearly favours the superficial, the incidental and the scandalous.

Hence, and according to Putnam, all of these factors, in contributing to the decline of ‘social capital’, seriously harm the performance of the democratic political system while they simultaneously encourage the decline in public support for its central institutions.

Institutional trust and specific support

Without forgetting the profound socio-economic and cultural transformations that have taken place since the end of the Second World War, and the decisive role they played in changing attitudes and political behaviour within advanced industrial democracies, Dalton suggests this structural change to the political culture cannot by itself explain the increasing public mistrust in democratic institutions (Dalton 1996; 1999; Norris 1999).

Starting from the approach pioneered by David Easton (1965), then developed by many other authors, Dalton argues the current tendency must also be assessed in the light of the ‘diffuse support’ and the ‘specific support’ citizens concede to different political objects, particularly
to the political community, to the political regime (norms, processes and institutions) and to the authorities or holders of political offices. It is precisely this type of approach that allows Dalton and others to argue empirically that the erosion of trust in institutions and authorities in the majority of advanced industrial democracies is simultaneous with the growing support for democracy, with other regime types being merely residual.

Having said this, however, we concentrate on the difference between the concepts of ‘diffuse support’ and ‘specific support’ in order to assess to what extent the latter is directly related to mistrust in political institutions in general and in parliament in particular.

The notion of ‘diffuse support’ refers to the normative adhesion created by the political institutions as such, or in other words, to the intrinsic value attributed to them by the citizens and to their unwillingness to accept changes that may compromise their performance, independently of any benefits or specific advantages they may at any given moment obtain as a consequence of their decisions.

The concept of ‘specific support’ reflects the degree of satisfaction with the actual performance and outputs of the political institutions and, consequently, depends on the assessment the citizens make of the responses to their demands and to the manner in which the costs and benefits are distributed among the population at any given moment.

Many authors believe there are powerful reasons to accept that the mistrust in political institutions is largely the result of the decrease in ‘specific support’ dictated by economic factors associated with the citizens’ assessment of the sitting government and its performance, as well as
their appraisal of the economy and of economic trends, particularly during periods of crisis or recession (Magalhães 2002; 2003). This is just as true in respect of many countries—Portugal included, as we will see below—in which trust in parliaments seems to be related with trust in governments, suggesting citizens do not always make a distinction between the roles of any particular institution, which is hardly surprising given the current tendency for parliaments to be ‘governmentalised’ (Norton 1998).

At this point we ought to state that in our essay we widen the approaches taken by the authors mentioned above and in particular address the question of trust in parliaments in Spain, Italy and Portugal.

**Dependent variable: Trust in national parliaments**

We use two types of empirical data to measure the trend in the level of trust in national parliaments in our set of European countries between 1981 and 2008: those produced under the aegis of the World Values Survey, and those obtained in the periodical Eurobarometer survey.

Table 2.1 shows how the citizens’ trust in the national parliaments in the different countries evolved. To assist with the analysis the countries are grouped into four regions: northern, eastern, southern and western Europe. The first conclusion that can be drawn from the data in this table is that levels of trust in national parliaments are relatively low, although in average terms they are higher in Northern and Central Europe, and much lower in Eastern Europe.
On the other hand, and still talking in average terms, analysis of the data allows us to identify a trend that cuts across all of the regions. Between 1981 and 1999, and 2000 and 2008 there was a general decline in the trust citizens had in their national parliaments, with the extent of this
Table 2.1: Trust in selected European parliaments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northern Europe average</strong></td>
<td><strong>55</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central Europe average</strong></td>
<td><strong>46</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
<td><strong>48</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southern Europe average</strong></td>
<td><strong>36</strong></td>
<td>–</td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eastern Europe average</strong></td>
<td><strong>47</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: The question in the World Values Survey measuring the degree of trust in parliament was framed as follows: ‘How much confidence do you have in parliament: is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all?’ In the Eurobarometer surveys the standard question measuring trust in national parliaments was, ‘Please tell me if you tend to trust or tend not to trust parliament?’
decline varying in each country. The decline was found in all regions, and was greater during the earlier period than during the later period being analysed here.

The analysis of Table 2.1 also shows that the level of trust the Portuguese had in their parliament was very similar to that found in Spain during these two periods, and slightly higher than that found in Italy or the United Kingdom—although all these countries have experienced a sharp decline in the level of trust during the past three decades.

**Figure 2.1: Degree of trust in political institutions.**

**Portugal 2002 (%)**

![Graph showing degree of trust in political institutions.](image)

**Source:** Freire et al. (2002).
**Note:** Excludes don’t knows and no replies.

Given this comparative trend, the data enables us to refute the idea, commonly accepted by some commentators and political observers, that one of the distinctive traits of Portuguese political culture—currently and historically—is
the tendency to devalue and underestimate the parliamentary institution.

Moreover, if, as we confirm, the comparative and longitudinal data prove the lie of the signs of this supposed ‘anti-parliamentarism’, the same is also true if we compare the trust Portuguese deposit with the main political institutions, using the data collected in the 2002 and 2008 questionnaires.

**Figure 2.2: Degree of trust in political institutions. Portugal 2008 (%)**

As Figures 2.1 and 2.2 demonstrate, among the political institutions considered in the 2002 and 2008 surveys, parliament enjoyed the second-highest level of trust (42.4 and 46 per cent, respectively) after the presidency, closely followed by support for the government (35 and 44.4 per cent, respectively).
cent) and very distant from the level of trust in the political parties, whose profoundly negative image is evident (24 and 29 per cent).

**Independent variables, hypotheses and interpretations**

Now that we have reviewed a number of the attempts to explain the erosion of trust in political institutions in general and in parliament in particular, it is necessary to test some hypotheses. We need to determine what the predictors of trust are in the parliaments of the three southern European countries being studied here. This will involve a linear regression analysis in which the independent (or explanatory) variables considered important theoretically are grouped into four sets.

In addition to gender, the first of the sets includes a group of variables related to resources and social integration, which are age, education, marital status, employment situation, objective social class and habitat. As we saw in Inglehart’s and Dalton’s cultural approaches, education is a factor favouring the adoption of a more critical and sceptical attitude towards traditional authority, which suggests those with higher levels of education will also be those who are most mistrustful of the political institutions.

As for age, where—according to the hypothesis inherent to Inglehart’s argument—we would expect the younger generations, those who have grown up during a period of economic prosperity and physical security, who have been guided by post-materialist values and who are therefore used to acting with greater freedom and with more opportunity to express themselves as individuals,
would be much more critical of and opposed to traditional political institutions. There is also a tendency, confirmed in many classical studies, for older people to place more trust in political and social institutions, whether for generational reasons or due to the longer period of political socialisation.

In respect of marital status and habitat, given the relationship Putnam described between the decline of social capital and social isolation as a result of the weakening of family and community bonds, we would expect those individuals who live alone or in more urbanised areas will tend to be less trustful of institutions.

Finally, the subjective social class will also affect levels of trust in parliament in one of two distinct manners. Taking into consideration the hypothesis related to the breaking of ‘specific support’, the lower a person’s own perception of their social class, the more unfavourable their attitude will be in relation to the operation of the political system and the performance of its institutions. If an individual’s social class can be regarded as an indicator of their prosperity and satisfaction with their standard of living, then this could also suggest a greater ‘specific support’ for democratic institutions.

The second set comprises a series of variables that are related to the individual’s values and political attitudes. Regarding the variable measuring the interest individuals have in political matters and the frequency with which they discuss politics and current affairs, expectations in relation to the direction of institutional trust tends to be ambiguous. While on the one hand, and according to the arguments presented by Inglehart and Dalton, it is to be expected the more politically aware and mobilised individuals will also
be those who are more demanding and critical of the performance of the political institutions, on the other it may also be that a greater interest in politics and the possession of greater cognitive resources are associated with a strong internal sense of political effectiveness and, therefore, have more trust in the institutions.

Both the feeling of internal efficacy (reflecting the perception citizens have of themselves as political actors capable of understanding what is happening in the political sphere and who are able to formulate their own independent opinions) and of external efficacy (reflecting the positive perception citizens have of the proximity and receptivity of politicians in relation to their interests, aspirations and opinions) are associated with greater levels of trust in institutions.

According to the view expressed by Putnam, it is only to be expected that exposure to television news results in higher levels of mistrust in institutions, taking into account the transformation of the television news agenda towards an ever more superficial, cynical and spectacular vision of political life.

As for expectations in relation to the individual’s ideological self-placement on the left-right scale, these suggest those who place themselves on the extremes of the ideological spectrum are those who tend to be least trusting of political institutions in general and of parliament in particular. The variable measuring how attached people are to post-materialist values must move in the direction of the hypotheses proposed by Inglehart in connection with the effects of the transition of the system of values in the attitudes individuals develop in relation to the institutions,
and which include elements of scepticism, criticism and cynicism.

The third set contains a group of variables that seek to determine the explanatory weight of ‘specific support’ on the degree of trust in parliamentary institutions. Here the expectations travel in the following direction: the greater the individual economic privation and the more unfavourable the assessment of the state of the economy and general performance of the government, the lower the levels of trust in political institutions, including in parliament.

The fourth set included in our linear regression analysis is deeply indebted to Putnam’s argument on the decline of social capital. We test the impact of the variables—social trust, political trust and civic associationism and activism—on trust in parliament. According to Putnam, this is to admit that either interpersonal trust or institutional trust—which are no more that the product of a ‘sufficiently virtuous’ society and, therefore, of a ‘public good’ accessible at the individual level—are associated with higher levels of trust in the political institutions in general. This can also be said of civic associationism and activism, or to use Putnam’s terminology, of ‘secondary social capital’, which is the product of relationships that emerge within and through participation in different types of associations.

Having outlined the independent (or explanatory) variables used in our analytical model, and having formulated our theoretical expectations for each of them, we now turn our attention to the results generated in each
set for each of the three countries being studied: Portugal, Spain and Italy.

Considering the variables aggregated in the first set, we note the values of explained variance are relatively low in each of the countries. This allows us to state that public trust in parliaments in the three southern European countries depends little on the resources and social integration of their citizens and their influence on political socialisation standards—causal factors that are not susceptible to short-term change. It is worth noting ‘age’ was a significant predictor in Spain and Portugal, which corroborates Inglehart’s view the younger generation tend to place less trust in parliament.

The variable ‘education’ had a significant explanatory value in Italy and Portugal, although in these cases it ran contrary to the theories advanced by Inglehart and Dalton in respect of the influence the level of education has on the amount of trust citizens place in political institutions. Those who most trust parliament are those with higher levels of education. In the Italian case, social class also can be said to be a predictor (although with weak explanatory power) of levels of trust in parliament, which suggests the level of trust increases as the respondents’ social status rises.

An examination of the results from the second set is somewhat more difficult when we recognise some of our initial expectations are not confirmed in the developed statistical model. First, while interest in politics is a powerful predictor of the levels of trust in parliament in the cases of Spain and Italy, this is not the case in Portugal where its explanatory value was much less significant.
While internal efficacy has no explanatory value in relation to the trust citizens place in the Assembly of the Republic in Portugal, this is not so in relation to external political efficacy. In this latter case the results are entirely in keeping with our expectations: the greater the perception politicians are open to the interests and opinions of the electorate, the higher the level of trust in parliament will be.

As we can see in Table 2.2, it is only in Italy that ideological self-placement on the left-right scale and post-materialism values represent powerful predictors of trust in the national parliament while in both cases, the direction of the determining coefficients also meet with our initial hypotheses: it is those citizens who position themselves more to the right of the political spectrum and who share post-material values rather that materialist ones who are least trusting of parliament. However, it is important to recognise that the weak explanatory value of predictors of trust in parliaments included in the first set are, except in the case of Portugal, poorly compensated by the political attitude variables of the second set.

Table 2.2 also shows the third set is the one in which the explained variance is most important in all three countries, and which shows that the individual-level determinants that more consistently and powerfully affect the trust citizens have in their national parliaments are associated with ‘specific support’. In respect of the trust in government and incumbents in the three countries, the direction of the causality is not only as expected, but it is also statistically more significant.
Table 2.2: Predictors of citizens’ trust in the parliaments of Spain, Italy and Portugal (2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Linear regression β coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model 1: Resources and social integration</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (a)</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.107***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status (b)</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective social class</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habitat</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model 2: Attitudes and political integration</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in /discuss politics</td>
<td>0.127***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal efficacy</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External efficacy</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure TV news</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological self-placement</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-materialism index</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2_{\text{change}}$</td>
<td>[0.020]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model 3: Specific support</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment status (c)</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in government</td>
<td>0.548***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for incumbents (d)</td>
<td>0.065**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of government’s performance</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of country’s economy</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2_{\text{change}}$</td>
<td>[0.260]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model 4: Trust and social networks</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social trust (e)</td>
<td>0.053*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in institutions</td>
<td>0.314***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/activism</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2_{\text{change}}$</td>
<td>[0.079]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes: The dependent variable is ordinal and measures the degree of trust citizens have in parliament, where 1=no trust and 4=much trust. The cells in this table show the standard coefficients of the linear regression analysis (β). Levels of statistical significance are: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, n.s.= not significant. Don’t know and no reply responses are included in the analysis and treated statistically using the regression imputation method. Dummy variables are coded as follows: (a) 0=male, 1=female; (b) 0=others, 1=married/civil partnership; (c) reference category is being in paid employment; (d) 0=did not vote for the governing party in the most recent elections, 1=voted for the governing party in the most recent elections; (e) 0=most people are not trustworthy, 1=most people are trustworthy. The highest value of the variance inflation factor was 1.960, which suggests there are no problems of multicollinearity. n.a.=not applicable: the information was not found among the variables.


Considering the variables only included in the Portuguese case, and for which we have data, the suggestion that indicators of ‘specific support’ represent the best predictors of trust in parliament seems to gain renewed strength, with assessment of the government’s performance and, particularly, the evaluation of the state of the country’s economy, also being as expected.

In the fourth set of variables we note that, with the exception of Italy, this is where the rise of the coefficient of determination (R²) is greatest. However, it remains far short of that found in the third set, which includes variables linked to ‘specific support’. In relation to the variables considered in this set, which are derived from social capital theories, we ought to note that only institutional trust represents a powerful predictor of the amount of trust citizens have in their legislative body—with this being more evident in Spain and Portugal than in Italy.

As far as the Portuguese case is concerned, these conclusions cannot but give rise to a certain pessimism in respect of the extent to which trust in the parliamentary
institution is far from being independent of the trust citizens place in the entire set of political institutions, such as is found still closely associated with the country’s economic situation and the general assessment of the government at any moment.

These are aspects, the alteration of which do not fall safely within the reach of the political will of any ‘reformers’, and which question the relationship of cause and effect—insistently and frequently—established between ‘parliamentary reform’ and the improvement of its image and credibility in the eyes of public opinion, whether through the strengthening of its powers of legitimation and bringing parliament closer to civil society (Barreto 1990; 1992; Leston-Bandeira 1998; 2002a; 2002b; 2003), whether through reform of the electoral system in order to reduce the excessive power the party apparatuses have over representation, to bring the elected and the electorate closer together.

The impasses that have characterised the many attempts to reform the Portuguese electoral system, and which have been hotly debated within political and academic circles, are both well-known and well-documented (Faculdade de Direito de Coimbra 1998; Cruz 1998; Freire, Meirinho and Moreira 2008). How well-known is it that all these attempts failed because of a lack of agreement between the two main parties? The postponement of this long-awaited reform apparently contributed to increasing criticism of the Portuguese parliament (Leston-Bandeira 2003); however, it remains to be seen if this reform alone will be enough to improve parliament’s public image.
Attitudinal correlates of trust in the Portuguese parliament

Considering the case of Portugal only, since we do not have comparable data for Spain or Italy, we are interested in discovering to what extent the level of trust in parliament affects the public’s view of its main functions. We believe analysis of this question will help us understand a little better if the modest levels of trust in the Portuguese parliament are due to the fact, as Leston-Bandeira argues, ‘they know very little about it’ (2002b; 2003).

In the following tables we compare the proportion of respondents sharing a number of opinions on the role and function of the Portuguese parliament in accordance with their tendency to either trust or mistrust it. Using Kendall’s tau-b coefficients we test the existing correlation between trust in parliament and the public’s perception of its functions.

Table 2.3 shows that around 51 per cent of Portuguese disagree with the comment ‘legislation reflects the interests of the majority of citizens’, a figure that ranges between 62 and 40 per cent for respondents who do not trust and who do trust parliament, respectively. Thus, the idea that the Portuguese Assembly of the Republic is a representative body par excellence for all citizens is mainly supported by those who already trust it. This is also evident for the second item in the table, where the degree of agreement with the statement ‘too much attention is paid to private interests in the making of laws’, is statistically significant.
Table 2.3: Public perception of the role of parliament according to citizens’ levels of trust (2008) (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tend to mistrust</th>
<th>Tend to trust</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Legislation reflects the interests of the majority of citizens</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree + completely disagree</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree + agree completely</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>1 217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Tau-b</em></td>
<td>0.214**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Private interests have too much influence in the making of laws</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree + completely disagree</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree + agree completely</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1 199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Tau-b</em></td>
<td>-0.113**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Debates in the parliament inform the citizens</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree + completely disagree</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree + agree completely</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>1 176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Tau-b</em></td>
<td>0.174**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Democratic debate needs confrontation in order that everyone can express and defend their ideas</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree + completely disagree</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree + agree completely</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>1 261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Tau-b</em></td>
<td>0.145**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; n.s.= not significant

If institutional trust is far from being irrelevant in relation to the public understanding of parliament’s traditional role as the legislature, this is also true in relation to its informative, pedagogic and deliberative functions. There is also a positive and statistically important correlation between the degree of trust in the Portuguese
parliament and the perception citizens have of its ‘strategic functions’. In truth, it was those respondents who placed more trust in the Assembly of the Republic who were more convinced debates within parliament (74 per cent) and the confrontation of ideas that characterises it (59 per cent) contributed to providing citizens with information and explanations.

Table 2.4: Public perceptions of the relationship between parliament and government according to citizens’ levels of trust (2008) (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred government formation</th>
<th>Tend to mistrust</th>
<th>Tend to trust</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single party</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tau-b</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.113**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>It is important for the government to have a parliamentary majority</th>
<th>Tend to mistrust</th>
<th>Tend to trust</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tau-b</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.056*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Should there be no absolute parliamentary majority, the party called to form a government must</th>
<th>Tend to mistrust</th>
<th>Tend to trust</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Make issue-by-issue agreements</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form a coalition</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govern alone</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tau-b</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.097**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; n.s.= not significant.

In Table 2.4 we seek to discover what effect trust in the Portuguese parliament has on the people’s understanding of the relationship between the legislature and executive. The data suggests those respondents who have most trust in
parliament are also those who are least in favour of majority governments formed by a single party (40 per cent compared to 51 per cent), who believe a parliamentary majority is less important (51 per cent compared to 57 per cent) and who think that when no party has an absolute majority the winning party must form a coalition (45 per cent compared to 37 per cent).

With this in mind, we believe it would be accurate to say trust in the Portuguese parliament ‘makes a difference’, since it is among those who trust it that the view the fusion of government and parliament need not represent the legislature’s political subjugation to the executive is evident (Barreto 1990; 1992).

**Final considerations**

Beginning with the view it is necessary to integrate two apparently distinct theoretical approaches to the study of parliament as an institution, one concentrating on examining the parliament’s functions (and which dominates the literature on legislative studies) and another examining public support for the democratic regime and its institutions (and which dominates the literature on political attitudes and behaviour), we have analysed both the level of trust in parliament from a comparative perspective and identified the individual determinants (or predictors) of this trust from both the synchronic and the comparative perspective, albeit one that was limited to Spain, Portugal and Italy.

In relation to trust in parliamentary institutions across Europe, we can affirm these are relatively modest levels, registering a decline that became more marked between the beginning of the 1980s and the end of the 1990s than
between 2000–04 and 2005–08. About the Portuguese case, we also noted that there is a relatively modest level of trust in parliament. However, this fact does not allow us to confirm Portugal’s allegedly ‘anti-parliamentarian’ political culture, which also finds no support in the comparative perspective: the low levels of trust in parliament we found in Portugal, vis-à-vis the higher averages we found in Northern Europe, are nevertheless well above the averages in Eastern Europe, and even above or very close to those found in countries like the United Kingdom and Spain.

As for the individual-level determinants of trust in parliaments—in the cases of Spain, Portugal and Italy—the main conclusion to be drawn is that the factors associated with ‘specific support’ and the factors linked to ‘institutional trust’ contribute most towards an explanation for levels of trust in parliament as an institution. Overall, there are reasons for some optimism: these are all aspects which politicians can alter either by political reform, to bring parliaments and political institutions more closer to citizens and civil society, and/or by increasing the performance of the political system and the macro-economic performance of the country, thus boosting citizens’ trust in political institutions, in general, and in parliaments, in particular.
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3 New media, citizens, and parliament in Portugal: the continued e-democracy gap and lessons from the Obama experience

Carlos Cunha and Filipa Seiceira

Introduction

Our goal is to analyse the use Portugal’s members of parliament make of information and communication technologies in their daily work and their views on the role these technologies play in a democratic system.

In a previous article, one of the authors discussed the origins of what was labelled the e-democracy gap in Portugal (Cardoso, Cunha and Nascimento 2006). Here we revisit this issue to see how, if at all, the situation has changed. That article argued against the belief of several members of parliament that weak vertical communication between the elected and the electors resulted from the small number of internet users, the weak participatory quality of the citizens and insufficient secretarial support (although we recognise the latter continues to be a problem).

However, a 2009 Hansard Society report presents a similar e-democracy gap in the United Kingdom, a country that does not suffer from the above problems (Williamson 2009). Therefore, the roots of the participatory deficit must be deeper than the arguments the Portuguese members of
parliament offered. We suggest comparative analysis needs to be carried out throughout Europe on this issue to ascertain how many nations suffer from the problem and what its root causes are: and if they do not have the problem, then why that might be.

Because adaptation to information and communication technologies must be viewed from a broader perspective, we demonstrate that not only are there varied examples of civic participation via these technologies between citizens and parliament, but there is also an absorption of information and communication technologies use in the routines and management of parliamentary functions by many of those entrusted with those duties in the last few Portuguese legislatures.

Our thesis is that information and communication technologies, under the current methods of the media’s political institutional integration, enables an increase in public participation vis-à-vis democratic institutions such as parliament, so long as the politicians’ attitudes toward the public—and of the latter toward the former—change. Again, to what extent, if at all, is this occurring?

Generally, previous comparative West European results show parliamentarians were still in an exploratory phase in the exploitation of the full range of these new technologies to support their parliamentary and partisan activity, to the extent privileged traditional media (television, radio and newspapers) were still favoured for political communication.

Representatives concentrated primarily on internal communication (between deputies of the same party and/or with the party structure), especially via email, and not so much on external communication with constituents.
Members of parliament resisted seriously considering electronic public participation, whether via email or online forums, for several reasons, including the difficulty of responding to the volume of requests, the quality of the messages sent by the public and the problem of internet access that restricted its use to a portion of the population (all legitimate concerns) (Cunha, Cardoso and Nascimento 2004).

Has the emergence of Web 2.0 (Web 1.0 emphasises one-way communication while 2.0 focuses on two-way interactivity) and social media (the ability to share information with a social network as with Facebook, YouTube or Flickr) altered these earlier trends? It has not among parliamentarians in the United Kingdom, and is not doing so in Portugal; however, in the United States Barack Obama’s presidential campaign—and now his administration—embraced these technologies. We expect this to become the wave of the future as the trend gravitates towards Europe. The main issue with which we are left is how rapid the uptake will be in the old continent.

We divide this analysis in two parts. First we study the results of the 2008 survey of members of parliament, which included a set of questions about the use of information and communication technologies by deputies in their daily routine in the Assembly of the Republic. These results will be compared with national data to see if the use of these technologies by deputies follows national trends, and with the results of a 2001 study to analyse the differences observed during this period.

We then turn to an examination of information and communication technologies used during Obama’s
presidential campaign and in his administration as a paradigmatic case of political use of these technologies and of the applications they can have in this domain.

We recognise Portugal differs from the United States and that institutional factors will make adoption of the type of interaction evident in the United States challenging for Portuguese deputies. We also recognise a more apt comparison would be with the United States Congress rather than with the administration; however, since in this second section we take a normative approach, we place less emphasis on these concerns. The normative purpose is to show how information and communication technologies use in Portugal is far from reaching its potential in the interaction between citizens and politicians.

**Portuguese deputies and the use of information and communication technologies: Means for the access to and transmission of information**

In this study, we divide the use deputies make of information and communication technologies into two categories: ‘information seeking’ and ‘information provision’.

On the one hand, information seeking is essential by any means because deputies require this data to make informed choices in the performance of their parliamentary duties (Habermas 1987). On the other, communication and information provision is required in political activity, where the flow of information between various actors is elementary for decision-making. How could parliament function without the communication of resolutions,
information and other necessary internal and external information? These activities are increasingly performed at ever-greater speeds, enhancing communication among information and communication technologies users.

Information and communication technologies are used by members of parliament to access, process, store, manage and research the daily deluge of information that can quickly inundate their office and staff. Without all necessary tools deputies would drown rather than navigate in the turbulent contemporary data sea lapping at governmental shores. Information and communication technologies tools are key for efficient performance ‘in the three major areas of the everyday work of legislators: as electorate representative, as party representative and as national legislator’ (Ward, Lusoli and Gibson 2007).

In this context, we define three hypotheses related to the use Portuguese deputies make of information and communications technologies in the execution of their parliamentary duties.

- **Hypothesis 1:**
  Since 2000, members of parliament have increased their use of information and communications technologies for information seeking and information provision in their daily work.
- **Hypothesis 2:**
  With the emergence of Web 2.0 deputies will increase vertical communication (direct communication with their constituents).
- **Hypothesis 3:**
Younger, educated male members of parliament will be most likely to use information and communication technologies as part of their parliamentary activities.

The results of our survey show Portuguese deputies are well aware of the strengths of information communication technologies and regularly resort to their use (see Table 3.1).

The averages (6.2 and 6.1, respectively) are especially high for information seeking, whether on specific themes or individuals or for general searches. The details show 50.5 per cent always use information and communications technologies to search for specificity, while 47.1 per cent use them for general information access.

Table 3.1: Main areas of information and communication technologies use (mean values)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Search for information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search for specific information on issues or persons</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search for general information</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication/ information transmission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal communication</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External communication with others</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External communication with the constituency</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political campaigning</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The scale for each area is between 1 (never use information and communications technologies) and 7 (always use them).

Furthermore, communication and information transmission/provision (via email, forums, chats,
newsgroups, blogs, mailing-lists, etc.) is also high among deputies. Overall, when compared to *information seeking*, there is a slight statistical decline in this area. Nevertheless, these are still very high values.

Deputies are more likely to use information and communication technologies for internal communication (with other representatives, their party, staff, etc.) and externally with journalists and other political agents than for communication with constituents.

Legislators are least likely to use the information provision aspects of the technologies in their campaigns, as shown by the 4.8 figure. This might be attributed to the more temporary and organisationally different (party-based rather than individualistic) aspects of communication provision during an electoral campaign compared to the more intensive, individualistic, internal and external uses of the daily, legislative, communicative information and communication technologies function.

During campaigns all candidates drive the electoral strategy from central party headquarters with collective deliberation. In addition, traditional rather than information and communication technology is still favoured in this exercise (Cardoso et al. 2005). The survey question referred to individual campaign activity, which was likely interpreted by respondents as complementary to party initiatives as the primary campaign mechanism.

We categorise parliamentarians’ use of the information seeking and information provision aspects of information and communications technologies to better understand their use of information and communication technologies.
Are certain types of deputies drawn to the use of these technologies? Is there a correlation between deputies’ use of these technologies and the population at large (in such aspects as gender and age) as seen in previous surveys (Cardoso et al. 2005; Cardoso, Nascimento and Cunha, 2003; Cardoso, Cunha and Nascimento 2006; OberCom 2008; 2009)?

We have constructed two indices, information seeking and communication/information provision to further explore these questions.\(^{11}\)

Our first observation is that there is no significant difference between the deputies in the two indices. In other words, parliamentarians who use information and communications technologies for information seeking also use it for information provision. Therefore, for all practical purposes we are discussing the same population.

The political party for which the deputy was elected is not a distinctive element in the use of the technologies among parliamentarians, since there are no statistically significant differences in information and communication technology use between members of different parties or coalitions with parliamentary seats.\(^{12}\)

We also do not find statistically important distinctions in terms of gender.\(^{13}\) Men and women have the same rates in communication/information provision index (5.8).

Nevertheless, we would like to highlight some differences observed in the information-seeking index, in which women (6.4) are slightly ahead of men (6.1). Compared to the public as a whole, gender differs between deputies and the Portuguese population. The 2009 study developed by the Observatório da Comunicação
(OberCom) shows men in the population at large use the internet more than women (43 and 39 per cent, respectively) (OberCom 2009). Although over the years internet use among men and women has increased, the disparity between the sexes in the Portuguese population has remained constant since 2002 (OberCom 2008).

There are significant differences in terms of age, with younger deputies using information and communication technologies more than their older peers. While 66.7 per cent of deputies under the age of 36 always use information and communication technologies for information seeking (seven on the index), 50 per cent of those over the age of 49 score six or less on the index. Information provision demonstrates similar tendencies, with 50 per cent of those under the age of 36 scoring six or less, while those over the age of 49 score 5.33.

This differential also exists in the population at large, where use of the technologies diminishes as age increases. In Portugal in 2008, 81 per cent of those aged 15–24 and 60 per cent of 25–34 year olds used the internet. A total of 19 per cent and five per cent of those aged 55–64 and over 65, respectively, used the technologies (OberCom 2008).

Thus, our third hypothesis is only partially correct in that male deputies are not more likely to use information and communication technologies than female deputies, although younger deputies were more likely to use them than their older peers.

The current data was compared to a 2001 survey of deputies developed under the coordination of Gustavo Cardoso. This survey sought to analyse the practices and representations of Portuguese parliamentarians in terms of
their use of information and communication technologies. The purpose of this examination is to analyse the level and speed of the penetration of these technologies during this seven-year period.16

**Figure 3.1: Information and communication technology use by evolution, 2008 (mean values)**

![Bar chart showing information and communication technology use by evolution, 2008 (mean values)]

**Note:** The scale for each area is between 1 (never use information and communications technologies) and 7 (always use them).

**Sources:** Cardoso (2001), Portuguese MPs Survey (2008) in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).

At first we do not notice much change in the areas in which deputies make use of the technologies, because in 2001 they tended to use them for information seeking
(general or specific) purposes, followed by internal communication and external communication with others and constituents. Again, campaign use was minimal.

Upon closer examination, most noticeable is the overall increase in information and communication technologies usage in 2008, suggesting deputies were making more frequent use of these tools. In other words, the penetration of the technologies during this period is significant. The increase is particularly evident in communication generally, but especially in internal communication.

While the use of information and communication technologies for campaigning is still lowest, it shows the second largest increase, demonstrating deputies’ recognition of its potential uses in this respect. The 2.6 per cent increase in communication with constituents was the third largest. Information seeking also increases, but not by as much, registering the smallest increase compared to 2001. One could argue that members of parliament latching on to this use from the beginning may explain why it would now increase at a slower rate.

Overall we see that deputies have routinised their use of the technologies in their daily parliamentary duties, recognising the advantages these tools have for their productivity.

This attitudinal change accompanies the penetration of information and communication technologies into Portuguese society. According to OberCom (2008), between 2002 and 2007 in homes with at least one person aged 16–74, internet usage increased 111 per cent. Home connections increased from 15 per cent in 2002 to 40 per cent in 2007, with broadband increasing from eight per cent
in 2003 to 30 per cent in 2007. The National Communications Authority (Autoridade Nacional de Comunicações) shows increased broadband usage from one per cent in 2001 to 15 per cent in 2007.

Table 3.2: Main areas of internet use. Portugal 2003–7 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Search for information</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information seeking for goods and services</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information seeking about health</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communication/information transmission</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending/receiving emails</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet phone calls and videoconferencing</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop blogs</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Those aged 14-74 who used the internet in the first three months of the year.

Email usage increased from 78 per cent in 2003 to 84 per cent in 2007, while internet phone calls and videoconferencing increased from 10 per cent to 22 per cent. Blogging increased from seven per cent in 2005 to 14 per cent in 2007. Information seeking for goods and services rose slightly from 82 per cent in 2003 to 83 per cent in 2007, with specialised searches showing larger increases (for example, searches for health information increased from 25 per cent in 2003 to 45 per cent in 2007) (OberCom 2008).

Our first hypothesis—that deputies have increased their use of information and communications technologies for
both information seeking and information provision—has been validated.

Because email is used as an information and communication technologies tool, we look at this aspect in greater detail for deputies. How do they use it for horizontal communication (i.e. with other politicians, decision-makers, staff, colleagues, etc.) and vertical communication (i.e. with constituents, journalists and others)? Email is particularly useful in allowing direct, vertical communication from constituents seeking redress for problems or for the communication of opinions without any mediating influences.

**Table 3.3: Origins of emails (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2008</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters/citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party colleagues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government/bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press/journalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In our survey, the deputies were directly questioned about the origins of their emails.

The majority of emails originated from their staff (22.5 per cent), followed by constituents (17.9 per cent) then party colleagues or the party organisation. The press and interest groups were at the bottom of the heap. What we find is that horizontal communication (particularly with staff) is favoured over vertical communication, a finding
that has corroborated earlier studies (Cardoso, Cunha and Nascimento 2006).

**Figure 3.2: Evolution of the origins of emails, 2001 and 2008 (%)**

![Bar chart showing the evolution of the origins of emails from 2001 to 2008.](image)

**Sources:** Cardoso (2001), Portuguese MPs Survey (2008) in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).

If we compare the 2001 and 2008 data (14.6 per cent and 8.5 per cent, respectively) we see a decline in emails from interest groups, while there is a slight increase in emails originating from the party, government/bureaucracy,
and the press. Emails from colleagues remain about the same.

We also see an inversion in terms of emails originating from staff and constituents. While emails from these two categories are generally first and second in frequency, emails from staff increased by five per cent while emails from constituents declined by three per cent between 2001 and 2008.

Table 3.4: Information and communication technologies influence in the contact between deputies and citizens/voters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizens contact me more now using information and communication technologies than they did 5–10 years ago</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information and communication technologies has made no difference in the frequency with which citizens contact me</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens contact me fewer times now using information and communication technologies than they did 5–10 years ago</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


At first this should seem paradoxical, given we saw an overall increase of the use of information and communication technologies by constituents during this period. However, we cannot directly conclude this decline in emails means there is less contact with constituents than in 2001.

Given the survey requested the categories total 100 per cent, an internal readjustment could have been made by
deputies to reflect increases in other categories. An increase in the use of information and communication technologies, and in this case emails, in the daily routines of deputies and their staff (given that internal communication via these technologies had the greater increase between 2001 and 2008, and also that emails from staff increased) would be a plausible explanation for the decline of the deputies’ perception of the proportion of emails received from constituents.

We cannot directly address this issue with the data at hand; however, we can state that when members of parliament were asked directly about the influence information and communications technologies had in respect of their contact with constituents, 94.6 per cent said direct contact with constituents had increased.

Thus, our second hypothesis may be partially correct insofar as vertical communication by members of parliament using information and communication technologies may have increased but, as mentioned above, the data at hand does not allow us to document a significant change in this area.

**Future trends?**

While our research shows information and communication technologies have been increasingly integrated into the daily routine of members of parliament, the e-democracy gap continues in Portugal and elsewhere. Is there hope for more interaction between legislators and their constituents in the future?
While our focus has been on Portugal, now we examine potential uses of information and communication technologies by looking towards recent experiences in the United States. The experimentation with these technologies during the Obama campaign, transition and administration demonstrates the technologies’ potential uses for Portuguese deputies should they choose to emphasise vertical communication in the future.

The democratic deficit has hopes of being narrowed in the United States as a result of the Obama experience. As a candidate, Obama gained a broad level of support through his use of information and communication technologies.

On MyBarackObama.com (MyBo), Obama’s own social network, two million profiles were created. In addition, 200,000 offline events were planned, about 400,000 blog posts were written and more than 35,000 volunteer groups were created—at least 1000 of them on the day Obama announced his candidacy for the presidency, 10 February 2007. Some three million calls were made during the final four days of the campaign using MyBO’s virtual phone-banking platform. On the MyBO fund-raising pages, 70,000 people raised $30 million (Vargas 2008).

Obama’s team also developed a broad volunteer network that was organised via the internet by collecting email addresses as people made campaign purchases and donations (Wallsten 2008).

With 13 million email addresses, hundreds of trained field organisers and tens of thousands of neighbourhood coordinators and phone bank
volunteers, the network has become one of the most valuable assets in politics, and Obama’s team may choose to deploy it to elect other Democratic officials, or to lobby congress for his toughest legislative goals, or even to apply pressure on local and state policymakers across the country (Connolly 2008).

While this statement emphasises the potential, the facts are that federal law insists the candidate’s campaign apparatus be separate from government, and the government cannot be used as a de facto extension of the campaign.

Obama had a team of lawyers look into how he could use his campaign data without breaking federal law. Once he felt comfortable enough in taking the next step he let Organizing for America (a group created in January 2009, announced by Obama on YouTube and now overseen by the Democratic National Committee) use his email lists to encourage supporters to contact Congress for passage of his $3.55 trillion budget (Cillizza 2009).

‘Just like people hadn’t used the internet in campaigning to this extent before, they haven’t really used it to govern before’, said Peter Daou, internet strategist for Senator Hillary Clinton. ‘The challenge here is trying to figure out how to use something that was used mostly for campaign advocacy—and use it in a way to advance policy’ (Garofoli 2008).

He doesn’t have to wait for CBS to use four seconds of one of his speeches as a sound bite in a story. He can send his full comments directly to his
supporters—and everyone else (Eli Pariser, executive director of MoveOn.org, cited in Garofoli 2008).

More important for our purposes is not how he will use his databank, but how he will interact with his supporters. Clearly, by using the databank he is interacting with supporters, but to what extent will he ‘pay them back’ by actually listening to their concerns? How will he ‘sustain the network, which grew and thrived in part on open dialogue and online social networking?’ (Wallsten 2008).

I don’t think emails or YouTube videos from the president-elect are going to be enough,’ Cuauhtemoc ‘Temo’ Figueroa, a former top Obama field organiser, said. ‘These people want to continue to be a part of whatever agenda comes out of the White House, and they want to be active participants in this government that they feel they have ownership of (Wallsten 2009).

For example, the Open Internet Coalition pressured Obama to follow through with his campaign promises to establish net neutrality rules (Gross 2008). So far the administration has included language emphasising net neutrality, but under lobbyist pressures to change the ‘non-discrimination and network interconnection obligations’ language, there emerged a petition drive (Tell Washington Don’t Listen To The Lobbyists: Use Our Money For An Open Internet) to prevent federal agencies from changing the language.

Obama supporters have become accustomed to interaction first with the campaign and the transition, and now they expect the same from the administration. For
example, the Obama transition team not only posted the president-elect’s weekly addresses on YouTube, it also posted snippets describing the activities of some of its transition groups. A three-minute video, titled Inside the Transition: Energy and Environment Policy Team, gave viewers a peek into the mind-set of the incoming government (Inspiredeconomist.com 2008).

But Obama’s early efforts on YouTube have not been in the two-way spirit of information and communication technologies communication. Comments are not accepted, although people can repost the videos or embed them elsewhere and start their own conversation threads.

Steve Grove, YouTube’s head of news and politics, predicts that if the Obama administration is anything like the Obama campaign, it will produce a prolific amount of video. Obama’s YouTube channel had more than 1,800 videos during the campaign, and they were viewed 110 million times. Many posted after September were seen upward of 50,000 times each, and more than a dozen were seen at least one million times. ‘Their user base has come to expect a certain level of accessibility’, Grove said. ‘But the challenge will be to find that sweet spot now that they’re governing’.

There’s no shortage of other ideas on how to engage people online. During the campaign, Obama officials talked about ways to create a ‘Craigslist for service’, where people interested in doing some sort of public service could be connected with a need in their
community. Others have spoken about video streaming all open government meetings. Daou [Peter Daou, internet strategist for Senator Hillary Clinton] said to expect a lot of ‘trial and error over the next few months as the White House sees what works’ (Garofoli 2008).

Obama is certainly aware of the interest in interactivity. He launched Change.gov (the official website of president-elect Obama) during the transition. One example of interactivity was made during the restructuring of the United States healthcare system. The transition team asked those interested, ‘What worries you most about the healthcare system in our country?’ After receiving 3701 comments, the transition team sent out an email update with a video response in early December.

The Obama administration continues its innovations in transparency and interactivity. Comments from the public continue to be encouraged. In mid-February 2009 the administration launched Recovery.gov to track where the $787 billion stimulus money would be spent. Obama, therefore, appears to have realised what Raven Brooks claims:

‘What’s most important is that he makes government more transparent,’ said Raven Brooks, executive director of Netroots Nation, the annual conference of bloggers and online activists that grew out of the popular DailyKos political blog

Brooks’ idea: He would love to see Obama—or more likely an aide—use the social networking tool Twitter to update citizens on what he is up to throughout the
day. ‘He wouldn’t have to be giving away state secrets or anything, but maybe something like, “I just met with Paul Volcker, and we talked about monetary policy” … I think a lot of people would appreciate the effort to communicate’, Brooks said (Garofoli 2008).

Another example of the Obama administration’s interactivity is the presidential innovation of holding occasional virtual town hall meetings (the first was held on 26 March 2009) direct from the East Room of the White House. In the new feature ‘open for questions’, added to WhiteHouse.gov, people submitted and voted on questions to the president. A total of 92,922 people asked 104,074 questions and cast more than 3.6 million votes, which determined the top six questions for President Obama to address (Corbin 2009).

‘What’s interesting is you usually see innovation in local communities and [then] working its way upward in society,’ said Ed Schipul, a social-media expert and chief executive officer of Schipul: The Web Marketing Company. ‘What is surprising is that we are now seeing innovation from the executive branch going down’ (Biezer 2009).

The techniques pursued by the Obama campaign have already spread not only to other politicians and political parties in the United States but also to other nations (Newton-Small 2009; Magid 2009). In the United States the Republicans are getting on board by exploring all of the Obama techniques, including Twitter, Facebook, Qik, YouTube, Flickr and other social networking opportunities
(Wilson 2009). John McCain’s presidential campaign not only embraced YouTube videos, but then spammed them—a common strategy to inflate popularity statistics (Silva 2009).

In Australia the Liberal National Party is using the Obama techniques to increase donations (Elks 2009), while in the Israeli election of February 2009 leading candidates, Tzipi Livni of the Kadima Party and Benjamin Netanyahu of the Likud Party, used the internet’s social media functions (Gilinsky 2009) and in the United Kingdom the Labour Party seems to have jumped on the bandwagon of internet politics (Helm 2009).

However, just as in the United States, the one issue that re-emerges is interactivity, as noted by Ed Coper, campaigns director at the online activist group GetUp:

The sooner our politicians see the internet as a vehicle for two-way communication, and not just a new medium for old static press statements, the sooner the inclusive, democratic and liberating power of online engagement will be harnessed in the way Obama harnessed it to such transformative effect (Moses 2009).

These developments might demonstrate a trend away from the public’s disillusionment and loss of confidence in politicians and politics in general. Could this trend lead to higher levels of electoral participation and trust, and increasing participation in traditional civic associations rather than the declines demonstrated by Sennett (1997) and Castells (1997)? If Obama allows this grassroots energy to slip through his fingers by not incorporating Web
2.0 features, it will further frustrate an emboldened and energised force. ‘Got hope’ may then be responded to by ‘Nope!’

As it is, many whom the right labelled ‘Obama zombies’ have already become disenchanted with Obama’s abandonment of core values by embracing nuclear energy and hopelessly seeking compromise with the right, despite constant Republican, ‘zombieish’ ‘party of no’ opposition (Mattera 2010).

These forces could be harnessed to energise the new administration in an inclusive, two-way fashion. The transformations of political systems throughout the developed world over the last several decades that have been characterised by the decentralisation of policy-making and of governmental institutions and public administration to other actors inside and outside of the political system would be enhanced. These changes have been described as the ‘displacement of politics’ (Beck 1997) or the emergence of a ‘plurality of power sources’ (Held 1987). It would also demonstrate a trend away from the cartel party to more inclusive politics (Katz and Mair 1995).

Norris (2000) and Castells (2000) claim that the public has not abandoned the political scene, but has become more ‘critical’ of the disconnect between their expectations, based on democracy as a theoretical ideal, and their negative experiences of actual representative institutional activity. The public may have lost confidence in political processes, rejecting the traditional methods of ‘politicking,’ but generally continue to believe in the democratic processes, given that they participate in a ‘symbolic
politics,’ which mainly focuses on local issues, the environment, human rights, family, and sexual freedom. Politicians are seen as orthodox and static regarding these issues, rarely showing interest or providing solutions to the concerns.

With the development of information and communication technologies, diverse ‘cyberoptimist’ (Norris 2000) views have led to resurgence in discussions of political and civic public participation. In an era of almost unlimited internet access by the public, from their perspective, they can be better informed of public issues; better present their positions via e-mail, discussion groups, and mailing lists; and be more active in mobilizing for community issues. These optimists also argue that the internet can strengthen the connection between the public and intermediary organizations, including political parties and social movements, and local, national, and global authorities. In this manner the public space would be broadened and reactivated via these new forms of vertical and horizontal communication, with a spirit of free debate and the exchange of views without hierarchies. Notwithstanding these possibilities and their importance in the political domain, the sole use of these means of information and communication do not in themselves signify an increase in public participation. There are other important contextual factors that are also at work, such as the specific uses of the different media, the strategy of political actors, the representations concerning the role of media in political processes, etc (Cardoso, Cunha and Nascimento 2006).
That is the hope the Obama campaign brought to these ‘disconnected’ masses.

Granted, there is political manipulation of information and communication technologies to guarantee the election, assumed re-election and everyday politics by President Obama, but it is clear he is also committed to greater transparency and deliberation.

Will the administration intensify the disconnection or begin to mend it by fulfilling the expectations of interactivity?

As noted above, these trends and information and communication technology techniques have already spread beyond the United States. The question now is will Portuguese deputies embrace Web 2.0 technologies to improve vertical communication or continue to follow the cartel party model?

We expect some political parties will embrace the new techniques, forcing others—willingly or unwillingly—to follow or be left behind (as has been the case in the United States).

The Portuguese Socialist Party contracted Blue State Digital, the company that designed Obama’s multimedia and online campaign, to do the same for its legislative campaign in the autumn of 2009 (Correio da Manhã 13 May 2009).

**Final notes**

This article has shown that Portuguese members of parliament increased the use of information and communications technologies in their parliamentary work.
Legislators use these technologies to seek information and to communicate, thus becoming essential functional elements in the Assembly of the Republic. However, in terms of the use of these technologies to connect with voters, and despite the increase in vertical communication (a point of view shared by almost all the respondents), we did not see any evolution towards more inclusive political participation by taking advantage of all the possibilities of interactivity Web 2.0 allows.

The successful example of the use of the technologies developed by Barak Obama and how he used interactivity to involve voters in his campaign is a good indicator of how new and more interactive forms of political involvement may be developed: forms that stimulate the political participation of citizens in democratic regimes.

Since some of Obama’s strategies have already begun to be adopted in Portugal, we hope several political parties will also adopt new technologies in a more consistent manner (political campaigning), forcing other parties to follow them in order not to be left behind (as happened in the United States). We also hope this development encourages deputies to use information and communication technologies in a way that promotes and stimulates the contact and involvement of their constituents.
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The participation of citizens and parliamentarians in voluntary associations

José Manuel Leite Viegas and Susana Santos

Associationism: A web of connections for a stronger civil society

In their role as agents of intermediation between citizens and the state, voluntary associations have been considered important for the operation of democracy for as long as sociology has been studied.

However, while Tocqueville ([1835] 2001) claimed the relationship between these associations and democracy is limited and unambiguous, more recent neo-pluralist (Cohen and Rogers 1995; Hirst 1994), neo-corporatist (Mansbridge 1995; Schmitter 1995), communitarian (Etzioni 1993; Bellah 1985; Bella et al. 1992), social capital (Putnam 1993; 2000; Fukuyama 1995) ideas, or indirectly, those arising from the re-evaluation or new formulation, of civil society, the differences are so great that, according to Roßteutscher, ‘all they have in common is their belief in the importance of voluntary associations for the functioning of democracy’ (2000: 234). There is probably not even any consensus on that.
These ideas were subjected to an often-severe critical analysis of the malignant effects associations had at the general political level. Eric Olin Wright synthesised the criticisms when he said, ‘enhancing the political role for such associations risks undermining their autonomy from the state and turning them into tools of social control rather than vehicles of democratic participation; secondary associations often claim illegitimately a monopoly of interest representation for specific constituencies and any formal role in democratic governance risks consolidating such monopolistic claims; the shift from a primary emphasis on territorial representation to functional representation risks strengthening tendencies towards particularistic identities, thus further fragmenting the polity’ (Cohen, Rogers and Wright 1995: 2–3).

In essence, the critics note on the one hand the factional effect associations engender to the detriment of the defence of the general interest (which was a criticism made by Rousseau), and on the other the pernicious effects of the weakening of social politics, which could lead to totalitarian situations (Arendt 1951: 303).

These criticisms are being made in the real political struggle beyond the scientific and academic fields. It is enough to be aware of what is currently taking place in Portugal in relation to the position of associations, and in particular the trade unions, in respect of state reform and public policies.21

To understand the complexity of positions concerning voluntary associations we first need to differentiate the many functions the associations assume before we can go on to critically analyse them. The first distinction is
between the macro-social level of the possible or desirable relationship between the associations and the state and the micro-social level of the relationship between the citizens and the associations.

Following Warren (2001; 2004), and greatly inspired by Habermas (1996), we are able to distinguish the effects of the associations on three levels:

- Individual level effects: better informed, increased symbolic powers, feelings better able to participate, improved critical sense, greater social and political tolerance and an altogether improved civic virtue in general;
- Public sphere level effects: transformation of private or individual problems into public and political problems, contributes to public information of specific matters, enlargement of the deliberative debate;
- Institutional effects: representation of interests and identities and provision of normative guidance at the institutional level, support for collective protest and resistance actions, coordination and regulation, subsidiary role in the implementation of public policies.

Historically, taking the work of Alexis de Tocqueville as a reference, the effects of the first and third levels mentioned above have already been considered. While they may attribute it with greater or lesser value, everyone appreciates that participation in associations enhances the civic education of those citizens involved and, as a
consequence, improves the civic life of the political community.

The benefits noted in the third level are also well understood, particularly within pluralist liberal circles. By not accepting common good is the goal guiding the hand of social agents in the political struggle, pluralist liberals believe it necessary to organise different interests in such a way as to ensure their representation in social and political negotiation forums.

Analysis of effects at the public level corresponds to a recent approach to the associative phenomenon that goes hand-in-hand with the theories of the valorisation of civil society, and with that of Habermas in particular (1996). Associations enable the problems experienced by citizens at the individual level—from the traditional, such as unemployment and poor working conditions, to those that express ‘post-materialist values’, such as environmental positions—to obtain a public and political status. This is achieved by the ability these associations have to transform individual problems into social and political problems and to bring them to the public debate, mainly through the media.

This is also a function of the political parties, although because their main goal is to win positions of power through elections they have to limit their demands in order to secure the support of the largest possible number of citizens. Thus, being free from such strategic necessities, the voluntary associations can operate with fewer restrictions in the public sphere, including the public political sphere.
This understanding of the role associations have in the public sphere enables us to answer the following paradox: how is it associations can be so important if only a minority of citizens participate in them? (Viegas 2004: 37).

One part of the answer depends on an understanding of the multiplier effect participation in associations has in the organs of mass communication—but not this alone. The diffusion in the mass media of social and political problems provides individuals with a plural, social and political interpretation of their problems, in a process that simultaneously enriches the democratic debate and the social and political consciousness of the citizens.

A second paradox is concerned with the decline in involvement in voluntary associations during recent decades, which has been noted by several authors, particularly Putnam (1993; 1995; 2000), and new theories on the role of associations that both promote citizenship and improve social integration and economic performance (social capital theories) and, in the broader theories, propose a new model of democratic governance in which voluntary associations play a prominent role (Cohen and Rodgers 1995; Hirst 1995; Mansbridge 1995).

The growing individualism of recent decades, accompanied by developments in information and communications technologies—particularly the internet—have generally replaced the more physical forms of conviviality and of investment in associations. It is clear this trend is not general, and there exist forms of reciprocal intervention between the internet and social and political participation. However, we will not examine these here.
Other factors operate in the opposite direction. The increasing complexity of developed societies ensures governments enter into dialogue with the voluntary associations, despite the conflicts deriving from the opposition of general and factional interests. This need rests both on the privileged information the associations possess and on the government’s interest in gaining the support of the associations in order to clothe their positions with legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

In the service delivery area, partnerships between the state and the voluntary associations—in particular the private social security institutes (instituições particulares de solidariedade social)—satisfy all parties: the individuals, because it increases their skills; the private social security institute because it broadens its field of activity; and the state because, at a time of cost-cutting, it provides a cheaper method of controlling and maintaining the services it provides to its citizens.

It is thus that the paradox can be explained. The associations may have fewer members—at least traditional associations may have fewer members—but they have an increasingly important institutional role both because of the magnifying effect of the media and as a result of the recognition they receive from the state.

In an earlier article, we listed the different type of association identified by many authors (Viegas 2004). In some cases these classifications are based on purely theoretical criteria (Kriesi et al. 1995; Putnam 2000). In others, supported by multivariate statistical analysis, taxonomies are created for the associations according to the
closeness between them, which are determined by the involvement preferences of the social agents. Combining these two perspectives, Wessel (1997) distinguishes three types of association: political associations (including professional associations), those representing new social movements and those of a social nature. Van Deth and Kreuter (1998) propose a very similar typology: associations of a social nature (including religious associations), and those representing traditional interests (political parties and professional organisations).

Our proposed typology includes the following: ‘social integration’ associations, ‘interest groups’ and associations expressing ‘the new social movements’.

‘Social integration’ associations include the following:

- social and religious solidarity associations;
- sport, culture and recreation association;
- parents’ and residents’ associations.

‘Interest groups’ include the following:

- trade unions, professional and pensioner groups and orders;
- business or financial associations.

Political parties are not represented in our model because of the incomparability of the data collected in the various surveys.

Associations expressing ‘new social movements’ include the following:
groups protecting the rights of the citizen;
consumer groups;
ecological and environmental groups;
animal protection groups.

The value of this typology is that it allows us to distinguish associations by their basic contribution to each of the functions listed: social integration, interest representation or contribution to the public debate.

Objectives, hypotheses and methodology

First of all we need to clarify that the empirical analysis on associations we intend to carry out in this chapter is at the level of individual involvement rather than in the area of institutional operation or the relationship between the associations and the state. We analyse the individuals’ participation in the associations, but this participation has, we believe, to take into consideration the type of association and, obviously, the social and political roles it fulfils.

A comparative European study on the topic of associations—Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy—which took place from 2001–2003, provided us with some indication of the contours of citizens’ participation in associations in Europe, particularly in Portugal (Van Deth et al. 2007). This study enabled the realisation of research more focused on the Portuguese case, which has since been continued in the national research project, Participation and democratic deliberation (Participação e deliberação democrática), which took place in 2006 and used the same
set of indicators used in the Citizenship, involvement, democracy project (Viegas 2004; Viegas and Santos 2008).

These studies show that levels of participation in Portugal are lower than in most of the countries of central and northern Europe, and higher than in the countries of Eastern Europe. Compared with Spain, participation rates in associations are generally lower, except in relation to those we have classified as being ‘social integration’ associations. It is in this type of association Portugal demonstrates greater investment, which in some modalities is greater than that found in other countries. Finally, one more characteristic of the Portuguese case is the low level of associative participation linked to ‘new social movements’.

These results represent one of the starting points for this study, which intends to be broader in three aspects: first, because by comparing the data from the 2008 and 2001 surveys we can analyse the evolution of the citizens’ associative participation; second, because we have a survey of deputies using the same material and the same indicators we can compare the participation of citizens and of the political elite—in this case the deputies; third, because we will explore some resource factors as well as factors of associative mobilisation that underlie the associative participation of citizens and of deputies.

The methodology used in this chapter is entirely quantitative and based on data obtained in the national and international surveys mentioned above.

In the introductory section we outlined our basic theoretical view, which included presenting a defence of a typology of associations, as well as the relationship
between each of these types of association with the developed social and political functions. Other theoretical aspects, such as the relationship between ‘social capital’ and ‘symbolic capital’ resources, as well as an analysis of the role of political identity in associative mobilisation, will be noted in the empirical points most related to them.

The following section, the first containing an analysis of the empirical data records the results obtained in relation to the associative participation of Portuguese in a European context (Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy project, 2001–2003 data). We then analyse the evolution of this associative participation, taking into account the data from our own 2008 questionnaire, which includes the same set of indicators as the Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy project.

The expectation is that between 2001 and 2008 there will be an upward trend in the associative participation we have labelled as representing ‘new social movements’, which takes the modernisation of Portuguese society into account. The number of associations created during the last referendum on abortion point in this direction. In relation to participation in the modalities of other types of associations, our expectation is there will be a general stagnation in line with international trends, and for which Portugal will be no exception.

The purpose of this work is to compare the associative participation of the political elite—the deputies—with that of citizens in general. The next step will be to compare the participation of citizens in associations with that of the deputies, which is now possible since the questionnaires applied to these two groups—the population sample and the
group of deputies—shared the same set of indicators covering associative participation (Freire, Viegas and Seiceira 2009).

The general hypothesis here is that involvement will be much greater among the deputies than among the general public. We also expect the difference to be larger in those associations with a greater presence in the public arena. One explanation for the different levels of associative investment may be found in the fact almost all deputies have university degrees, which is considered an important decisive resource, or ‘symbolic capital’, in explaining associative involvement. In order to validate this hypothesis, we will compare the associative participation of three groups: the deputies, all of the individuals in the population sample, and the part of the sample consisting of respondents with a university education.

However, there are other reasons, under the designation of ‘social capital’ and ‘political capital’ that can explain this difference. To be a deputy in a representative democracy is to be a representative of the electorate; however, it is also to seek to defend the public interest and public values, and in this way expand the field of social representation that can be transposed to the political field.

In the point above, we consider deputies as a whole; however, we are also interested in making a disaggregated analysis that takes the party they belong to into consideration. The underlying aim is, first, to find out if the associative participation of deputies and citizens who identify with a particular party are attracted to certain types of associations. We also want to know what modalities
register the greatest number of mismatches between citizens and deputies.

Our belief is that citizens and deputies linked with left-wing parties will be more involved in trade unions and associations that advocate causes in the public arena. Those individuals and deputies who identify more with parties of the right will display a greater tendency to become involved in associations of social and cultural integration and those that defend interests. Those, both citizens and deputies, who identify with the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista) or the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata), tend to have a more diverse associative investment.

Citizens and voluntary associations: Comparative and evolutionary analyses

It is important to place Portuguese associative involvement in the European context, and to do this (given the lack of up-to-date comparative data) we make use of data from the Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy project of 2001–2003. In this survey, which was conducted in all of the countries forming part of this research, respondents were asked if during the previous 12 months they had been involved in any of the 36 types of association listed. By ‘involvement’ is meant either: (a) being a member of an association, (b) participating in an association’s activities, (c) making a donation or (d) carrying out voluntary work. In order for the results to be comparable with existing data here we limit our analysis to option (a)—being a member of a given organisation or voluntary association.
Of the 13 countries included in the Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy project, we have selected eight—including Portugal—giving us a diverse overview of Europe: from the south to the north and from the west to the east.

The data presented in Table 4.1 shows it is the ‘sport, culture and recreation’ and ‘social solidarity and religious’ associations that have the largest share of associative belonging in Portugal, with a proportion very close to that found in Spain and much greater than found in the Eastern European countries being studied. As previous research has demonstrated (Viegas 2004), these types of associations are characterised by their impact on the social integration of their members and by their limited contribution to the public debate.

Associations with greater potential to participate in and contribute within the public sphere, such as consumer groups and advocacy and citizenship groups and associations for defending social values (which are aggregated into the first line of Table 4.1) are those that in Portugal present the lowest involvement rates—much lower than the rates found in Spain or in the countries of northern and central Europe.

While concentrating on Portugal, it is important to include one other item of data in order to observe the trend in relation to the citizens’ social participation. This indicator refers to association membership by number of associations, and was constructed using all available data for Portugal from 1990 to 2008. As Table 4.2 shows, association membership remains relatively stable from 1990–2006; however, in 2008 there is a sharp fall in citizen investment, with the proportion of citizens who are not
involved in any way with any association rising to the order of 84 per cent.
Table 4.1: Membership of association by type in eight European countries, 2001–2003 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of association</th>
<th>Portugal (N=1010)</th>
<th>Spain (N=4252)</th>
<th>Germany (N=1649)</th>
<th>Netherlands (N=1210)</th>
<th>Sweden (N=1640)</th>
<th>Denmark (N=1219)</th>
<th>Moldavia (N=1219)</th>
<th>Romania (N=1217)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New social movements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Civic action organisations</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social integration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Sports clubs</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Cultural organisations</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Recreation clubs and organisations</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Religious organisations</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Social organisations</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest defence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Trade unions</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Professional associations</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Employers’ organisations</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: Membership of associations by number of associations, Portugal 1990–2008 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of associations</th>
<th>EVS 1990(^{(a)})</th>
<th>EVS 1999(^{(b)})</th>
<th>CID 2001(^{(c)})</th>
<th>PDD 2006(^{(d)})</th>
<th>IP 2008(^{(e)})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 or more</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>83.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=985</td>
<td>N=1000</td>
<td>N=1010</td>
<td>N=1000</td>
<td>N=1000</td>
<td>N=1350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These figures need to be dealt with in more detail, with recourse to other indicators allowing us to better identify the benchmark for associative involvement in Portugal. Earlier studies detected a tendency in the associative involvement model in Portugal characterised by a smaller number of highly active participants (Viegas 2004, Viegas and Santos 2008). The intensity of participation is measured by indicators of participation in activities, voluntary work and donations.\(^{22}\) The combination of this data with association membership provides us with a better understanding of this phenomenon. According to many of the researchers responsible for the development of a typology of civil society (Dekker and Van den Broek 1998; Morales 2009), Portugal is included with other Southern European countries in its parochialism, defined by the limited overall participation by citizens, but by their greater activism.
Because the 2008 survey does not include indicators of the intensity of participation, however, we are unable to continue exploring this aspect of associative participation. This deeper analysis of associative involvement will look at the manner of associative participation, which is also a very important aspect for the characterisation of the model of associative investment.

Table 4.3: Trends in association membership by type of association, Portugal 2001–2008 (%)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of association</th>
<th>2001 (N=1010)</th>
<th>2008 (N=1350)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New social movements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Civic action organisations</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social integration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Sports clubs</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Cultural organisations</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Recreation clubs and organisations</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Religious organisations</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Social organisations</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest defence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Trade unions</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Professional associations</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Employers’ organisations</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


By comparing the 2001 and 2008 data (Table 4.3) at first sight we see a tendency towards the diminution of membership across most associations, with the exception of socio-professional groups—which show a slight increase—and social organisations—which remain stable at around four per cent. The fall, from 8.9 to 1.8 per cent, in the
membership of religious organisations can be explained by the laicisation of Portuguese society that has also been registered in other contexts. Less understandable is the decline in the membership of sport and recreation associations. Is this the result of economic factors associated with a period of financial difficulty for families, or is it a reflection of a structural change of reduced collective involvement? The data we have does not allow us to give a definitive answer to these questions.

Another item worth noting is the lack of any increase in participation in civic action organisations, which is unexpected. Our inability to compare current data collected in Portugal with other European countries means we are unable to reach a better overall understanding of this. However, by looking at data from previous studies, we believe it to be a characteristic of Portuguese associative investment that has been aggravated during the current economic crisis (Viegas and Santos 2008).

According to Inglehart, it is at moments when resources are scarce that materialist values tend to superimpose themselves on the post-materialist values underlying this type of association.

**Citizens and parliamentarians: A comparative analysis**

*Education and participation in voluntary associations*

In accordance with our objectives, we need to present the data on the associative participation of citizens and parliamentarians in a comparative manner. Our hypotheses lead us to expect the difference in the resources and capital
available to citizens and deputies will have an effect on their associative involvement.

**Table 4.4: Membership of associations by type of association: comparison of citizens with deputies and of citizens with university education and deputies (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of association</th>
<th>IP^{(a)}</th>
<th>IP^{(b)}</th>
<th>ID^{(c)}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New social movements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Civic action organisations</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>58.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social integration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Sports clubs</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Cultural organisations</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Recreation clubs and organisations</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Religious organisations</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Social organisations</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest defence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Trade unions</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Professional associations</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Employers’ organisations</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** (a) Survey of population (N=1350), (b) Survey of population (university educated group) (N=151), (c) Survey of deputies (N=141).

**Source:** Portuguese Mass and MPs Surveys (2008) in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009)

At first sight, and taking the information regarding the type of association into account (Table 4.4), we see a clear difference in social participation. Overall, deputies participate more in all types of association, with the biggest differences found precisely in civic action organisations. These results are in line with previously advanced hypotheses. In order to better understand these differences, we segmented the population, screening those with university educations and presenting them in column four of Table 4.4. This separation enables a clarification of the
analysis of the explanatory power of symbolic capital—in this case of education—for associative participation. Thus, we note an increase in the overall participation of this more educated section of the population, in particular in civic action organisations, trade unions and professional associations. It should be noted those involved in professional associations tend to be in highly qualified professions.

Despite this increase, the participation rates of the more educated section of the population are still below those of deputies, which is in line with our hypothesis. As was said above, deputies possess social representation and political capital that provides an additional contribution to associative involvement.

*Left/right ideological identity and associative participation*

A first glance at the average values of self-positioning on the left-right scale, in relation to associative belonging according to modality, we note the population situate itself further to the right than deputies in every type of association. In Figure 4.1 we see the lines for the population and the deputies are very similar, with lower values registered in the case of membership of civic action organisations and trade unions. At the other end are members of religious organisations who have higher average values on the left-right scale. The largest distance between the population and deputies is found in relation to membership of professional associations, with the former placing themselves much further to the right than the latter.
Following this global reading of the average values, and taking into account the distribution and characteristics of the variables being analysed, we proceed to the realisation of a new statistical operation (t-test) between the associative participation and self-positioning on the left-right scale variable for the two samples. Table 4.5 shows the average values and gives an indication of those cases in with statistical significance.
Table 4.5: Average values for membership of types of association by citizens and deputies according to self-placement on the left-right scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of association</th>
<th>Citizens</th>
<th></th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y(a)</td>
<td>N(b)</td>
<td>Y(a)</td>
<td>N(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New social movements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Civic action organisations</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.4*</td>
<td>3.9*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social integration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Sports clubs</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.9*</td>
<td>3.3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Cultural organisations</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Recreation clubs</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Religious organisations</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.6**</td>
<td>3.4**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Social organisations</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest defence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Trade unions</td>
<td>3.9***</td>
<td>4.9***</td>
<td>2.9*</td>
<td>3.7*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Professional associations</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Employers’ organisations</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (a) Member, (b) Not a member. * p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.001

Taking the analysis of this population sample as our starting point, we found the only statistically significant differences were in relation to involvement in trade unions \( t(1023) = -3.416, p = 0.001, p \leq 0.001 \). This is also where the average difference between membership and non-membership is greatest. Thus, we can confirm trade union members place themselves further to the left on the scale, while non-members place themselves more emphatically on the right (the highest average value for all types of association, in the non-member column).

In respect of the population, we note that despite the existence of a visible difference between the average values of those belonging and those not belonging to religious
organisations, this difference is not statistically significant 
(t (1023) = 1.477, p = 0.140, p > 0.10).

In the sample of deputies, we find statistically significant differences in respect of their involvement with religious organisations, trade unions, civic action organisations and sport clubs. As for participation in religious organisations (t (139) = -2.721, p = 0.007, p < 0.05), and given its statistical significance, we can confirm those deputies who are members of organisations of this type place themselves on the right of the self-positioning scale, while deputies with no formal connection with these organisations place themselves more to the left.

Participation in trade unions (t (139) = 1.948, p = 0.053, p < 0.10) reveals an opposite tendency, with deputies involved in unions situating themselves more to the left of the scale, while those who are not involved place themselves more to the right.

With involvement in civic actions organisations, the empirical results show a difference with some statistical significance (t (139) = 1.672, p = 0.097, p < 0.10). Deputies belonging to this type of organisation place themselves more to the left on the scale, while those who do not place themselves more to the right. This finding is in line with interpretations claiming left-wing individuals are more active in the civic and political sphere.

Conversely, deputies who place themselves further to the right of the scale are more likely to be members of sports clubs, while those who do not belong to this type of club tend to place themselves more to the left.  

23
Party identification and associative participation

Party identification is another factor likely to differentiate the social participation of individuals by type or nature of the associations in which they are most involved. We also seek to discover in what type of association the greatest harmonies or differences exist between those citizens and deputies who identify with the same political party.

We first seek to assess whether there is a statistically significant association between party identification and associative participation. In order to do this, and since we are dealing with nominal dichotomous variables (being or not being a member of an association) and ‘proximity to a political party’ in the case of party identification, we use the Cramer’s V method.24

We note belonging to or not belonging to a union is influenced by party identification, as is belonging or not belonging to professional associations and recreation clubs and associations.

To empirically analyse these results in comparative terms, population and deputies, we present Figures 2–6, each of which corresponds to a party identification and a party membership and which compares the associative investment of citizens and deputies by modality.
Table 4.6: Association values of party identification (citizens) and membership association by type (Cramer’s V)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of association</th>
<th>Citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New social movements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Civil action organisations</td>
<td>0.170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social integration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Sports clubs</td>
<td>0.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Cultural organisations</td>
<td>0.191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Recreation clubs</td>
<td>0.421**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Religious organisations</td>
<td>0.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Social organisations</td>
<td>0.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest defence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Trade unions</td>
<td>0.321*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Professional associations</td>
<td>0.420**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Employers’ organisations</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p ≤ 0.10; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.001

Figure 4.2 compares the rates of association membership of citizens sympathetic to the Left Bloc (Bloco de Esquerda) with those of the party’s deputies. It shows there are types of association in which the involvement of citizens and of deputies is close to zero: in religious and recreation associations. It also shows there are two types of association in which the differences between the two groups are not so great—especially in the case of ‘social organisations’ and unions. Finally, two forms of association that have found favour with deputies, and which are not similarly supported by citizens sympathetic to the party, are ‘civic action organisations’ and cultural associations. Involvement in associations with a presence in the public.
sphere is noticeable, but only with the deputies. These results are generally in line with our expectations.

Figure 4.2: Association membership. Left Bloc sympathisers and deputies according to type of association (%)

Turning to the data from those citizens and deputies who identify with the Democratic Unity Coalition\textsuperscript{25} (Coligação Democrática Unitária) (Figure 4.3) we see involvement in associations is very similar to that for the Left Bloc, except this party’s deputies are less involved in cultural organisations. Similarly, the greater involvement of deputies in civic action organisations is not shared by those citizens who say they sympathise with this party.
Involvement in social organisations and trade unions does not diverge much between citizens and deputies, and corresponds to similarly significant values analysed in relation to Left Bloc sympathisers. Involvement in associations with a presence in the public sphere is also noticeable, and not only in relation to deputies. Again, these results are generally in line with our expectations.

**Figure 4.3: Association membership. Democratic Unity Coalition sympathisers and deputies according to type of association (%)**

Focusing attention on data for individuals sympathetic to the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista) (Figure 4.4), there seems at first to be a greater distribution of involvement by both citizens and deputies in the different types of association than was found in the previous cases. However, there is still a large difference between the involvement of deputies and citizens in associations, particularly in ‘civic action’ and cultural organisations. While these results are in line with what was expected, it is interesting to note participation rates in unions and employers’ organisations are greater among the general public than among deputies.

The results for those who identify with the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata) (Figure 4.5) are very similar to those already outlined above for the Socialist Party, and are also in line with our expectations. Involvement in associations is dispersed in terms of the type of association, both for the citizens and for the deputies, and there is a mismatch between citizens and deputies, particularly in ‘civic action’ and cultural organisations.

Figure 4.5: Association membership. Social Democratic Party sympathisers and deputies according to type of association (%)


Finally, for those who identify with the Social Democratic Centre (Centro Democrático e Social) (Figure 4.6) we note the party’s deputies are involved in all types of associations, unlike the citizens who support this party.
Indeed, their involvement in civic action organisations, sport clubs, unions or employers’ organisations is practically non-existent, although they do participate in recreation clubs, social organisations and professional associations. There is also evidence of some difference between the deputies and supporters of this party, with the deputies being more involved in associations with a greater presence in the public sphere and in groups promoting social integration.

**Figure 4.6: Association membership. Social Democratic Centre sympathisers and deputies according to type of association (%)**

![Bar chart showing association membership by type and party](image)

- Civic action
- Sports
- Cultural
- Recreation
- Religious
- Social
- Trade unions
- Professional
- Employers

- □ Sympathisers
- ■ Deputies

**Source:** Portuguese Mass and MPs Surveys (2008) in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).
Conclusions

Let us now turn to the main conclusions according to the aims and hypotheses we have presented.

What seems most significant in respect of the trend in the associative participation of citizens between 2001 and 2008 is the unexpected absence of an increase in participation in new social movements. We observed participation rates in these types of associations were relatively low in 2001, much lower than the rates found in central and northern Europe. The only explanation for this result is the economic and financial austerity that defined this period, and which according to Inglehart operates against the post-material agenda. The increased financial difficulties in which individuals and families found themselves in may also explain the fall in the memberships of recreation and sports associations—although, as was noted above, there are also other more structural reasons for this—for example, the growing tendency towards a more individualist involvement that takes different shapes.

The fall in the membership of religious associations is consistent with theories of the laicisation of developed society over the medium- to long-term.

The comparison of the associative participation of citizens with that of deputies demonstrated—as we expected—the much greater involvement of deputies in all types of association. In line with our hypothesis, this difference is greater in associations with a stronger presence in the public sphere.
The comparison of the associational involvement of university-educated individuals and deputies showed symbolic capital is important, particularly when we consider the population in general; however, it is not sufficient to explain the differences between the population’s and the deputies’ involvement in associations. Social representation capital, which is closely associated with political careers, can explain this difference.

As for the relationship between left-right ideological identity and membership of associations, we note that the average values for the population are, across all types of association, greater than the respective average values obtained from the deputies. However, if we limit our analyses to relationships with a statistical significance, we note they are very limited: individuals, who are members of trade unions, whether they are deputies or citizens, tend to be on the left of the political spectrum. If we restrict our analysis to the deputies, the relationship between ideological identity and membership of associations is statistically significant: deputies who are members of civic action organisations tend to be left wing, while those who are members of sports clubs and religious organisations tend to be on the right. In all of these cases the results met with our expectations.

We also examined a factor judged important in associative mobilisation: party identification. Our analyses showed that, generally, the involvement of deputies in associations was greater than that of citizens who supported the same parties, particularly in relation to associations with a powerful presence in the public sphere (civic action organisations). We also noted that among those individuals
who are closer to the political centre and who identified themselves with the larger parties (Socialist Party and Social Democratic Party), associative involvement is distributed across all types of association. Among sympathisers and deputies of the left-wing parties (Left Bloc and the Democratic Unity Coalition), there are types of associations in which they do not participate. This profile is similar to that encountered in relation to citizens who are sympathetic to the Social Democratic Centre, who are almost entirely uninvolved in civic action associations and trade unions.
References


Morales, L. (2009), Joining political organisations: Institutions, mobilisation and participation in western democracies, Colchester: ECPR Press.


PART TWO
Introduction

The empirical study of political representation in democratic regimes has relied extensively upon the ‘responsible party model’ and its normative implications (e.g. Miller and Stokes 1963; Powell 2000; 2004; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Miller et al. 1999; Thomassen 1994; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999; Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Wessels 2007; Belchior 2010. For the concept of representation see Pitkin 1972 and Martins 2008). This model points to some major features about the relation between voters and political parties (and elected officials): 1) electors share various packages of issue positions, 2) electors compare their issue positions with those presented by the political competitors in each election, 3) electors vote for the party that presented the manifesto closest to their own views and 4) once elected, party officials remain united and strive to translate their manifesto into public policy (Pierce 1999: 9; Thomassen and Schmitt 1999: 13–19).
Although some voters in at least some occasions do compare their issue positions with those presented by the political parties in order to decide how to vote, the truth is this task is demanding in terms of data collection and processing and the benefits of the act of voting are not very high. Thus, most electors usually use shortcuts, such as the left-right divide, to evaluate where parties stand on issues and to evaluate how close the parties are to their own views (Downs 1957; Popkin 1994). They then tend to vote for the party closest to their own position, although this is normally evaluated in terms of the appropriate shortcut, which in Europe is usually the left-right divide, and in the United States the liberal-conservative schema. Moreover, to communicate with voters, political parties often use the language of left and right to inform the electorate about where they stand on issues (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Herrera 1999).

These are some of the reasons why Fuchs and Klingemann say that at the macro-level the left-right divide is a communication device between politicians, the mass media and electors, and, at the micro-level, the left-right schema is an economising information device to help voters cope with the complexities of the political world and to arrive at political decisions.

There is no doubt if we follow ‘the responsible party model’, the study of the levels of left-right congruence between electors and representatives (in a democratic polity) is crucial to understanding the quality of political representation. The greater the level of left-right congruence between voters and representatives, the greater the probability voters’ preferences are well represented in
parliament and well reflected in policy-making, thereby the greater the probability of a well-functioning representative process.

This is why many research papers in political science use the level of congruence between representatives and electors, in terms of left-right self-placement, as a proxy for congruence in terms of substantive issue preferences (Schmitt and Thomassen 1999; Thomassen and Schmitt 1997; Wessels 1999; Huber and Powell 1994; Powell 2000; Belchior 2010; Golder and Stramski 2008).

However, even where we find significant levels of deputy-citizen congruence in terms of left-right self-placement, there are still several possibilities for a significant deputy-citizen mismatch in terms of issue preferences (or vice-versa). First, because there is always a significant level of ambiguity in the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ and, therefore, in the way these concepts are used between representatives and voters (Herrera 1999; Pierce 1999: 13–15; Powell 2000: 94). Second, because at the mass level there is only a partial (and in some countries a very partial) match between issue positions and left-right self-placement (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Huber 1989; Knutsen 1997; Freire 2008). Third, because sometimes there is a rather low level of clarity in terms of the policy alternatives the parties present to the electorate, especially in countries like Portugal (Freire 2008), and voters may have a difficult task relating policy differences with the left-right divide. Fourth, because the match between issue positions and left-right self-placement might be dependent upon level of education, media exposure and political interest (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Freire and Belchior forthcoming) and if
the latter are low (as in Portugal) the likelihood of a mismatch is increased.

These are some of the reasons why significant levels of left-right elite-mass congruence can co-exist with a significant mismatch in terms of issue preferences, especially in countries (like Portugal) in which the clarity of policy alternatives is low and the levels of education, media exposure and political interest are also low (comparatively speaking).

In the academic literature on political representation in democracies, elite-citizen congruence is usually measured either in terms of issue preference (Pierce 1999; Holmberg 1999), left-right self-placement (Converse and Pierce 1986; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999; Herrera 1999) or the latter is used as a proxy of the former (Thomassen and Schmitt 1997; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999; Huber and Powell 1994; Powell 2000; Golder and Stramski 2008).

The two forms of congruence are seldom used together (Dalton 1985; Belchior 2007; 2008), and when they are hardly ever with our purpose: to ascertain if the levels of congruence (or lack thereof) are similar even if we use different measures for evaluating congruence (left-right self-placement or substantive issue preferences).

We use Portugal as an extreme case (due to the low level of clarity of policy alternatives presented by the parties, and the relatively low levels of education, media exposure and political interest) in which it is possible to find a good level of congruence in terms of left-right self-placement and a not-so-good level of congruence in terms of issue preferences. Thus, due to its extreme characteristics, this case will tell us to what extent we can
or cannot use congruence in terms of left-right self-placement as a proxy of congruence in terms of substantive issue preferences.

In the third and fourth sections of the chapter we use different measures to evaluate congruence (left-right self-placement and substantive issue preferences) after presenting the data used here: a mass survey and a survey of the deputies.

In the fifth section we use the same surveys to compare the social, value and partisan correlates for left-right self-placement among Portuguese voters and deputies. This is yet another proxy to see if ‘left’ and ‘right’ mean the same for voters and deputies (both overall and across parties).

Finally, in the sixth section, we use a set of two open-ended questions about the meaning of ‘left’ and ‘right’ for both deputies and voters. This will be the final step towards discovering if there is a significant mismatch in the ‘language of politics’ (Herrera 1999) between Portuguese voters and politicians.

**Data and methods**

Here we mainly use two surveys (a mass survey and a survey of deputies, n=1350 and n=143, respectively) that were conducted in Portugal between the beginning of spring and the end of summer 2008; for further details see the introduction to this book and Freire, Viegas and Seiceira 2009.

Both questionnaires relied heavily on the comparative questionnaires of the research networks to which the project is related (Comparative Candidate Survey and
PARENEL – Parliamentary Representation at the European and National Levels). Since the response rate to the deputies’ survey (62.2 per cent) resulted in some deviations vis-à-vis the Parliament’s composition, we weighted the sample by party and sex to have a closer profile of the population.

Theory, measures and hypotheses

To evaluate the level of congruence between deputies and the electorate we used both questions about left-right self-placement, and two batteries of issue positions that can be said to tap substantive issue preferences in terms of both the economic left-right divide and the libertarian-authoritarian divide (always the same questions across surveys).

To evaluate the level of congruence between deputies and electors we used questions about left-right self-placement and two batteries of issue positions that can be said to tap substantive issue preferences in terms of both the economic left-right divide and the libertarian-authoritarian divide. To analyze the level of congruence between deputiess and voters, we consider the average values by party (party dyads), the complete distributions (deputies versus voters) and statistical testing.

Why should we expect to find significant mismatches between voters and deputies in terms of the different distribution of preferences (left-right scale versus substantive issues)? And why should we expect to find significant differences between voters and deputies in terms
of the structure of determination of left-right placement and the meaning of left and right?

First of all, because left-right identities have at least three types of anchors (social factors, issue/value preferences and partisan identities) and for some groups some anchors might weigh more than others: for example, for elites (more educated and politically informed) substantive policy preferences might have more weight than they do for voters, while social and partisan factors might have more importance for the latter: the use of (social and/or political) shortcuts, instead of substantive policy preferences, is more likely among less sophisticated and politically engaged citizens (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Fuch and Klingemann 1990; Knutsen 1997; Freire and Belchior 2011).

Second, even in terms of issues/values, the left-right divide is correlated with multiple dimensions—namely with economic and authoritarian-libertarian issues—and these correlates might be different for voters and deputies, contributing to some significant mismatches between the two groups both in terms of the distribution of preferences and the meanings attributed to the left-right divide.

Finally, deputies are usually politically more sophisticated and engaged than voters, and this might contribute to some mismatches between the two groups in terms of the distributions of preferences across different scales, of correlates of left-right self-placement and, finally, of the meanings of left and right. For example, deputies should be more aware of the differences between the two camps and use more abstract concepts to describe them,
voters should be less aware of those differences and use more social and political groupings to describe them.

Considering the fact that economic left-right issues are traditionally related to the left-right divide, and that the authoritarian-libertarian divide is more orthogonal to the left-right divide, we expect to find the following (first hypothesis):

\[ H1: \text{More similar results (regarding deputy-voter congruence) between left-right self-placement and economic left-right issues than between left-right self-placement and authoritarian-libertarian issues.} \]

To compare the structure of determination of left-right self-placement across voters and deputies we will use a set of survey items (measuring social factors, issues, and voters’ party identification/party list within which the deputy was elected), and use ordinary least square regressions to explain ideological self-placement.

Here we have two hypotheses: due to the greater political engagement and cognitive mobilization of deputies we expect to find:

\[ H2: \text{Left-right self-placement of MPs more anchored in issue preferences than left-right self-placement of the individual citizens, and;} \]

\[ H3: \text{Left-right self-placement of MPs less anchored on social cleavages and partisan identities than the individual citizens.} \]
Finally, to understand the meaning both voters and deputies attribute ‘left’ and ‘right’, we used two open-ended questions included in both surveys.29

The three final hypotheses are the following: due to higher political engagement and cognitive mobilization of MPs, vis-à-vis electors, we expect:


\[ H4: \text{Deputies to use more abstract concepts and issues to refer to either left or right, than individual citizens,} \]

\[ H5: \text{Individual citizens to use more social and political groups’ issues to refer to either left or right, than deputies, and;} \]

\[ H6: \text{Individual citizens to have a less clear picture about the meaning of left and right (more ‘no difference’ and ‘don’t know’) than deputies.} \]

**Deputy-voter congruence in terms of left-right self-placement**

First we analyse the levels of deputy-voter congruence, both overall and across parties. At the deputy level we use the party list on which the deputy was elected in order to separate parliamentarians by party. For the electorate, we use party identification to divide the population by their party sympathies. This was due to an increase in the number of cases vis-à-vis voting intention (2008); however, we have cross-checked the results.

Overall, and in line with the mainstream literature on this subject, we see Portuguese electors are slightly further
to the right in comparison with the deputies (Figure 5.1). Using the T-test for two population means (variances unknown and unequal) (Kanji 1999: 29), we found these differences are statistically significant. This characteristic has been largely supported by other European studies (Converse and Pierce 1986; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999; Thomassen and Schmitt 1997; Belchior 2010), and specifically in previous studies relying on Portuguese case research (Belchior 2007: Ch. 4.2; 2008).

**Figure 5.1: Left-right self-placement. Voters and deputies (frequency distributions)**

![Graph showing left-right self-placement](image)

**Notes:** T-test for two population means (variances unknown and unequal) (Kanji 1999: 29, 162). $T = 7.41; V=135/1040$. Critical Value of $T_{135}, 0.025=1.96$. Reject the null hypothesis ($H_0: \mu_1=\mu_2$).

**Source:** Portuguese Mass and MPs Surveys (2008) in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).

Using the party dyads and the average position by party we can see the right-wing conservative Social Democratic Centre and the centre-left Socialist Party are the more congruent parties (Figure 5.2). In fact, using the appropriate statistical test (see above) we found that only in the case of
these two parties are the differences between deputies and voters not significant; in the case of the other three parties (Left Bloc, Democratic Unity Coalition and Social Democrats) those differences are always significant. On the radi

**Figure 5.2: Left-right self-placement by party. Voters and deputies (averages)**

![Figure 5.2: Left-right self-placement by party. Voters and deputies (averages)](image)

**Legend:** Bloco de Esquerda (Left Bloc), CDU-PCP (Democratic Unity Coalition), PS (Socialist Party), PPD-PSD (Social Democratic Party), CDS/PP (Social Democratic Centre).

**Notes:** T-test for two population means (variances unknown and unequal). Left Bloc—T=5.15, V=8, critical value of T8, 0.025=2.31*; Democratic Unity Coalition—T=10.74, V=9, critical value of T9, 0.025=2.26*; Socialist Party—T=-7.03, V=95, critical value of T95, 0.025=1.96**; Social Democratic Party—T=10.78, V=21, critical value of T21, 0.025=2.08*; Social Democratic Centre—T=0.57, V=8, critical value of T8, 0.025=2.31** [* Reject the null hypothesis (Ho: μ1=μ2). ** Does not reject the null hypothesis (Ho: μ1=μ2).]

**Source:** Portuguese Mass and MPs Surveys (2008) in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).

cal left, we find the less congruent parties, with deputies of both the left-wing libertarian Left Bloc and the communist/environmentalist Democratic Unity Coalition
being to the left of their sympathisers. These same party trends have been found in the above-mentioned Portuguese surveys, although a set of other congruence measures have been used (Belchior 2008: 463–5).

Using the complete distributions instead of average positions we get rather similar conclusions. The only additional features worth mentioning are that the average congruence for the Social Democratic Centre is largely due to the peculiar situation in that its sympathisers are distributed across the scale (positions 3–8), although with a concentration in positions 7 and 8 (where the numbers are even higher than those for deputies), while the party’s deputies are concentrated in positions 6–8. Of course, we should bear in mind the absolute number of deputies representing the Social Democratic Centre (12, of which eight were interviewed), the Left Bloc (eight elected and interviewed) and the Democratic Unity Coalition (14 elected, ten interviewed), is rather low.

**Deputy-voter congruence in terms of issue preferences**

Are the previous results for deputy-voter congruence based on left-right self-placement also true in terms of substantive issue preferences? At the mass level, left-right self-placement was found to correlate with major issue conflicts in both advanced industrial democracies and new democracies, particularly with classical economic issues associated with the class cleavage, and also with new politics issues such as materialist/post-materialist or authoritarian/libertarian divides (Inglehart and Klingeman 1976; Inglehart 1984; Knutsen 1997; Flanagan and Lee
2003; Freire 2008). Some have even described ‘left-right’ as a kind of ‘super-issue’, summarising preferences in terms of several packages of issues (Inglehart and Klingeman 1976; Downs 1957).

However, can we really use left-right placement as a proxy for measuring deputy-voter congruence in terms of substantive issue preferences? As we said above, we use Portugal as an extreme case in which the conditions for this to happen are least likely, mainly because of its low levels of education, media exposure and political interest—all of which are related with lower levels of ideological sophistication (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Freire and Belchior forthcoming), the poor clarity of policy alternatives presented to the electorate by the parties (Freire 2008) and the low level of left-right self-placement anchoring in issue positions/values (Freire 2008). Thus, if we find left-right placement to be a good proxy for measuring deputy-voter congruence in terms of substantive issue preferences here, we can reasonably extend the conclusions to other (less extreme) cases.

To measure issue preferences we asked both deputies and voters to state their level of agreement or disagreement (on a 1–5 scale) with 18 issue statements arranged in two subsets that can be said to measure both the ‘economic left-right’ and the ‘libertarian-authoritarian divide’. All of the questions were re-coded so higher values mean either economic right or authoritarian positions. After applying the Cronbach’s alpha to each battery of issues, we arrived at two additive indexes (issues summed up and divided by the relevant number of questions) (Tables 5.1 and 5.2).
Table 5.1: Additive battery of ‘economic left-right’ issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voters</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics should abstain from intervening in the economy.</td>
<td>Politics should abstain from intervening in the economy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing a stable network of social security should be the prime goal of government.</td>
<td>Providing a stable network of social security should be the prime goal of government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people.</td>
<td>Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education should mainly be provided by the state.</td>
<td>Globalisation should be promoted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care should mainly be provided by the state.</td>
<td>Education should mainly be provided by the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The present levels of social protection must be maintained even if it means tax increases.</td>
<td>Health care should mainly be provided by the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater efforts have to be made to reduce income inequality.</td>
<td>The present levels of social protection must be maintained even if it means tax increases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth is more important than a balanced budget.</td>
<td>Greater efforts have to be made to reduce income inequality.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Voters—Cronbach’s alpha (after removing ‘Globalisation should be promoted’ variable)=0.725. Deputies—Cronbach’s alpha (after removing ‘Economic growth is more important than a balanced budget’ variable)=0.580.

We can see the variables in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 are basically the same for both voters and deputies (the exclusion of variables in each case was due to the results of the
Table 5.2: Additive battery of ‘authoritarian-libertarian index’ issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voters</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stronger measures should be taken to protect the environment.</td>
<td>Immigrants should be required to adapt to the customs of Portugal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same-sex marriages should be illegal.</td>
<td>Stronger measures should be taken to protect the environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women should get preferential treatment when applying for jobs and promotions.</td>
<td>Same-sex marriages should be illegal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawbreakers should receive stiffer sentences.</td>
<td>Lawbreakers should receive stiffer sentences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our democracy needs serious reform.</td>
<td>Our democracy needs serious reform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants are good for Portuguese economy.</td>
<td>Immigrants are good for Portuguese economy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion.</td>
<td>Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal should provide military assistance to the ‘war on terror’.</td>
<td>Portugal should provide military assistance to ‘the war on terror’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torturing a prisoner is never justified, even if it might prevent a terrorist attack.</td>
<td>Torturing a prisoner is never justified, even if it might prevent a terrorist attack.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cronbach’s alpha). However, since we are more concerned with the underlying variable (‘economic left-right’ and ‘authoritarian-libertarian’ issue preferences), we can be sure we are comparing the same underlying preferences (not to mention that the differences are negligible).  

In terms of the ‘economic left-right’ index we can see that, overall, there seems to be a higher level of congruence
between Portuguese deputies and voters (Figure 5.3), compared to a similar exercise in terms of left-right self-placement (Figure 5.1). In fact, appropriate statistical tests do reveal that in the case of socioeconomic issues there are no statistical differences between the two groups; the opposite was true for left-right self-placement. Moreover, where in terms of left-right self-placement there seemed to be a more pronounced cleavage because of a bimodal distribution (both at the mass and elite levels)—although the highest mode is located on the left—in terms of economic issues the distribution is clearly unimodal (and located exclusively on the left). Thus, although in terms of economic issue preferences both voters and deputies seemed mostly aligned to the left, in terms of left and right

Figure 5.3: Position on the economic left-right index. Voters and deputies (%)

the polarization it is much clearer, especially at the deputy level: voters tend to locate at the centre (although with a bimodal distribution), while deputies are more differentiated (bimodal distribution)—although they lean more to the left than voters.

**Figure 5.4: Position on the economic left-right index by party. Voters and deputies**

![Graph showing position on the economic left-right index by party.](image)

**Legend:** Bloco de Esquerda (Left Bloc), CDU-PCP (Democratic Unity Coalition), PS (Socialist Party), PPD-PSD (Social Democratic Party), CDS/PP (Social Democratic Centre).

**Source:** Portuguese Mass and MPs Surveys (2008) in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).

Analysing the party dyads (Figure 5.4) we also arrive at a similar conclusion: greater congruence in terms of economic issue positions than in terms of ideological self-placement. In the former case, statistically significant differences occurred in three parties (Left Bloc, Democratic Unity Coalition and Social Democrats); in the latter this only happened in the case of the Left Bloc. However, the differences are not very great.
In terms of direction, radical-left parliamentarians are further to the left of their constituents. The novelties are that the Socialist Party is now the more congruent party (while before it was to the left of its sympathisers) and deputies who place themselves on the right are further to the right than their constituents (in terms of left-right self-placement, and apart from the overlap of the then more congruent party—the Social Democratic Centre, who were to the left of their sympathisers).

**Figure 5.5: Position on the economic left-right index.**

**Voters and deputies: Socialist Party (%)**

![Bar graph showing the position on the economic left-right index for voters and deputies of the Socialist Party.](image)

**Source:** Portuguese Mass and MPs Surveys (2008) in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).

Analysing the complete distribution by party (deputies against voters) we arrive at basically the same conclusion, except perhaps in the case of Socialist Party (Figure 5.5) where, in general, deputies seem to place themselves further to the right of their constituents, and overall average congruency is due to small right-wing segment of the socialist electorate inflating the average position.\(^{32}\)
Passing now to the analysis of deputy-voter congruence in terms of issues relating to the ‘authoritarian-libertarian’ index, we see that deputies are generally much closer to the libertarian/new-left pole than the electorate (Figure 5.6). Moreover, although the incongruence is in the same direction (with deputies to the left of the electorate), the difference is more pronounced than in terms of left-right self-placement (Figure 5.1). While in terms of left-right self-placement there seemed to be a more pronounced cleavage due to the bimodal distribution, in terms of authoritarian-libertarian issues the distribution is clearly
unimodal (and located on the new-left/libertarian pole for the deputies, and at the centre for the voters).

**Figure 5.7: Position on the libertarian-authoritarian index by party. Voters and deputies**

![Graph showing position on the libertarian-authoritarian index by party]

**Legend:** Bloco de Esquerda (Left Bloc), CDU-PCP (Democratic Unity Coalition), PS (Socialist Party), PPD-PSD (Social Democratic Party), CDS/PP (Social Democratic Centre).

**Source:** Portuguese Mass and MPs Surveys (2008) in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).

Nevertheless, while the value for the T-test is much higher now than in the case of left-right self-placement (for the same critical value), the truth is that in both cases we reject the null hypothesis that states voter and deputy distributions are equivalent.

Analysing the party dyads we see all the left-wing parties’ deputies are more distant from their supporters than deputies of the right-wing parties who more in harmony with their voters. Additionally, the Social Democratic Centre is the only party to the right of its supporters—albeit
only narrowly. Consideration of the complete distribution by party does not add anything to what has been said.

Statistical tests (for different population means) do reveal for all parties except the Social Democratic Centre, that the distributions of deputies’ issue preferences are significantly different from those of their voters. Recall that in the case of left-right self-placement the significant differences included both the radical left and the Social Democrats.

Thus, overall, we can say our first hypothesis is only partially confirmed: at the descriptive level similar results seem to hold when we compared deputies’ and voters’ left-right self-placement with their positions on economic left-right issues than when we compare the former with their positions on authoritarian-libertarian issues. However, we also found some mismatches when we compared deputies’ and voters’ left-right self-placement with their positions on economic left-right issues. Moreover, in terms of statistical testing, we found the distribution of both their economic issue preferences is basically similar; the opposite was true both in terms of left-right self-placement and authoritarian-libertarian issues.

The structure of determination of left-right self-placement among deputies and voters

In the present section we seek to discover whether the correlates of left-right self-placement are the same for deputies and voters. This is yet another means of finding out if we can use left-right self-placement as a proxy to
measure the level of congruence in terms of substantive issue preferences between deputies and the electorate. Ever since Inglehart and Klingemann’s seminal paper (1976: 244–45), there has been a consensus that individuals’ self-placement on the left-right axis has had three major components: social, issue/value and partisan (1976: 244; Huber 1989; Knutsen 1995; 1997; Fuchs and Klingemann 1990: 207; Freire 2008). Bearing in mind this literature, in table 5.3 (citizen) and 5.4 (deputy) we compare the structure of determination of ideological self-placement across citizens and their parliamentary representatives. In each case we have three sets of variables introduced by blocs in the ordinary least square regressions: one for social factors, another for issue preferences and one for partisan orientations.

Looking carefully at tables 5.3 and 5.4, we fully confirm our second and partially confirm our third hypotheses: deputies’ left-right self-placement is indeed more anchored in issue preferences than the left-right self-placement of the individual citizen. Thus at the elite level, left-right is more strongly and multi-dimensionally correlated with substantive issue preferences, which can be said to be a result of higher political engagement (Converse and Pierce 1986: 135–40; Freire and Belchior 2011).
Table 5.3: Explaining left-right self-placement. Citizen level (ordinary least squares regression, stepwise)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social class 1: Professionals 1</th>
<th>Social factors</th>
<th>Social factors and issues</th>
<th>Social factors, issues and party identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.151***</td>
<td>-0.143***</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social class 2: Professionals 2</th>
<th>Excluded</th>
<th>Excluded</th>
<th>Excluded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social class 3: Clerks and Salesmen</th>
<th>Social factors</th>
<th>Social factors and issues</th>
<th>Social factors, issues and party identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.121***</td>
<td>-0.100**</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social class 4: Manuel labourers</th>
<th>Social factors</th>
<th>Social factors and issues</th>
<th>Social factors, issues and party identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.268***</td>
<td>-0.225***</td>
<td>-0.071**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Church attendance</th>
<th>Excluded</th>
<th>Excluded</th>
<th>Excluded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic left-right index</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.141***</td>
<td>0.095***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian-libertarian index</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party identity</th>
<th>Social factors</th>
<th>Social factors and issues</th>
<th>Social factors, issues and party identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-0.130***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU-PCP</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-0.182***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.579***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS/PP</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.242***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Adjusted R² | 0.050 | 0.054 | 0.526 |
| N (valid)   | 801   | 601   | 432   |

**Legend:** BE (Left Bloc), CDU-PCP (Democratic Unity Coalition), PSD (Socialist Party), PPD-PSD (Social Democratic Party), CDS/PP (Democratic Social Centre).

**Note:** Social class reference group—bourgeoisie, party identity reference group—Socialist Party. *p=0.1, **p=0.05, ***p=0.01

**Source:** Portuguese Mass and MPs Surveys (2008) in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).
Table 5.4: Explaining left-right self-placement. Deputy level (ordinary least squares regression, stepwise)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social factors</th>
<th>Social factors and issues</th>
<th>Social factors, issues and Party List</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social class 1:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals 1</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social class 2:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals 2</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance</td>
<td>0.414***</td>
<td>0.326***</td>
<td>0.268***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic left-right index</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.254**</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian-libertarian index</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.272**</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party list:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU-PCP</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.382***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS/PP</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.510***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.347</td>
<td>0.452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (valid)</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend:** BE (LeftBloc), CDU-PCP (Democratic Unity Coalition), PS (Socialist Party), PPD-PSD (Social Democratic Party), CDS/PP (Democratic Social Centre).

**Note:** Social class reference group—bourgeoisie, party identity reference group—Socialist Party *p=0.1, **p=0.05, ***p=0.01

**Source:** Portuguese Mass and MPs Surveys (2008) in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).

However, the results for our third hypothesis are more complex: we expected to find the left-right self-placement of elites less anchored in social cleavages and political identities than individual citizens. In the case of social factors, the evidence runs against H3: the level of variance explained is more important in the case of deputies than for voters (and the type of factor is also different). Concerning party loyalties, they seem to be more important in the case
of citizens than in the case of deputies: thus confirming H3.

Finally, the partisan component of left-right self-placement refers to the part of an individual’s ideological orientation that mainly reflects partisan loyalties (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976: 244; Huber 1989; Knutsen 1997; Fuchs and Klingemann 1990: 207; Freire 2008).

The meaning of left-right to deputies and voters

In this final section we analyze the responses of both voters and deputies to two open-ended questions included in the two surveys: one about the meaning of the term ‘left’, the other about the meaning of the term ‘right’. The responses were then coded anywhere from 19 to 23 categories for each camp. However, following previous academic practices in the study of the meaning of ‘left’ and ‘right’ with open-ended questions (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Converse and Pierce 1986; Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Herrera 1999), we further recoded the answers into seven and five categories for the ‘right’ and the ‘left’ respectively.

One of the categories refers to the use of abstract concepts describing either the ‘right’ or the ‘left’ (see notes to tables 5.5 and 5.6). The second category refers to the use of issues to describe ‘right’ and ‘left’, while two other categories result from the association of the ‘right’ or the ‘left’ with either social or political groups. Two final categories refer to ‘No difference between left and right’, ‘don’t know’ and other responses. In terms of the meaning of the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ to deputies and voters, we have three further hypotheses.
Table 5.5: The meaning of ‘right’. Voters and deputies (by party bloc) (%)\(^{(c)}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Left-wing parties(^{(a)})</th>
<th>Right-wing parties(^{(b)})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>citizen deputy diff.</td>
<td>citizen deputy diff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract concepts(^{(a)})</td>
<td>19.5 26.7 -7.2</td>
<td>20.4 26 -5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues(^{(e)})</td>
<td>9.3 23.2 -13.9</td>
<td>15.6 24.6 -9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social groups(^{(f)})</td>
<td>36.0 13.5 22.5</td>
<td>12.4 14.9 -2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political groups(^{(g)})</td>
<td>4.3 15.6 -11.3</td>
<td>7.0 15.3 -8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political personalities(^{(b)})</td>
<td>0.6 5.2 -5.1</td>
<td>0.0 5.1 -5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No difference / Don’t know(^{(i)})</td>
<td>23.6 10.4 13.2</td>
<td>38.8 9.2 29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6.6 5.0 1.6</td>
<td>5.9 4.9 1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>521 1652 –</td>
<td>355 1003 –</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (a) Left Bloc, Democratic Unity Coalition, Socialist Party. (b) Social Democratic Centre, Social Democratic Party. (c) Multiple responses set, percentages are calculated vis-à-vis the total number of responses. (d) Abstract concepts are capitalism, traditional values/conservatism, fascism, democracy and liberty, dictatorial government, liberalism. (e) Giving preference to economic affairs, privatizations, evolution and social mobility, government guided by what is in the interests of the people/society, social injustice/social inequality. (f) Social groups include those that defend large economic group interests, valorisation of the higher social classes, employers associations. (g) Socialist Party, Social Democratic Party, Social Democratic Centre. (h) Salazar. (i) No difference/don’t know—no difference between left and right/don’t know.


In tables 5.5 and 5.6 we compare the meanings attributed to each ideological camp by partisans belonging to each camp (voters and deputies from both left-wing and right-wing parties).

In Table 5.5 we consider the meanings attributed to the term ‘right’. In terms of left-wing and right-wing partisans, we see voters are much more likely to believe there is no difference between left and right ‘don’t know’ than deputies are, thus confirming H6. On the other hand,
deputies tend more to refer to the ‘right’ using either abstract concepts or issues than voters, thus confirming H4.

Table 5.6: The meaning of ‘left’. Voters and deputies (by party bloc) (%)\(^{(c)}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Left-wing parties(^{(a)})</th>
<th>Right-wing parties(^{(b)})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>citizen</td>
<td>deputy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract concepts(^{(d)})</td>
<td>21.18</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues(^{(e)})</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political groups(^{(f)})</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No difference / Don’t know(^{(g)})</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>1663</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (a) Left Bloc, Democratic Unity Coalition, Socialist Party. (b) Democratic Social Centre, Social Democratic Party. (c) Multiple responses set, percentages are calculated vis-à-vis the total number of responses. (d) Abstract concepts are revolutionary/progressive politics, communism, socialism, popular government, liberal values (in habits, life styles), totalitarianism, democracy and liberty, democratic government, opposition. (e) Concerns with social affairs, concern with industrial relations, equal rights, the primacy of the public over the private, greater state intervention in society and the economy. (f) Socialist Party, Left Bloc, Portuguese Communist Party, Democratic Unity, Social Democratic Centre. (g) No difference/don’t know—no difference between left and right/don’t know.


In terms of the meaning of the ‘right’, we can see there are important mismatches between deputies and voters: the latter have a less clear picture about the meaning of this ideological camp and use less abstract concepts and/or issues to refer to it than the former. However, neither feature is a novelty in comparative terms (Converse 1964; Converse and Pierce 1986; Herrera 1999).

Additionally, we can also see deputies associate more often than voters’ political groups to the ‘right’. In terms of
the association of social groups to the ‘right’ the incongruence is different according to which partisan groups we are talking about (left: more voters than deputies; right: more deputies than voters). Thus, in respect of H5 the evidence is mixed: sometimes confirming it, other times not.

With respect to the meaning of the term ‘left’ (Table 5.6), a first remarkable element is that the category ‘social groups’ is absent both for the electors and for deputies. On the other hand, we note we found similar mismatches between voters and deputies as those found for the meaning of the term ‘right’, thus confirming our hypotheses (H4 and H6). In the case of category issues, the direction of incongruence is different for left-wing (more voters than deputies) and right-wing parties (more deputies than voters). This latter element partially disproves H4. Deputies more often use political groups to refer to the ‘left’ than the voters, which also partially disproves H5.

Conclusions

In the empirical study of political representation in democratic systems deputy-voter congruence is usually evaluated either in terms of issue preferences or in terms of left-right self-placement. Even when these measures of political representation are used jointly, they are seldom if ever used with the purpose for which they have been used here: i.e. to find out if levels of congruence (or lack thereof) are similar using either left-right self-placement or substantive issue preferences.
Due to the usual limited clarity on the policy alternatives presented by the parties to the electorate, and to the relatively low levels of mass education, media exposure and political interest found in Portugal, we used it as an extreme case in which it might be likely to find significant differences in the levels of congruence in terms of left-right self-placement vis-à-vis congruence in terms of substantive issue preferences.

Due to its extreme characteristics, this case was intended to inform us to what extent we may use congruence in terms of left-right self-placement as a proxy of congruence in terms of substantive issue preferences.

First, we found that in terms of ‘economic left-right’ issue positions there seems to be a higher level of congruence among Portuguese deputies and voters compared to the congruence in terms of left-right self-placement.

Additionally, in terms of left-right self-placement a more pronounced cleavage seems to exist: there is a bimodal distribution at both citizen and deputy level, although the highest mode is located on the left. The same was not found in relation to economic issues, where the distribution of the preferences of deputies and voters was clearly unimodal, with the mode located entirely on the left.

Analysing the party dyads, we also arrive at a similar conclusion: there is greater congruence in terms of economic issue positions than in terms of ideological self-placement.

Second, comparing deputy-voter congruence in terms of left-right self-placement with the same phenomenon in terms of ‘authoritarian-libertarian’ issues, we note deputies
in general are much closer to the libertarian/new-left pole than voters. Moreover, while this incongruence is in the same direction as it was in terms of left-right self-placement (deputies to the left of the electorate), the difference here is more pronounced in terms of left-right self-placement. Where in terms of left-right self-placement there seemed to be a more pronounced cleavage because there was a bimodal distribution, in terms of authoritarian-libertarian issues the distribution was clearly unimodal, and the mode for deputies was located on the libertarian pole, while for voters it was at the centre.

Parenthetically, we could ask what are the reasons for the low levels of congruence on authoritarian-libertarian (according to expectations) and the very high levels of congruence on economic left-right (differing from expectations)? It is not easy to answer this question with the available data; however, we can suggest some explanations.

From several surveys across decades, we know the Portuguese are rather conservatives in terms of life-style; however, urban educated elites are more liberal, and this might account for the mismatch in the libertarian-authoritarian divide. On the other hand, past evidence also tells us the Portuguese are more progressive in terms of economic issues (pro-state and pro-welfare state, etc.). Curiously deputies (from both left- and right-wing parties) also seem aligned with this tendency. Of course, this might be for several reasons: the temptation to adjust to the median voter; a tendency to give socially-desirable answers; or problems of internal validity with at least some of the questions in the questionnaires. We should bear in
mind we are using statements and not actual enacted behaviour/policies.

We also found there are significant differences in left-right correlates at the citizen and deputy levels: for the former they are mainly partisan loyalties, while for the latter they are social factors (religion), issue positions and partisan loyalties.

Finally, using the responses to the open-ended questions about the meaning of ‘right’ and ‘left’, we found the electorate are more likely than deputies to choose the response ‘no difference between left and right’ or, more usually, ‘don’t know’. On the other hand, deputies are more likely than voters to refer to the ‘right’ and the ‘left’ using either abstract concepts or issues. In terms of the meaning of ‘right’ and ‘left’, we note there are important mismatches between deputies and voters, in which the latter have a less clear understanding of the meaning of the ideological field and will use less abstract concepts and/or issues to refer to it than deputies. While neither feature is a novelty in comparative terms, they can produce problems in political communication and in the use of left-right self-placement as a measurement of issue congruence.

Thus, we have found that in many situations the results for deputy-voter congruence are different whether we use left-right self-placement or substantive issue preferences (especially for economic left-right issues). In terms of economic issues, both voters and deputies seem more aligned to the left; however, in terms of libertarian-authoritarian issues, deputies are usually much further to the left-libertarian pole than those who elect them.
In terms of left-right self-placement, deputies are also to the left of their voters—especially in the case of left-wing parties—although this mismatch is less than in the case of the authoritarian-libertarian divide. These results might account for the multi-dimensionality of the left-right dimension: it is both a reflection of economic issues and social issues (like those included in the authoritarian-libertarian dimension), and that is perhaps why the mismatch in terms of left-right self-placement is mid-way between what we found for economic issues (almost no mismatch) and authoritarian-libertarian issues (a large mismatch).

All these mismatches mean some problems in political communication might result from the left-right language, and that ‘left’ and ‘right’ might not be a well-suited indicator for measuring issue congruence. Of course, Portugal is an extreme case, and our results may be due to that fact (and the evidence we found might be only applicable for similar cases). More comparative study is clearly needed in this area, research that will ascertain if the results apply in countries with more polarised party systems and/or in which there are higher average levels of education, media exposure and political interest.
Appendix: Questions on issue positions

**CCS_L30.** People hold different views on political issues. What do you think of the following? *(SHOW CARD 15)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCS_L30.1 Immigrants should be required to adapt to the customs of Portugal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>(98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics should abstain from intervening in the economy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>(98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS_L30.2 Stronger measures should be taken to protect the environment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>(98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same-sex marriages should be illegal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>(98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS_L30.5 Politics should abstain from intervening in the economy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>(98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS_L30.6 Women should get preferential treatment when applying for jobs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>(98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS_L30.7 Lawbreakers should receive stiffer sentences. Providing a stable</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>(98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS_L30.8 Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>(98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS_L30.9 Our democracy needs serious reform.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>(98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS_L30.10 Immigrants are good for Portuguese economy.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>(98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS_L30.11 Torturing a prisoner is never justified, even if it might prevent a terrorist attack.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>(98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Statement</td>
<td>Options</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS_L30.14</td>
<td>Globalisation should be promoted.</td>
<td>1□  2□  3□  4□  5□</td>
<td>(98)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS_L30.15</td>
<td>Education should mainly be provided by the state</td>
<td>1□  2□  3□  4□  5□</td>
<td>(98)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS_L30.16</td>
<td>Health care should mainly be provided by the state</td>
<td>1□  2□  3□  4□  5□</td>
<td>(98)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS_L30.17</td>
<td>The present levels of social protection must be maintained even if it means tax increases</td>
<td>1□  2□  3□  4□  5□</td>
<td>(98)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS_L30.18</td>
<td>Greater efforts have to be made to reduce income inequality</td>
<td>1□  2□  3□  4□  5□</td>
<td>(98)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS_L30.19</td>
<td>Economic growth is more important than a balanced budget</td>
<td>1□  2□  3□  4□  5□</td>
<td>(98)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


The analysis of congruence between elites and electors is a central topic in the literature on political representation. Focusing on it, we study representation by exploring deputy-voter issue congruence. Although the examination of representation implies varied levels of analysis, ranging from the formation of citizens’ preferences to policy outcomes, we disregard the diachronic analysis underlying that process and focus on the synchronic analysis of citizens and their policy issue congruence towards the parliamentarians.

Using data from two recent surveys: one conducted on Portuguese deputies and other on Portuguese voters, this chapter will address three main goals.

First, we will assess if there is a common structure of attitudes in terms of policy preferences between deputies and voters. We consider this topic using principal component analysis and compare the solutions across the both samples.

Second, we assess the levels of deputy-voter policy congruence. With the exception of Belchior (2007; 2008) we are unaware of any significant research on Portuguese party representation or on deputy-voter policy congruence.
This being so, we intend to address this by comparing deputy-voter policy preferences within Portuguese political parties.

Third, relying on the results of the principal component analysis and empirical knowledge of the major dimensions of political conflict, we use two composite indices of policy preferences—left-right issues and libertarian-authoritarian issues—to explore the predictive importance of the social and political characteristics in explaining the policy preferences of both the deputies and the voters (particularly left-right self-placement).

The empirical study of representation usually requires equivalent databases for citizens and parliamentarians, which probably explains why the literature on this subject is not as extensive as it is on other areas. As we are comparing voters with deputies, the study of this subject also requires some parsimony in research design, especially when opting for cross-national analysis. For these reasons our research focuses on the Portuguese case—a little-studied case even in comparative terms—where we will explore three important perspectives on policy representation in detail supported in a broad set of policy issue preferences.

Notwithstanding the fact the analysis is centred on Portugal, the findings will contribute to a better understanding of policy representation, and can stand as an empirical reference for other case studies conducted using similar research designs.

We begin with a short overview and discussion of the theory underlying the topic, following which we explain the research goals and hypotheses before presenting the
data analysis options and sources. Finally, we discuss the empirical findings corresponding to our three goals.

**Policy issue representation: Literature discussion**

Despite the debate on what representation should mean, and on how it should be put into practice, it is broadly and normatively assumed representatives should serve the interests of those they represent. It is generally agreed mandatory approaches to democracy presuppose an understanding of representation that may contradict democratic values. Furthermore, it is widely recognised the empirical implementation of straightforward deputy-voter congruence is impracticable (Pierce 1999: 25; Thomassen and Schmitt 1999a: 186; 1999b: 19).

Nevertheless, although the mandatory perspective should not be understood as the legitimate vision of democratic representation (Eulau and Karps 1977: 233–54; Jewell 1983; Thomassen 1994: 238, 257–8), it does seem to offer an important framework for studying the topic. Thus, in this chapter representation is measured in terms of the congruence between electors and their representatives. This perspective goes back to the seminal work of Miller and Stokes (1963), later developed by others (Barnes 1977; Converse and Pierce 1986; Miller et al. 1999; May 1973).

In our study, deputy-voter congruence is not seen as a sign of better democratic representation or as a normative good in itself, but rather as a means of studying representation in which constraints should be acknowledged. For the purpose of this study, congruence and representation are synonymous.
The ‘responsible party model’ has been the most common theoretical background to studies on representation. It views political parties as the core mechanism in the process of democratic representation. On the one hand, it requires voters to judiciously consider their vote using information about the parties’ positions and by rewarding and punishing incumbent parties based on their performance. On the other hand, the party system is expected to be competitive and parties are expected to offer distinct policy options, to impose discipline and effectively carry out their electoral mandates.

It is the decisions of the voters that indirectly control political alternative, since the party will carry out the pledges it made in accordance with the will of the voters who elected it. According to this model, individuals should vote for the party with opinions closest to their own, and parties should respond to voters’ preferences (Converse and Pierce 1986: 499–501, 699; Pierce 1999: 9; Thomassen 1999: 251–2; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999: Chs 6–9).

Criticisms have been directed at this model, both because it must be questioned whether voters give political parties a clear mandate, and due to its assumption political parties are the exclusive agents of representation (Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996: Ch. 15; Thomassen 1999: 34–5; Dye and Zeigler 2006: 180–1, 203–5). Criticisms aside, however, this model allows our approach to be theoretically supported. Indeed, our specific aim is to centre the analysis on political parties as privileged agents of political representation and assess the extent to which they constitute an efficient link between voters and leaders.
There is considerable evidence European party systems support the responsible party model rather well (Dalton 1985: 270–1; Kitschelt and Rehm 2004; Thomassen and Andeweg 2004: 48–9, 61), so we consider the normative assumptions of the model as our theoretical benchmark. That is to say, assuming voters tend to behave consistently and parties perform responsively, we intend to estimate the proximity between deputies and the electorate in terms of policy issue preferences.

**Research goals and hypotheses**

The first goal is to explore if there is a common structure of attitudes in terms of deputies’ and voters’ policy preferences. Previous research on representation has only occasionally explored this matter—supported with data from the European Parliament (surveys carried on in 1979): Dalton’s research is one of the few (1985).

Considering a set of 13 issue items, Dalton showed that although the same dimensions emerged for both citizens and members of the European Parliament, the composition of some dimensions differed between the two groups (1985: 273–5). These findings are consistent with the idea deputies and voters are dissimilar political actors: the former characterised by greater political sophistication, stability and consistency in political attitudes, while the latter see politics as a rather complex subject and show lower levels of stability and consistency in political attitudes (Converse 1964: 213–4; Converse and Pierce 1986: Ch. 7; Dye and Zeigler 2006: 3).
Likewise, we intend to assess the preference structure of both citizens and deputies using up-to-date data and a broad set of 19 policy issues covering the major political conflicts in modern democracies. Methodological procedures shall be presented.

Our first hypothesis is that while the attitude structures of deputies and citizens are not expected to be equivalent, important similarities should be apparent.

The second goal is to estimate the level of deputy-voter congruence within Portuguese political parties (and overall) for each one of the policy issue sets. In this respect, while some studies have reported the existence of a crisis in representation (Porras Nadales 1996), others have argued political parties represent public preferences well (Dalton 1985: 293–4; Klingemann 1995: 195). Generally speaking, low indices of congruence have been detected between voters and parties (Thomassen 1994; Pierce 1999).

The degree of congruence seems to vary according to the type of issue: being higher for socio-economic or moral issues, lower for foreign policy matters and non-existent for topics such as law and order (Thomassen 1994: 255; Thomassen and Schmitt 1999a: 199). However, these trends are neither stable nor susceptible to generalisation as they may involve other nuances (Dalton 1985, 380–1; Thomassen 1999, 45–52).

Notwithstanding these uncertainties, the comparative study of deputies’ (or European deputies’) and citizens’ positions have also led to the repetition of some findings. While it has largely been demonstrated party elites tend to be ideologically more polarised (Dalton 1985: 275; Converse and Pierce 1986: 128; Esaiasson and Holmberg
in this respect, and bearing in mind the conditions of the responsible party model, Valen and Narud argue ‘representatives generally adopt more extreme standpoints than their voters … on the “core issues”’, because ‘voters do not necessarily wish to vote for parties that reflect their own views … but rather prefer the parties that occupy a more extreme position than they do themselves’ (2007: 300).

More than assessing the levels of congruence across a set of 19 items, it is our aim to discover if traditional issues characterising the left-right cleavage produce more or less congruence than new issues related to the libertarian-authoritarian divide. To achieve this we constructed two additive indices: one on the left-right socio-economic dimension, another on the libertarian-authoritarian dimension.

The first is concerned with state intervention in the economy and society, combating inequality and attitudes towards globalisation (for a review of the literature see Freire 2006; 2008) (Table 6.3), while the latter is concerned with life-style issues (e.g. abortion, same sex marriage), authority, immigration and environmental protection, etc. (Flanagan and Lee 2003; Kitschelt and Rehm 2004) (Table 6.4).

Due to its importance in shaping the political debate in most European countries, it is expected socio-economic issues anchored in the left-right dimension will produce higher levels of deputy-voter congruence than libertarian-authoritarian issues.
Our second hypothesis is that policy issues anchored in the left-right divide are expected to produce higher levels of deputy-voter congruence than policy issues anchored in the libertarian-authoritarian dimension.

The third goal is to assess how the social and political characteristics of deputies and voters explain their respective policy preferences. While recognising some party and party system features, as well as some institutional system rules, can be determinant in this explanation (Dalton 1985: 294; Powell 2000), given that our research is focused on the Portuguese case and we need to keep the research focused, only some of the deputies’ and electorate’s characteristics are considered.

Since left-right (or liberal-conservative) has been seen as a scheme upholding the organisation of individual political thought and behaviour (Converse 1964: 214–9), and the literature suggests left-right self-placement captures the policy preferences of parliamentarians and citizens reasonably well (Powell 2000: 162–3; McDonald and Budge 2005: 31–8, 228), left-right self-positioning is integrated as core variable to explain individuals’ policy preferences.

Although this might seem to be something of a tautology, since we seek to explain the preference for left-right socio-economic issues by left-right self-placement, the fact is both variables are plainly independent from a statistical point of view. The former is based on citizens’ preferences towards substantive policies: the latter corresponds to the abstract self-positioning in the left-right scale. The purpose of this analysis is precisely to assess whether the latter produces a stronger correlation compared
to other independent variables, such as religiosity, social class or party identification (particularly regarding socio-economic policy preferences) (Flanagan and Lee 2003; Freire and Belchior 2009). These explanatory variables have been traditionally referred as main predictors of political divides (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Kitschelt and Rehm 2004).

Which leads us to our third hypothesis: the left-right self-placement of deputies and citizens is expected to be the most significant single variable in the explanation of policy preferences, particularly in respect of socio-economic policy issues anchored in the traditional left-right cleavage.

Some authors have shown greater levels of effective representation occur when individuals are connected to a political party and when they are more involved in politics (Barnes 1977: Ch. 8, 132; Hill and Anderson 1995). Additionally, considering Converse’s (1964) and Zaller’s (1992) studies, it is essentially citizens’ political sophistication that allows them to make rational political decisions (Freire and Belchior forthcoming). That is, the informed and politically engaged citizens are better able to choose efficiently the party best fitting their preferences.

Their effective knowledge of parties’ policy positions is therefore the determinant factor in explaining individuals’ policy choices. For this reason political information is expected to interfere with the voters’ ability to express policy preferences: that is, political information should intensify the effect of an individual’s socio-political characteristics on their policy preferences. Thus, the voters in this analysis are organised in two groups: those with low levels of political information, and those with high levels.34
Finally, well-informed electors are expected to be closer to deputies in terms of the structures of policy preference determination.

The general purpose now is to compare the structures of policy preference determination by deputies and voters, which leads us to our fourth hypothesis: the structure of policy preference determination (left-right socio-economic issues and libertarian-authoritarian issues) is expected to be different according to the extent of the voters knowledge, with better-informed citizens demonstrating a structure of determination similar to that of the deputies.

**Data and methods**

Representation is often said to be a complex concept that goes beyond the assessment of deputy-voter congruence. However, this congruence can be seen as a valid instrument with which to assess representation—albeit limited to measuring the distance between the positions of the representatives and of the electorate.

To this extent, representation occurs if the deputies share the same ideological positioning and/or policy preferences of those citizens who voted for them, or those whom they represent. This straightforward approach to representation provides helpful information about the level of the representatives’ responsiveness. Therefore, in this research congruence is measured by comparing the similarities and differences between the relative distributions of deputies and voters.

The data analysis is supported by the two surveys (the mass survey and the survey of deputies) referred to in the
book’s introduction, which were conducted in Portugal during 2008 as part of the Portuguese deputies in comparative perspective: Elections, leadership, and representation project.35

An equivalent questionnaire was used for both Portuguese citizens and deputies, covering basically the same topics. Specifically, with the purpose of studying deputy-voter congruence in terms of policy preferences, deputies and voters were asked to respond to a set of 19 comparative questions. The study of political representation using such a large battery of indicators covering the main political conflict dimensions had never before been carried out in Portugal. Those items seek to tap two perspectives of conflict: the traditional left-right divide, and the libertarian-authoritarian dimension, as presented above.

With the purpose of obtaining qualitative data on what meanings citizens attribute to left and right, in-depth interviews we also carried out using a sample of 22 Portuguese citizens aged 18 or over and living on the mainland (Freire, Viegas and Seiceira 2009). The sample includes citizens who voted for one of the five Portuguese parties represented in parliament and those who did not vote.

The structure of policy preferences

Are issue items appreciated and interconnected in terms of the same general issue dimensions for both electors and deputies? Do both actors evidence the same attitudes’ structure regarding policy preferences? Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present principal component analysis with rotated
component matrixes constricted to two factors—respectively to assess the attitudes of voters and of deputies.

**Table 6.1: Voter attitude structure in terms of policy preferences (principal component analysis rotated component matrix constrained to two factors)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>F1&lt;sup&gt;(a)&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>F2&lt;sup&gt;(b)&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health care should be mainly provided by the state</td>
<td>0.806</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education should mainly be provided by the state</td>
<td>0.796</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing a stable network of social security should be the prime goal of government</td>
<td>0.738</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater efforts have to be made to reduce income inequality</td>
<td>0.727</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our democracy needs serious reform</td>
<td>-0.673</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stronger measures should be taken to protect the environment</td>
<td>0.632</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people</td>
<td>0.629</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences</td>
<td>-0.505</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion</td>
<td>0.496</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalisation should be promoted</td>
<td>-0.625</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal should provide military assistance to the ‘war on terror’</td>
<td>-0.613</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The present levels of social protection must be maintained even if it means tax increases</td>
<td>0.608</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants are good for Portuguese economy</td>
<td>0.607</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% of variance                                           | 23.911 | 9.000 |
Total % of variance                                      | 32.91  |      |

**Notes:** (a) The role of the state and libertarian-authoritarian, (b) Globalisation, social protection and immigration. The extraction method used was principal component analysis. The rotation method was varimax with Kaiser normalisation a. Rotation converged in three iterations. KMO=0.828. Bartlett’s test, approximate Chi-Square=3796.957, df 171, Sig. 0.000. All variables were coded in such a way that higher values mean more liberal attitudes in socio-economic terms (old right) and more authoritarian attitudes (new right).  
Table 6.2: Deputies’ attitude structure in terms of policy preferences (principal component analysis rotated component matrix constrained to two factors)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>F1(a)</th>
<th>F2(b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education should mainly be provided by the state</td>
<td>0.745</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care should be mainly provided by the state</td>
<td>0.714</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion</td>
<td>0.696</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The present levels of social protection must be maintained even if it means tax increases</td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same-sex marriages should be illegal</td>
<td>0.561</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants should be required to adapt to the customs of Portugal</td>
<td>0.544</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences</td>
<td>0.530</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics should abstain from intervening in the economy</td>
<td>0.471</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater efforts have to be made to reduce income inequality</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth is more important than balancing the state budget</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our democracy needs serious reform</td>
<td>0.407</td>
<td>-0.445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants are good for Portuguese economy</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.439</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% of variance: 18.801 9.351
Total % of variance: 28.152

Notes: (a) The role of the state and libertarian-authoritarian. (b) Inequalities and democratic reform. Extraction method used was principal component analysis. The rotation method was varimax with Kaiser normalisation a. Rotation converged in three iterations. KMO: 0.604. Bartlett’s test: approximate Chi-Square 521.229, df 171, Sig. 0.000. All variables were coded in such a way that higher values mean more liberal attitudes in socio-economic terms (old right) and more authoritarian attitudes (new right).

Source: Portuguese MPs Survey (2008) in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009). First, we restricted the principal component analysis to only two factors. We see they appear to explain reasonably well the structure of deputy and voter attitudes in respect of their policy preferences. The first factor appears to cluster quite well around similar preferences of both actors, being supported in attitudes towards the role of the state and in libertarian-authoritarian issues. Although underlying the same issue dimension, this cluster is not composed of exactly the same issue preferences for the two groups. However, it is noteworthy that some of the most high-loading issues are equivalent among voters and deputies, especially the response to the questions ‘education should
mainly be provided by the state’ and ‘health care should be mainly provided by the state’.

As with Dalton’s findings (1985: 273–5), although the resulting dimensions of factor analysis do not allow us to conclude for a strictly equivalent pattern of evaluation and interrelation of issues between the two groups, it is true some significant correspondence occurs.

The second factor is not convergent. For electors it is organised around globalisation, social protection and immigration issues, while for deputies it is concerned with inequalities and democratic reform. This means that even while demonstrating significant similarities, deputies and electors do not value and organise their policy preferences in strictly equivalent modes. If we consider the greater political sophistication of the political elite compared to citizens, these are expected and reasonable findings.

Our first hypothesis is therefore supported by the data: that is—the attitude structures of Portuguese deputies and citizens are not equivalent, although very important similarities are noticeable.

In addition to the previous test, a principal component analysis was also undertaken for deputies and voters without restrictions in terms of the number of factors to be extracted.36

This analysis allows us to reiterate the preceding conclusions and restate support for our hypothesis. The most important preference clusters exhibit significant correspondence between electors and deputies, showing they do share a similar structure of attitudes for the most important policy issues. Heterogeneity between them grows
as we move to less important factors (in terms of the level of variance explained).

**Policy congruence between voters and deputies**

As in other Western European parliamentary democracies, Portuguese parties are not only fundamental actors in the democratic process, they are also the key official channels linking the will of the people with their representation in parliament. The link provided by elections serves as a base upon which to assess deputy-voter congruence (Dalton 1985: 278; Powell 2000: 5; McDonald and Budge 2005). The role of parties as linkage mechanisms has been the focus of little attention in the Portuguese case: this study aims to contribute towards filling this gap.

Our analysis focuses on the parties currently represented in the Assembly of the Republic. The centre-left Socialist Party and the centre-right Social Democratic Party are the largest. They are commonly considered catch-all parties and have been alternating in government (either alone or in coalition) since 1976.

To the right of the Social Democratic Party is the Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party. Closest to the cadre party type, it represents mainly conservative voters.

The Portuguese Communist Party is a Marxist-Leninist party, and is also the only one that can properly be considered a mass party. Since 1991, the Portuguese Communist Party has competed in elections in the Democratic Unity Coalition with the Ecology Party ‘The Greens’. Thus, for analytical purposes the Democratic
Unity Coalition is the unit analysed. Finally, the remaining left-wing party is the Left Bloc—a left-libertarian party.

We now focus on the extent of deputy-voter policy congruence, both overall and within the parties. Bearing in mind the literature on the left-right and authoritarian-libertarian divides (Knutsen 1997; Freire 2006; 2008; Flanagan and Lee 2003), policy issues are organised in two major dimensions: socio-economic left-right issues, and libertarian-authoritarian issues. The results are presented in Tables 6.3 and 6.4.

First, considering the socio-economic issues usually associated with the left-right dimension (Table 6.3), two policies stick out: ‘income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people’, and ‘greater effort would have to be made to reduce income inequalities’, which simultaneously show the highest percentages of support by both deputies and voters (above 90 per cent). Thus, we can say Portuguese voters across all parties largely agree with deputies (also across all parties) in respect of giving greater importance to income and wealth redistribution policies: both agree with the need for a more balanced society in social terms. It is important to note that according to the in-depth interviews with the citizens wealth redistribution is perceived by the Portuguese as a core policy of the left (Freire, Viegas and Seiceira 2009). However, in general this data reveals Portuguese voters, deputies and parties have a noticeable leftwards bent.

If we now turn more specifically to the party level, it is interesting to note the most ideologically anchored party, the Democratic Unity Coalition, is the one more clearly exhibiting lower proportional levels of disagreement for the
items that structure its ideology better. This is true in relation to responses to the statements ‘income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people’, ‘education should mainly be provided by the state’, ‘health care should be mainly provided by the state’, ‘the present levels of social protection must be kept the same even if means an increase in taxes’, ‘greater efforts have to be made to reduce income inequalities’ and ‘economic growth is more important than balancing the state budget’.

The views of voters and deputies of the Left Bloc are very close to those of the Democratic Unity Coalition, suggesting that for left-right socio-economic issues these two parties share similar deputy and voter policy preferences structures and similar levels of deputy-voter policy congruence.

Although also demonstrating very similar distributions in terms of deputy and voter policy preferences, the Socialist Party and Social Democratic Party show two remarkable exceptions concerning public education and health items. Citizens sympathetic to both these parties and Socialist Party deputies overwhelmingly agree the state should play a major role in education and health matters: that is, ‘they both share a leftist position on these issues’. However, the Social Democratic Party’s deputies are significantly less supportive, especially in terms of education (in terms of health care a clear majority still support the idea, although to a much lower extent than the party’s sympathisers), thereby demonstrating a more right-wing leaning (in terms of health) or a clear right-wing stand (in terms of education).
Consequently, the Social Democratic Party’s deputies are less in harmony with the average voter than Socialist Party deputies. On average, the Socialist Party exhibits the highest level of congruence on socio-economic issues of all
Table 6.3: Policy agreement between voters and deputies on the socio-economic (left-right) dimension (by party) (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Left-right dimension</th>
<th>Left Bloc</th>
<th>Democratic Unity Coalition</th>
<th>Socialist Party</th>
<th>Social Democratic Party</th>
<th>Democratic and Social Centre</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>citizen</td>
<td>deputy</td>
<td>Diff</td>
<td>citizen</td>
<td>deputy</td>
<td>Diff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics should abstain from intervening in the economy</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing a stable network of social security should be the prime goal of government</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalisation should be promoted</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education should mainly be provided by the state</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>96.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care should be mainly provided by the state</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The present levels of social protection must be maintained even if it means tax increases have to be made to reduce income inequality</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth is more important than balancing the state budget</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Figures are the proportion of respondents who agree (totally and partially) with the proposition by party identification (voters) and party list (deputies) and the differences between them (shaded).

**Source:** Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Libertarian-authoritarian dimension</th>
<th>Left Bloc</th>
<th>Democratic Unity Coalition</th>
<th>Socialist Party</th>
<th>Social Democratic Party</th>
<th>Democratic and Social Centre</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants should be required to adapt to the customs of Portugal</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stronger measures should be taken to protect the environment</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>97.7</td>
<td>95.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same-sex marriages should be illegal</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women should get preferential treatment when applying for jobs and</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>promotions</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our democracy needs serious reform</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants are good for Portuguese economy</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants are good for Portuguese economy</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants are good for Portuguese economy</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal should provide military assistance to the 'war on terror'</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torturing a prisoner is never justified, even if it might prevent a</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes: Figures are the proportion of respondents who agree (totally and partially) with the proposition by party identification (voters) and party list (deputies) and the differences between them (shaded).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Portuguese parties. A similar pattern was found for the average left-right self-placement of voters and deputies (Freire and Belchior 2009).

Overall, the Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party is the Portuguese party with the highest scores for deputy-voter divergence on socio-economic issues. This is particularly apparent in relation to the statement ‘education should mainly be provided by the state’. While all of the party’s sympathisers agreed with the statement, only 12.5 per cent of the party’s deputies did.

By-and-large, it can be said deputies and voters are coherent and match in the choice of policies connected with their party’s left-right placement, especially those on the left. However, in terms of policy preferences, the Portuguese electorate clearly demonstrates a tendency to the left, even among those identifying with and/or voting for right-wing parties, which explains most of the deputy-voter incongruence.

However, on some core issues usually associated with the left (combating inequality and redistributing wealth to ordinary citizens) both voters and deputies (across all parties) share what can be said to be a more leftist position. Of course they disagree (especially right-wing deputies vis-à-vis the left-wing ones—but not so the voters) over the instruments with which to combat inequality—namely the role of the state in education and health. Nevertheless, this evidence is congruent with other findings (based on the electorate’s perception of party positions on the left-right scale), showing there is some lack of clarity in terms of policy alternatives in Portuguese politics (Freire 2008). In addition, the present findings can help us understand why
Portuguese citizens usually lack clear and structured views about the left-right divide (Freire and Belchior forthcoming).

In Table 6.4 the same analysis is performed in relation to the libertarian-authoritarian divide. Greater policy preference differences (between deputies and voters) occur in this dimension than in the preceding one, a difference is also found with other methodologies (Freire and Belchior 2009).

The statements, ‘stronger measures should be taken to protect the environment’ and ‘torturing a prisoner is never justified, even if it might prevent a terrorist attack’, are those that produce greater deputy-voter agreement and support across parties.

‘Portugal should provide military assistance to the war on terror’ also produces a large amount of agreement, but only in the Socialist Party and Social Democratic Party (which alternate in government), with both their sympathisers and deputies tending towards the authoritarian pole.

In left-wing parties, voters are significantly more authoritarian than the deputies (on issues such as immigration, same-sex marriage [Socialist Party only], attitudes towards authority and military assistance to the war on terror [Left Bloc and Democratic Unity Coalition]). The reverse, that is deputies being demonstrably more authoritarian than electors, is usually found in relation to the Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party, and particularly on issues related to abortion and military assistance to the war on terror. However, the pattern is not the same on all issues. On immigration (‘immigrants are
good for the economy’) the Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party’s deputies are more libertarian than its voters. In this dimension of conflict, the Social Democratic Party is the most congruent: concerning the direction of policy preferences. On only one issue do the deputies have policy preferences completely different from those of the party’s sympathisers (the former more libertarian, the latter more authoritarian), and that is in respect of the statement ‘immigrants should be required to adapt to the customs of Portugal’. (This is an issue in which, except for the Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party, the deputies of all parties are more libertarian than their party’s sympathisers).

Although ignoring the direction of policy preferences, Figure 6.1 summarises the contents of Tables 6.3 and 6.4, depicting the average proportion of disagreement within Portuguese parties, both for the socio-economic (left-right) and the libertarian-authoritarian dimensions.

There is generally less congruence between voters and their representatives in the libertarian-authoritarian dimension than in the left-right dimension (except for the Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party, which demonstrates similar patterns of disagreement across the two dimensions). Moreover, also except for Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party (which demonstrates greater levels of disagreement), the parties show similar levels of agreement in the socio-economic dimension. This is an unsurprising finding if we consider ‘left-right’ is a powerful dimension organising individuals’ political thought and behaviour.

However, we should recall that in terms of the direction of policy preferences, left-wing parties are more congruent
than right-wing ones: the former are more in tune with an overwhelmingly leftist electorate in terms of socio-economic policy preferences.

**Figure 6.1: Deputy-voter average level of disagreement across the two dimensions of conflict (by party)**

![Figure 6.1 Graph]

**Notes:** BE (Left Bloc), CDU-PCP (Democratic Unity Coalition), PS (Socialist Party), PSD (Social Democratic Party), CDS-PP (Social Democratic Centre). **Source:** Portuguese Mass and MPs Surveys (2008) in Freire, Viegas and Seicereira (2009).

However, except for the Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party (equivalent levels of disagreement), the opposite is true for the authoritarian-libertarian divide: the major centre-right party (Social Democratic Party) is clearly more in tune with a predominantly conservative/authoritarian electorate, while deputies from left-wing parties (the Left Bloc, Democratic Unity Coalition, Socialist Party) are clearly more libertarian than those who are sympathetic towards their parties, which is also visible in the average levels of agreement.
Explaining voters’ and deputies’ policy preferences

The third and final goal seeks to ascertain the ability of social and political characteristics (especially left-right self-placement) to explain voter and deputy policy preferences.

To perform this task we use socio-economic (left-right) and libertarian-authoritarian indices of policy preferences as the dependent variables and a set of independent variables covering the most important social and political characteristics of both actors.38

We test the two hypotheses. The purpose is to see whether deputies’ and voters’ left-right self-placement is the most important variable explaining policy preferences, especially with respect to socio-economic issues (third hypothesis), and to assess whether the structure of policy preferences determination is different among poorly- and well-informed voters (fourth hypothesis), with the latter showing a structure of determination similar to that of deputies.

To compare the structure of policy preference determination of electors and deputies, ordinary least squares regressions are used. In each case we have three sets of variables, introduced by blocs in the regressions.

In the first bloc we consider education, social class and church attendance as indicators of relevant social characteristics. In the second bloc we consider the latter variables plus left-right self-placement (an indicator of political features). In the last bloc we include the previous two sets and four dummies for party identification (electors) or party list (for deputies), always using the Socialist Party as the reference group (again as indicators
of political characteristics). Moreover, to assess the importance of the extent of the individual’s political knowledge for left-right self-placement’s capacity in predicting policy preferences (fourth hypothesis), we consider two models: one for poorly informed voters, and another for well-informed voters. The results are presented in Tables 6.5 and 6.6.  

In respect of our third hypothesis, left-right self-placement is indeed among the most important variables in explaining the socio-economic policy preferences of deputies (Table 6.5). However, when party lists are introduced in the model (block three), left-right self-placement loses importance. The effect of ideological identification is completely mediated by party belonging, which is also true for libertarian-authoritarian issues.

With the voters the results are not so easy to interpret, at least at first glance. The coefficients associated with left-right self-placement are more significant for poorly-informed voters on socio-economic issues, and more significant for well-informed voters on libertarian-authoritarian issues, showing much weaker correlations than with deputies in both cases. Thus, new politics issues are more associated with left-right ideology among the well-informed voters, which of course are also the better educated and politically interested.

This finding can be said to be in line with the new politics perspectives of political conflict (Inglehart 1984; Flanagan and Lee 2002), which states the new meanings for
Table 6.5: Explaining socio-economic policy preferences (ordinary least squares regression, method enter)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voters</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poorly-informed</td>
<td>Well-informed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Block 1 Social class (reference: bourgeoisie)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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Notes: *p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. ***p < 0.001. (a) Variable with no responses. (b) Constant variable.
Source: Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).
Table 6.6: Explaining libertarian-authoritarian policy preferences (ordinary least squares regression, method enter)

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Notes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. (a) Variable with no responses. (b) Constant variable.
Source: Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).
the left-right divide (either materialism versus post-materialism [Inglehart] or authoritarian versus libertarian [Flanagan and Lee]) are mainly associated with young, educated and middle-class voters.

The findings concerning differences between Portuguese voters and deputies reiterate the widely reported lower levels of citizens’ political thought anchoring on more ideological grounds vis-à-vis the political elite (Converse and Pierce 1986: Ch.7; Dye and Zeigler 2006: 3; Freire and Belchior 2009; 2010).

Therefore, and in accordance with our expectations, left-right self-placement is among the most important variables in explaining the policy preferences of deputies, although right-wing party lists can play a more important role (note the Socialist Party is the reference group and that is perhaps why radical-left dumies are not significant). For the voters, different results were found according to the type of issue: more important for poorly-informed voters in socio-economic issues; more important for well-informed voters on authoritarian-libertarian issues. This finding can be said to be in line with the new politics perspectives.

Also according to our hypothesis, the left-right self-positioning of (poorly-informed) voters is more important in relation to policy issues anchored in the socio-economic left-right cleavage—although unexpectedly, deputies also exhibit a significant and robust coefficient concerning libertarian-authoritarian issues (also for party list). For these reasons the third hypothesis is only partially confirmed, although the strong correlation between left-right self-placement and the new politics issues among both deputies and well-informed voters means these new issues
are also being integrated into the overarching left-right divide.

Another difference between poorly informed voters on the one hand and well-informed voters and deputies on the other, is the level of social anchoring of socio-economic policy preferences. Among the poorly informed voters, socio-economic policy preferences are much more dependent on social class than they are among well-informed voters and deputies. Thus, the former rely much more on social clues to interpret socio-economic conflicts than the latter.

Well-informed voters and deputies, who share much greater cognitive resources than poorly-informed voters, rely more on ideological and party cues to interpret socio-economic conflicts—that is, they are rather more sophisticated in the way they think about politics (Converse and Pierce 1986: Ch.7; Dye and Zeigler 2006: 3). This again can be said to be (at least partially) in line with our third hypothesis. In terms of the issues related with the authoritarian-libertarian divide, which lacks a clear social base, the social factors play a negligible role across all the three groups.

**Conclusions**

In this chapter we sought to provide a first detailed look at policy representation in Portugal, a country that clearly requires to be studied more. In respect of our four hypotheses, the main conclusions are as follows.

First, while not demonstrating equivalent attitude structures in respect of policy preferences, Portuguese
deputies and citizens were shown to have some remarkable similarities (confirming our first hypothesis). The role of the state in public education and the national health system, as well as some libertarian-authoritarian issues, are among the most contentious policies on the political map for both voters and deputies, and our findings reiterate previous research, and corroborate our first hypothesis.

Second, the set of socio-economic policy issues anchored in the traditional left-right cleavage produced higher levels of deputy-voter congruence than policy issues anchored in the libertarian-authoritarian divide, especially among the left-wing parties (the Left Bloc, Democratic Unity Coalition and Socialist Party). This conclusion restates the importance attributed to the left-right divide in structuring the political thought and behaviour of individuals, and is supported by other research. Therefore, we can say the data also supported our second hypothesis.

However, some qualifications are necessary. The Portuguese show a clear tendency towards the left in terms of socio-economic policy preferences. Because of this, in terms of the direction of policy preferences, the left-wing parties are more congruent than those on the right. The situation is not entirely different between left and right parties, because among the latter even the deputies demonstrate some left-wing preferences in terms of socio-economic issues (namely in terms of the priority given to combating inequality and redistributing wealth). This is pretty much in line with what the voters want, thus increasing congruence.

However, it can also be said to pinpoint some lack of clarity in policy alternatives (between the centre-left
Socialist Party and the centre-right Social Democratic Party) found in other studies using different data and methodologies (Freire 2008; Freire and Belchior forthcoming), and that can also have a negative impact upon the quality of political representation. Future studies, especially those adopting a comparative approach, should perhaps try to discover whether similar patterns in terms of the policy preferences of voters and deputies are also found in other countries with low levels of clarity in policy alternatives.

In terms of authoritarian-libertarian issues, divergences in the direction of policy preferences (voters versus deputies) were mainly a problem of the left: a libertarian political elite vis-à-vis a mainly authoritarian electorate. The reverse is often true for the more right-wing party, the Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party, which is more authoritarian than its supporters on many issues. Thus, if the left-wing parties are more in tune with a mainly leftist electorate in terms of socio-economic policy preferences, the Social Democratic Party is clearly more in tune with a mainly conservative/authoritarian electorate in terms of social issues.

Third, as we expected for the two set of policy preferences studied, the left-right self-placement of deputies is one of the most significant variables in explaining policy preferences. However, when party belonging was introduced (in the equations) it revealed itself to be more important than ideology in explaining policy preferences.

We expected left-right placement to be more important in explaining policy preferences among well-informed
voters than among the poorly-informed (our third hypothesis); however, we found this to be true only for authoritarian-libertarian issues, thus confirming the new politics perspective (this is, of course, only a partial confirmation of our third and fourth hypotheses). This revealed that, both for voters and deputies, the new politics issues, like traditional socio-economic issues, are already clearly integrated in the left-right divide.

On the other hand, and again as expected, poorly-informed voters use more social cues to interpret socio-economic issues than well-informed voters and deputies, who are more likely to use ideology and party identification and thus are politically more sophisticated than the former (confirming the third and fourth hypotheses).

These findings generally correspond to a positive perspective on political representation, showing representatives and voters share similar perspectives over the political map in Portugal in terms of policy preferences, although their respective causal explanations sometimes rest on different grounds.

These results are not surprising, and mostly support the theory and previous research in this area. What remains to be seen is to what extent these results for Portugal are due to the nature of the party system and/or political institutions. However, that is clearly a task for future comparative work on political representation, including Portugal—a country that has been neglected in this respect (although now less than before).
References


Miller, W., Pierce, R., Thomassen, J., Herrera, R., Holmberg, S., Esaiasson, P. and Wessels, B. (eds)


Assessing voter and elected representative support for Europe: The case of Portugal

Catherine Moury and Luís de Sousa

Introduction

During the first 40 years of the existence of the European Communities, European leaders tended to ignore the role of public opinion in shaping support for (or mistrust of) the process of European unification.

Initially, the European Union was not conceived as an inclusive political project, but mainly as an exclusive elite-based functional solution to structural and macro-economic problems. Few people were suggesting placing coal and steel under a supranational authority would unleash a process that would change the traditional way people thought about government, democracy and citizenship. For this reason, researchers and decision-makers alike always suggested inter-governmental bargaining, elite preferences, or the actions of organised interests at the base of European integration took place in an atmosphere of ‘permissive consensus’: that is, a mixture of loyalty, blind faith and apathy.

Things have changed since then, and this so-called ‘permissive consensus’ started to unravel at the beginning of the 1990s, during a period when Europe was moving
towards its full political development. Particularly, the Danish ‘no’ to the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the narrow French ‘yes’ and the rejection by the Conservative rebels were the first serious challenges to Europe as a political project.

Although the Danish ‘no’ vote would eventually be solved by conventional inter-governmental negotiations (setting an opt-out for Denmark), the damage was done: there was no turning back for the democratic reformist mood of the 1990s.

The public opposition continued in the form of votes for anti-European parties, in the opinion polls and in the referendums subsequently held (above all the rejection in France and the Netherlands of the draft constitutional treaty). Accordingly, now it is more appropriate to speak of a ‘constraining consensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2006: 248).

In the midst of this growing Euro-scepticism, citizens have come to question, protest and mobilise against Europe. In other words, European public opinion has become politicised. Not surprisingly, political actors are responding to this development. On the one hand, new Euro-sceptic formations have recently been formed at the national and European levels (such as the pan-European party, Libertas). On the other hand, traditional political forces have also included European issues in their strategies, public discourse and manifestos for national elections (Imig and Tarrow 2001; Van der Eijk and Franklin 2004; Koopmans 2007).

This increased politicisation of European issues by national political parties and voters at large has important
consequences for political representation. In theory, political parties would try to capture voters’ concerns about Europe and, once in power, should respond to these. This process would result in (or at least would be facilitated by) a good congruence of European views between the deputies and their representatives. In practice, however, it has been said the mass public is much less enthusiastic about European union than their deputies. Political elites, it is claimed, have pushed European integration beyond the will of the people.

Is this true? How real is the divide between political elites and public opinion? What can explain this divide? These are exactly the questions we want to answer for the Portuguese case in this chapter. In doing so we move beyond existing literature by using data extracted from face-to-face interviews with deputies about their perceptions of Europe.

**Research questions and hypotheses**

This chapter is structured around three main objectives. Our first goal is to assess the degree of congruence between deputies and the citizens on six dimensions of European integration.

The conventional wisdom is elites are more in favour of European integration than the public (Hooghe 2003). This makes sense given the cognitive levels of voters and deputies regarding the structure and process of the European Union remain substantially different.

Citizens organise their knowledge about Europe through abstract mental frames, fed by a variety of sources
(in the forefront the media, but also social groups of all kinds: books, internet, etc.), with different degrees of sophistication and consistency (Kufer 2009: 36-7). By contrast, deputies’ perceptions (institutional representations) are endogenous to the European Union political system, and for that reason they tend to express a more elaborate and informed vision of its modus operandi.43

Notwithstanding this reasoning, the conventional wisdom according to which elites are more pro-European than the electorate rests on a weak empirical base. Extensive research has been done on the nature of support for European integration, but there are few comparisons between the views of national deputies and their voters. Particularly, most of the studies rely on proxies for assessing deputies’ views, such as party manifestos or expert judgements (Van der Eijk and Franklin 1991; Gabel 1998 and Ray 2003). Alternatively, the few studies directly considering elite perceptions about Europe focus on European rather than national political elites (Schmitt and Thomassen (2000) on deputies, Beyers and Direickx (1997) on permanent representatives and Hooghe (2001) on senior European Commission officials).

To our knowledge, the only comparative assessment of national political elite and citizen opinions on Europe was developed by Hooghe (2003). This study demonstrates two dynamics: 1) there is little difference between national political elites and citizens regarding their level of support for the pooling of further authority to the European Union in important policy fields and 2) political elites conceive, to a greater degree than citizens, European integration as an
optimal solution for those policy fields whose externalities go beyond the state jurisdiction (i.e. environment).

In this chapter, we want to test to what extent the conventional wisdom holds true for the Portuguese case, and hence we posit:

*First hypothesis: deputies are more in favour of European integration than citizens are.*

Research also reveals deputies tend to adopt more extreme policy positions on both the left and the right of the ideological line (Converse 1964; Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Miller et al. 1999). Portugal is no different in that regard (Belchior 2008). In line with this theory, it makes sense to argue the political elite also share attitudes about Europe that are more extreme than those of the citizens. In other words, we expect the proportion of very pro- and very anti-Europeans to be higher among deputies than among citizens.

*Second hypothesis: political elites hold more extreme views about Europe than citizens do.*

The second objective of this chapter is concerned with assessing the degree of congruence between the European attitudes of deputies and their supporters. In order to do so, deputies and the population were divided according to the party to which they belong or to which they are attached. Such an exercise seeks to fuel the debate about the divergence or convergence of policy positioning between voters and their representatives: an issue that has not so far been sufficiently tested and explained.
Representation studies show there is a reasonable level of congruence between political leaders and their voters (Converse and Pierce 1986; Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996), and that left-wing parties, generally speaking, tend to correspond better to their electorate’s policy positioning (Inglehart 1970; Gibson and Harmel 1998: 225–6; Pierce 1999: 27). While this finding is not confirmed for Portugal (Belchior and Freire this volume), we posit:

Third hypothesis: left-wing party camps display a more congruent positioning about Europe than right-wing ones.

The third and final objective of this paper is concerned with explaining elite and public divergent views regarding European integration. The literature on representation theory shows higher levels of representation occur when individuals are strong supporters of a given party and when they are involved in politics (Barnes 1977; Hill and Anderson 1995; Converse 1964; Zaller 1992). There is no a priori reason not to believe these representation factors hold valid for the positioning of voters and deputies on European integration, and hence we posit:

Fourth hypothesis: the distance between voters and their representatives’ views on the European Union will decrease together with the voters’ party attachment and fifth hypothesis: the distance between voters and their deputies’ views about the European Union will decrease together with the voters’ political interest.

Finally, it has been argued that, amongst other factors, party-voter linkage on the issue of European integration will also depend on internal party unity, as the presentation
of contradictory messages by various party leaders will muddle the cues sent by the party to its supporters (Ray 2003). Hence we posit the final hypothesis:

Sixth hypothesis: the distance between voters and their representatives’ view about the European Union will decrease together with the degree of political positioning unity amongst the deputies of a similar party camp.

When testing these hypotheses, one needs to control for important alternative explanatory factors. Indeed, it might be the case deputies and their voters hold similar views ‘by chance’, i.e. they might both share characteristics likely to make them more Euro-pessimistic or Euro-optimistic, independently of the variables described above.

Hence all variables that might explain voters’ support for European integration should be controlled for. These include the citizens’ educational background, their perceptions about the economic situation and their perceptions about immigration.44

Setting the scene: Portuguese party system

Before comparing the positioning of voters and their parties in relation to European matters, it is useful to give a quick overview of the Portuguese party system to those readers unfamiliar with this case study.

With the exception of the Portuguese Communist Party, all Portuguese parties are post-1974 creations.45 The democratisation and constitutional contexts—and in particular their revolutionary dimension—help explain the weak social foundations of Portuguese political parties
(Jalali 2007: 62–8). These have not evolved from pre-existing social cleavages, but from a democratic transition process that placed parties at the centre of the newborn regime (Bruneau 1997; Sousa 2001; Jalali 2007).46

The distance between parties and those they represent was partially compensated by their proximity to the state and access to public resources, as the capacity to redistribute those resources in a selective manner helped parties institutionalise and consolidate electoral clienteles (Sousa 2001: 159–60).

With the exception of the communists, who have traditionally recruited their cadres from dedicated activists, party leaderships do not originate from the party activists. Parties remain ‘different arrangements of personalities’ (Lopes 1997: 30) attracting a multitude of interests and clienteles that are important to electoral success. This strategic rather than programmatic mobilisation of voters has consequences in terms of the nature of representation and the divide between voters and their representatives.

The Portuguese Communist Party was created in 1921, forced underground five years later, and remained clandestine for 48 years—for as long as authoritarianism lasted in Portugal. The party played a key role in the 1974 revolution, which helped it become and remain a major player in the present party system, notwithstanding the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe.

In the aftermath of the revolution, the Communist Party was able to build an extensive and solid organisation, superior to that of its adversaries in both material and human resources. The party boasted the largest and territorially most developed party machine.
The party has survived the shock of the end of the Cold War, and while remaining one of the most orthodox communist parties in Western Europe, it has been able to adapt to emerging realities. It exerts tight control over the leadership of one of the major trade unions (General Confederation of Portuguese Workers-Intersyndical), and ‘sponsored’ the creation of an ecologist movement in 1982, which later become the Ecology Party-‘The Greens’.

Since 1987 it has stood for election with The Greens and Democratic Intervention in the Democratic Unity Coalition.

The party was a member of the Comintern until the collapse of this organisation, and this is perhaps the reason why European integration was not a major policy priority for its leaders, who have traditionally resisted any pooling of sovereignty to a supra-national body. Their Euro-pessimism was only slowly softened towards a more sceptical stand due to the party’s inevitable engagement in the first round of European elections in Portugal in 1988.

Currently, the Communist Party is a member of the United European Left/Nordic Green Left parliamentary group.

The Socialist Party has never been able to develop a mass organisational structure or levels of affiliation similar to other European social democratic parties. Left-liberal, well-educated, bourgeois notables dominate its core, and its decentralised organisational structure shows little co-ordination between the national headquarters and local branches.

The Socialists have also undergone a process of renewal in recent years following their first experience in
office as a minority government. During both the Guterres and the current Sócrates leaderships, the party’s programmatic stand has moved towards the centre, with a catch-all appeal that attempts to reconcile market liberalism practices with democratic socialist principles, in line with Tony Blair’s ‘Third Way’. This has partly justified the party’s electoral success at the cost of leaving the more-to-the-left factions unsatisfied with its economic policy preferences in office. The Socialist leadership and electorate have always been supportive of European integration. The party is a member of the Party of European Socialists. This renovation of the left was not sufficient to address emerging social tensions and created space for a new force to appear and to cling to the post-materialist discourse that had been ignored by both the communist and socialist formations.

The new radical left party, the Left Bloc, emerged out of the convergence of two old extreme left-wing parties and a political movement, and became a party to compete in the 1999 legislative elections, where it was able to catch an urbanised, well-educated, libertarian electorate that felt increasingly unrepresented by the two dominant left-wing parties.

The entry of this new party has had an important impact on the party system, which has evolved from a four- to a five-party structure. This has had significant implications in terms of political representation and electoral competition. As Freire put it: ‘For the period 1975–96, the post-materialist issue dimension was irrelevant both as a domain of competition and of identification …With the emergence of the Left Bloc as a parliamentary force,
however, new political issues have become a domain of competition between the left (particularly the Left Bloc, but also the Communist Party and Socialist Party) and the right (the Social Democratic Party and, particularly, the Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party). From 1996 until at least 2005, post-materialism has been a pertinent dimension of policy competition, although only with medium-level significance.’ (Freire 2005: 29–30).

The Left Bloc has become a permanent feature in national party politics and is gradually making its way both at the local and European level, where it elected its first European deputy at the 2004 European elections. In the European Parliament, the Left Bloc (like the Communist Party) is an associate member of the United European Left/Nordic Green Left parliamentary group.

The Social Democratic Party is often labelled ‘the most Portuguese of all parties’. The designation is not too inaccurate in the sense that it is a catch-all party, including representatives whose policy positioning ranges from the moderate left to the liberal and conservative right and a party with widespread territorial implantation.

The two major identifying elements cutting across the social diversity of its electorate are a common hostility towards the state and its administration and a general sympathy for market rules and private ownership. Like the Socialists, the Social Democrats have a weak and flexible organisational structure, allowing local branches great autonomy.

Until the 1990s, the party had been associated with the European Liberal Democratic and Reformist Group in the European Parliament; however, since the beginning of the
1990s it has aligned itself with the conservative European People’s Party (Frain 1997).

Finally, the Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party is essentially a party of notables, and has never been able to transform itself into a catch all party of the right, as it set out to do in its earlier years of existence.

Its resources are less plentiful than those of its adversaries, and it is continuously embroiled in leadership quarrels, which is reflected in its changing electoral positioning. It has swung from a being a Christian democrat to a liberal-conservative party, and sometimes to a ‘populist’ party, depending on its changing leadership. This has often led it to enter short-lived tactical coalitions with the two major parties—the Socialists and the Social Democrats—but the party’s small electorate did not enable it to obtain a pivotal position in government formation (Robinson 1996: 961–4). Now the party represents the more Christian democrat/conservative segment of the population. Due to its strong Christian democratic background the party joined the European People’s Party following Portugal’s accession to the then European Economic Community.

The Euro-sceptic stance of the early 1990s under the leadership of Manuel Monteiro not only cost the party several of its senior political figures, but it also led to its removal from the European People’s Party in 1992. Following this, the party joined the Union for Europe of the Nations Group.

After its massive defeat in the 1997 local elections, Manuel Monteiro resigned and Paulo Portas saw a window of opportunity to consolidate his leadership by returning to
the party’s Christian Democrat roots and setting himself the challenge of keeping all 15 seats in parliament in the general election of 1999, which he did. Since then the party has resumed its Euro-pragmatic stance, which led to its re-admission to the European People’s Party in July 2004.

**How conflicting are the opinions of voters and deputies on the subject of Europe?**

Proceeding to our first objective, we seek to discover to what extent deputies’ and voters’ evaluations about Europe match each other: or, in other words, to what extent are the position of deputies with respect to Europe representative of their electorates?

**Data**

For this empirical test we used two surveys conducted in Portugal between the beginning of spring and the end of summer 2008.

The survey of the population relied on a multi-stage probabilistic sample of Portuguese citizens aged 18 or over and living in the mainland (N=1350). Some weighting in terms of age, sex and education was done to make the sample more representative of the population profile. A similar questionnaire was used to survey Portuguese deputies about the same topics, to which 60 per cent replied. Again, some weighting in terms of party affiliation and gender was performed in order to correct any deviances resulting from the composition of the Assembly of the Republic in 2008.
Comparing elite and citizens

In order to test our first hypothesis according to which deputies are more in favour of European integration than citizens, we first constructed an index using five dimensions to measure European support.

This index is calculated by measuring the average of the answers to five questions about European integration. It is a variable, with ten values ranging from 0 to 1, and scores 0 when the respondent does not agree at all with any of the pro-European statements and 1 when they agree strongly with all of them.\(^{48}\)

In Table 7.1, we present the mean, median and standard deviation of this index for both citizens and deputies, excluding for now those voters who are indifferent or do not know how to respond. The data shows our first hypothesis lacks clear confirmation. While it is true deputies are slightly more pro-European than voters, the difference between the two index means is not very significant (0.13 points difference in the index) and the median is identical. We also observe the standard deviation is slightly more important for voters.

In Figure 7.1, we compare the distribution of the index ‘support for Europe’, again excluding for now those voters who are indifferent or do not know how to respond.
Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics for support for Europe (deputies and citizens)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.791375</td>
<td>0.634622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>0.276717</td>
<td>0.326198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There is a relatively high degree of congruence between those voters and deputies who adopt anti-European or intermediate stands with respect to European integration, but the data also shows deputies are more fervent supporters of European integration than voters. Hence, our second hypothesis, political elites hold more extreme views about Europe than voters, is only partially confirmed. Deputies are more strongly pro-European than voters, but we do not find a larger proportion of anti-Europeans amongst the elite than among the population.

Table 7.1 looks into specific questions rather than the index and includes one additional question on enlargement. It shows the average difference between the opinions of deputies and voters in general without taking into consideration party positioning.

Overall, as observed above, the opinions of deputies and voters tend to converge in what they consider to be positive and negative about European integration. The degree of discrepancy is lower than 13 per cent for most dimensions, except those concerning European unification, where the majority of public opinion is sceptical (only 41.7
per cent are in favour) while the political class are in favour (73.2 per cent).

**Figure 7.1: Support for Europe index (deputies and citizens) (%)**

![Graph showing support for Europe index](image)


This lack of citizens’ support for deepening the union may demonstrate citizens no longer believe additional pooling of sovereignty is bringing additional gains, as a sort of law diminishing marginal returns is applied to European Union utility. However, this difference might be to some extent artificial, as the percentages represent an a posteriori dichotomisation of answers located in a 0–10 scale.

This table also shows that political elites tend to be only slightly more supportive of European integration than the
mass public, except for one dimension of integration: enlargement.

Surprisingly, the public is slightly more in favour of enlargement than the elite. However, it should be noted this is considered a negative dimension of integration for both political elites and the mass public at large. The proportion of those who support enlargement is very low in both cases: less than a third of both deputies and citizens support further enlargement.

There is a potentially good reason for this: the Eastern European enlargement had a short-term negative impact upon traditional and labour-intensive sectors of the Portuguese economy, such as the shoe-making and textile industries.

In this survey we also asked deputies which countries they would accept as European Union members and which they would leave outside the European project. The Portuguese political elite ranked Turkey and the Balkans as the first members of the ‘club’ that should be included, while the few citizens who answered that question favoured Switzerland.

As noted elsewhere, the main pitfall of survey questions is the relatively high proportion of citizens who do not know how to respond or who refuse to answer (Bacalhau 1994; Costa Lobo 2003). The absence of opinion could be derived from both positive and negative factors: that is, from ‘permissive consensus’ to ‘political apathy’ explanations (Lobo 2003: 100) or simply candid ignorance about more complex/elaborate aspects of European integration.
Table 7.2: Attitude towards the European Union (deputies and citizens) (%)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Citizens</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Diff.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thinks Political Europe is necessary</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thinks Portuguese membership is a good thing</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>-12.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thinks unification of Europe should be pushed further</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>-31.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is satisfied with European Union democracy</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>-6.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supports enlargement</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform treaty is a good text</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>-9.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In our sample, the proportion of respondents who ‘don’t know/don’t reply’ varies according to the questions asked—from ten per cent for the question about Portugal’s membership of the European Union, to 45 per cent for the question on enlargement and 61 per cent on the question on the reform treaty.

We observe two different patterns according to whether the type of questions focuses on the relationship between Portugal and the European Union or addresses the European Union as a political institution (Lobo 2003). First, when a question is ‘intuitive’, when it asks for a vague opinion about the European Union by being framed thus: ‘do you think Portuguese membership of the European Union is a good thing?’, the proportion of those who do not know is very low (ten per cent). These
questions measure something akin to Easton’s (1965) notion of affective support.

On the other hand, when the question is less general and more ‘technical’, then the rate of non-respondents increases. For example, 27 per cent do not know if a political Europe is necessary, while 45 per cent do not know if the Lisbon Treaty is a good text.

Comparing deputies and their supporters by party

In Table 7.3 we show the proportion of deputies and their supporters who agree with a series of proposals about European integration affecting the European Union’s legitimacy.

In order to compare the degree of consensus or discrepancy between the opinions of a given party’s deputies and voters about Europe, at the deputy level we have used the party list on which the deputy was elected to group parliamentarians by party and, at the electorate level, the voters’ party identification to segment the population.

The degree of convergence between the perceptions of deputies and voters in relation to Europe notwithstanding, once we take party positioning into consideration we observe important variations between and within parties for each of the different dimensions of integration.

When assessing overall support for Europe we need to distinguish between government and non-government parties: in other words, those parties that have been in office alone or in coalition (Socialist Party, Social Democratic Party, Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party)
and those parties that have never been in government (Left Bloc, Democratic Unity Coalition).

While it has been said political elites are tendentiously more in favour of European integration than citizens at large, in the case of Portugal this seems to be true for government parties only.

Political elites from parties that have experienced governmental office are also more pro-European than their supporters, and more pro-European in general.

Deputies from the Left Bloc and the Democratic Unity Coalition are less in favour of European integration and less supportive than their traditional party sympathisers. Using a different dataset, Marina Costa Lobo observed this tendency. She showed that ‘minor parties, which have been systematically excluded from government since 1982, have adopted an anti-integration stance’ (Lobo 2003: 115). Since government parties represent the largest slice of the electorate, the data reconfirms the traditional view political elites are more supportive of European integration than their party supporters.

The perceptions deputies and voters have of Europe are more conflicting for non-government parties (Left Bloc and Democratic Unity Coalition). In line with the findings of Belchior and Freire in this volume, we note the most congruent party is the Social Democratic Party, clearly refuting our third hypothesis that maintains left-wing party camps display a more congruent positioning towards Europe than right-wing ones.

While deputies from both non-government left-wing parties are dissatisfied with European democracy or the prospects of institutional reform (reform treaty)
deputies have a more positive vision of Europe than their Democratic Unity Coalition peers (an average of 33.3 per cent against 16.7 per cent, respectively).

Sympathisers of the Democratic Unity Coalition are the most sceptical of all voters. They believe Portuguese membership of the European Union is, in principle, a good thing (83.3 per cent), but in practice the country has gained too little as a result of it—hence their discontent with the European Union and the prospects of reform (only 31.6 per cent are satisfied with European Union democracy and 30.8 per cent believe the reform treaty is a good text).

This disenchantment might be understood through a cost-benefit vision of European integration. The traditional basis of Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party support comes from economic sectors that have been negatively affected by the implementation of the Common Market and the eastwards expansion of Europe: small farmers, fishermen, shopkeepers and small- and medium-size businessmen.

The Europeanism of the Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party’s political elite is in contrast with the Euroscepticism of its traditional support. However, since the party has been a government party (and its electorate might believe the party can have a greater say in European affairs in the future), the average discrepancy between perceptions at the top and bottom of the party is less significant than one might be led to believe.

All deputies are against widening, except those from the Democratic Unity Coalition, who are largely in favour (80 per cent). This result (which is not in line with the opinions of other deputies and the majority of citizens)
comes as a surprise, since the party’s constituency is largely unskilled workers whose lives have been negatively affected by the entry of the 12 new Central and Eastern European members.

All deputies, apart from those of the Democratic Unity Coalition, are in favour of deepening. Socialist Party deputies are most in favour of greater European unification (85.3 per cent). This does not come as a surprise given this party is currently the party of government. What does comes as a surprise, however, is the fact deputies of the Social Democratic Centre are also largely in favour of deepening the European Union while the party’s sympathisers are by far the most sceptical about it.

Unlike with enlargement, where there are consensual negative perceptions about its effects, with deepening the political elite are more proactive than the electorate. In a way this confirms the traditional view the engine of European integration is political elite consensus, but it also highlights the growing scepticism of citizens in relation to the pooling of political competences in Europe.

**Explaining the divide**

The comparison between deputies’ perceptions with those of their party sympathisers shows that, with some exceptions, the degree support for the European Union is relatively similar for both groups of interviewees.

The third objective of our research is to explain the divide between voters and their representatives. The operationalisation of each variable is briefly described
below, while more detailed information is presented in the appendix.

The dependent variable, the divide between a voter and their representative’s perception of the European Union, was obtained by calculating the mean index of support for European integration of the party the respondent identifies with and subtracting it from the voters’ index of support for European integration.\textsuperscript{49}

To test our fourth hypothesis (the distance between voters and their representatives’ views on the European Union will decrease together with the voters’ party attachment) a variable measuring party attachment was introduced.

To test our fifth hypothesis (the distance between voters and their deputies’ views about the European Union will decrease together with the voters’ political interest) we constructed an index incorporating ‘the frequency of political discussion’ and ‘political interest’ variables.

Finally, in order to test our sixth hypothesis (the distance between voters and their representatives’ view about the European Union will decrease together with the degree of political positioning unity amongst the deputies of a similar party camp) we inserted the variable ‘party unity’, which we calculated subtracting from ‘1’ the standard deviation of the index of support for Europe of the respondent’s party.

To control for other explanatory variables we included a variable measuring education, an index of economic evaluation (at the national and personal level) and an index measuring pro-immigrant sentiments.
Table 7.4 shows the results of an ordinary least squares regression explaining the divide between deputies and their electorate. In Model 1 we test all variables identified in the literature and in our hypotheses: the political knowledge and interest of the voters, the strength of their party attachment, the extent of unity within their preferred party and their educational background.

The data shows the divide between a voter’s positioning and that of their representative is significantly lower as the voters’ political knowledge and interest in politics increases, which supports our fifth hypothesis (more political interest, less divide).

The weight of party attachment in explaining this divide is very low and not significant, while the degree of political positioning convergence amongst deputies of a similar party camp is significant and, contrary to our hypothesis, positively rather than negatively correlated to the divide between voters and deputies. Hence our fourth and sixth hypotheses are refuted.

In Model 2 we insert the ‘support for the European Union’ variable in order to ascertain whether the identified explanatory variables hold even when controlled for the citizen’s pro-European stance. This increases the $R^2$ significantly. We observe the more pro-European a citizen is the smaller the divide between their positioning on Europe and that of their representative. However, the variables
Table 7.3: Public attitude of deputies and citizens towards European integration (% agreeing)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Left Bloc</th>
<th>Democratic Unity Coalition</th>
<th>Socialist Party</th>
<th>Social Democratic Party</th>
<th>Social Democratic Centre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Europe is necessary</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-12.1</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese membership is a good thing</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification should be pushed further</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>-30.0</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy is satisfactory</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlargement is a good thing</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform treaty is a good text</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.4: Ordinary least squares estimates of a voter’s support for the European Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Dependent variable: Difference between the voter i position and representative’s mean position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political knowledge and interest</td>
<td>-0.217***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party attachment</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party unity</td>
<td>0.130***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.118***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support European Union</td>
<td>-0.599***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good economic perception</td>
<td>-0.152***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good perception of Immigration</td>
<td>-0.104**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party identification <em>(a)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Bloc</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.287)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy party identification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Unity</td>
<td>0.131***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.818)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.438)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Centre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid N</td>
<td>756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean of the dependent variable</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation of the dependent variable</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (a) Reference group: Socialist Party. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

‘political information and interest’ remain significant, and the ‘party attachment’ variable becomes significant at the
0.05 level (although the coefficient is still relatively low). Only education loses its significance.

In Model 3 we introduced the variable likely to explain voters’ support for Europe rather than the index itself and we find similar results. The model shows that the variable on European support (good economic perception, pro-immigrant sentiments) is significant in explaining a low divide between a voter and their representative’s position on Europe integration.

In Model 4 we repeated the exercise made in Model 2, while introducing a dummy variable for the party the respondent identifies with. The model shows, all other things being the same, the divide between a voter and their representative is significantly higher for the Democratic Unity Coalition than it is for the Socialist Party (in line with what has been discussed above), while it makes no difference for the other parties.

In Table 7.5 we turn to those voters who do not have an opinion on Europe. In doing so we dichotomised the answers to the six questions about Europe mentioned above (0–did not know/did not reply, 1–responded) and we combined an index taking the mean of the dichotomised answers.

In Model 1 we seek to ascertain if the variables explaining a lower divide are also important in explaining a voter propensity to have an opinion on European issues and included age as a control variable. Again, the data shows the political knowledge and interest index and the degree of education are positively related with the probability of a voter having an opinion, while party attachment and age are negatively correlated.
Table 7.5: Ordinary least squares estimates of a voter’s opinion about the European Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Dependent variable: Difference between the voter’s position and their representative’s mean position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political information and interest</td>
<td>0.319***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party attachment</td>
<td>-0.091**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party unity</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.269)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.221***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.134***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party identification(a)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Left Bloc</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dummy party identification</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Unity Coalition</td>
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<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Centre</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Valid N</td>
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<td>Mean of the dependent variable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Standard deviation of the dependent variable</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (a) Reference group: Socialist Party. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.005; *** p<0.001

In Model 2, we repeated the operation, including the dummies for party identification, and no new results were shown.
Hence, it seems those who are informed about and interested in politics and who are educated are not only more likely to have an opinion about Europe, but they are also likely to be closer to the position of their representatives. These results are in line with the main findings of other electoral studies on Portugal.

In a similar fashion, the Comparative National Election Project notes informational intermediaries exert a significant impact on voting choices, particularly in elections in which partisan predispositions are less important, and the discussion of political issues is by far the most important source of information (Magalhães 2007).

**Conclusion**

In this chapter we compared and tried to explain the perceptions deputies and voters had of various dimensions of European integration. Our empirical exercise confirmed some existing theories, but it also refuted several conventional wisdoms.

The general assertion that political elite perceptions tend to be more pro-integration finds some support in our analysis, but the results strongly indicate this difference, in the Portuguese case, is lower than has been suggested in the literature.

The data also showed citizens are more in favour of enlargement than their representatives are. Deputies are more polarised than the electorate in one aspect—they are more strongly in favour of the European Union—while the proportion of deputies and voters strongly opposed to European integration is almost identical.
These assertions hold true in average, but only for the deputies of the three parties that have held government office (Socialist Party, Social Democratic Party and Social and Democratic Centre). Left Bloc and Democratic Unity Coalition deputies are much less in favour of European integration than the supporters of these parties: hence, we do not find support for the belief left-wing parties are more congruent than their right-wing counterparts.

Finally, we sought to explain the divide between citizens and their representatives in respect of their positions on European integration. We observed political interest and knowledge are the main explanatory variables for a low degree of separation (which also explains the probability of voters having an opinion).

We do not find strong support for either the party attachment or party unity hypotheses. Interestingly, political interest and knowledge, together with education, also explains the probability a voter will have an opinion on European issues. Hence, uninterested and uninformed voters are more likely not to have an opinion on Europe, and if they do have one, to disagree with their representatives.
References


PART THREE
Institutional reform in Portugal: From the perspective of deputies and voters
André Freire and Manuel Meirinho

Introduction

Electoral system reform has been a much-debated topic in Portugal since 1997. However, while several proposals to change from a party list system to a mixed member proportional system have been presented and discussed by the major parties in parliament—and the constitution changed to allow it—in the end the reform never passed.

There is not much literature about the role of voters in electoral reform (Fournier et al. forthcoming; Norris 2009; Curtice 2004; Weir 2005; Banducci and Karp 1999; Banducci, Donovan and Karp 1999). This is a gap in the literature: ‘the public’s agenda’ is not only a first step in policy-making, but also an element of feedback in any reform process that takes place (Norris 2009).

Even more scarce is the analysis of deputy-voter congruence and cohesion on these topics. This is another gap in the literature, because although voter preferences are a first step in policy-making, legislators have a crucial role in turning the preferences of voters and parties into law. Moreover, as we show below, parties are not unitary actors, and the lack of deputy cohesion may help us understand the failure of electoral reform.
This helps us answer a fundamental question in each academic paper: why should we care about the topic being analysed? We argue we should care because while the role of the citizenry in the processes of electoral reform is fundamental (at least by feeding the public agenda, especially the policy-makers’ agenda) it is a neglected subject. We should care because political parties are not unitary actors and both the divisions within the political elite and the levels of congruence (or incongruence) between the preferences of deputies and voters in terms of electoral reform can help shed some light on the reasons for the success or failure of these reforms.

We also ask ourselves why should pay attention to the Portuguese case. We believe we should because electoral reform is a much-debated topic in that country and the role of the citizenry in feeding the public agenda on this issue is clear (particularly since 1997), and because there is a large amount of data (a mass survey and an deputy survey, both conducted in 2008) providing a privileged position from which to study voter and deputy preferences on electoral reform (as well as their levels of cohesion and congruence), from which we can relate the voters’ attitude to electoral system reform with their evaluation of the political system.

After a very brief historical overview, we focus on voters’ attitudes towards the operation of the political system and their inter-relation with the level of support for electoral reform. We then focus on the level of deputy cohesion within and across parties and on the level of deputy-voter congruence around the topics of institutional reform. We seek to understand in what way the level of deputy cohesion and deputy-voter congruence can help us
explain why there have been no changes to the electoral system.

The study relies on two surveys fielded in Portugal in 2008: a survey of 143 of Portugal’s 230 deputies and of a representative sample of the adult population living in the mainland (N=1350). The study begins by reviewing the literature on electoral system reform before offering a historical overview of the major discussions and proposals for electoral system reform in Portugal.

We then seek to address the following five points. First, are there indicators of strong discontent with the functioning of the political system at the voter level that could be said to press political elite towards electoral system reform?

Second, we try to ascertain if the Portuguese electorate’s support for the idea of political reform is related to discontent with the political system.

Third, we investigate whether—overall and across parties—there is any deputy-voter congruence in terms of preferences concerning the main rules of the political and electoral game?

Fourth, do deputies (and voters) from different political parties (large versus small parties, parties that have been in government versus those that have not) have different perspectives about the main rules of the political and electoral game?

Finally, what are the levels of deputy cohesion within and across parties around the topics of institutional reform?
Electoral reforms: Between complexity and the difficulty of change

The political processes associated with major electoral reform—that is, with a change of the rules to convert votes into seats (Katz 2008)—are rather complex.

Several factors help explain this complexity:

1. Electoral systems are multi-dimensional structures and therefore change requires some equilibrium between normative elements and issues related with government efficiency (Dunleavy and Margetts 1995: 13).

2. Reforms are marked by the double pressure of short- and long-term contexts often indicating contradictory solutions (Norris 1995a; 1995b: 7; Shugart 2001: 27).

3. These reforms imply a high level of uncertainty in terms of their effects, because they have an impact on several dimensions of political life and thus tend to generate ‘a kind of fear of the unknown’ (Taagepera and Shugart 1989: 236; Katz 2008: 61–3; Colomer 2005; Pilet 2008).

4. These reforms are unavoidably related to the debate around different conceptions of democracy (majoritarian versus consensual/consociational) and therefore about the major objectives the electoral rules should accomplish and the best devices with which to accomplish them (Lijphart 1999; Norris 1997).
Besides those factors mentioned above there are at least three more that can help us understand some of the failures to implement electoral reform (the latter concern, for example, changing the electoral formula within systems of proportional representation, to pass from closed to open lists, etc.).

The first centres on the fact reform is usually proposed by the ‘parties of power’ (the two major parties or blocs of parties) that rarely achieve consensus on the benefits (and costs) of the reforms (measured in terms of ease of achieving or maintaining power).

This leads to the central role of the ruling parties in this type of reform and its timing. Usually the reforms proposed obey the principles of the maximisation of power (in terms of an increase in the number of seats). For as long as the current system benefits the ruling parties, they will not feel the need to propose any change; however, whenever there are significant changes in the party system and/or in voters’ preferences affecting the ruling parties, then they tend to bring forward proposals to change the electoral system (Boix 1999: 609).

This type of approach has been framed within the theory of rational-choice institutionalism that assumes political actors in representative democracies try to maximise their votes and seats in the electoral market in order to obtain or maintain power (Norris 2004; Katz 2008).

Of course, there are some serious doubts about the idea political actors are guided only by self-interest: it does appear parties sometimes simply want to do the right thing. This possibility is the basis for the long-standing debate
about whether proportional representation was introduced in Europe because the ruling parties recognised it was required for fairness, or because it offered protection to bourgeois parties about to become minorities with the enfranchisement of the working class (Katz 2008: 68; Benoit 2004: 368–70).

At least *prima facie*, the Portuguese debate on electoral change since 1997 points in the direction of the ‘general interest’. The main reason put forward for reform has been the alleged need to improve the conditions for a closer deputy-voter relationship at the district level and therefore for greater accountability and more democracy.

Moreover, in their bills for electoral reform, the parties usually refer to such thing as declining electoral turnout, levels of party identification and the growing criticism of the political class to justify change (Meirinho 2004; Freire, Meirinho and Moreira 2008: 1–14). However, it is also true the smaller parties have argued that underneath these motives there is also the ruling parties’ self-interest in seat maximisation (Freire, Meirinho and Moreira 2008: 1–14).

The second aspect concerns the degree of freedom political actors have to affect reform. It is usually not easy to change the electoral system, especially when it is constitutionally protected (as in Portugal). With it being difficult to proceed with reforms affecting ‘the principle of representation’, political actors are usually limited to making changes within the same system of representation (Rahat 2004), and even with these types of changes, political engineers are often faced with several politically incompatible options, or choices that are not easily
accepted by the ruling parties (Reilly 2007: 1354; Nolhen 2007: 33–40).

Finally, electoral reforms are rarely the result of a bottom-up process (although there are some examples of this type of reform during the 1990s [Donovan 1995; Vowles 1995]). Usually, reforms are top-down, driven by political elites and rarely resulting from popular pressure. However, the erosion of links between voters and the political systems, and the reduction of the latter’s legitimacy in the eyes of the former, are often used to justify the need for reform. Thus, public opinion usually has an important role in electoral reform, at least by feeding the public agenda (Norris 2009), and Portugal is a clear example of this.

Despite the failure to implement any reform, this type of explanation has frequently been referred to in the Portuguese debate on electoral change. Nevertheless, voters seldom have the ability to ‘force’ the parties to change the rules of the game: it is the party elites who usually determine reform, its timing and the desired outcome.

We also analyse the role of Portuguese voters in the process of electoral reform, which we will show is both significant (the proposals for reform from the parties almost always begin by referring to some ‘political malaise’ to justify the need for change) and limited (despite all the indicators of ‘political malaise’, and the knowledge electoral reform might help change this, no significant reform has yet taken place).

We are also concerned with the role of legislators in turning the preferences of voters and parties into law.
There is not much literature on the role of voters in electoral system reform (Fournier et al. forthcoming; Norris 2009; Curtice 2007; Weir 2005; Banducci and Karp 1999; Banducci, Donovan and Karp 1999), or about the relationship between electoral institutions and attitudes towards the political system (Birch 2008; Anderson and Guillory 1997). Even scarcer in the literature are analyses of deputy-voter congruence and cohesion in respect of electoral reform.

These are clear gaps in the literature. The ‘public’s agenda’ is always both a first step in policy-making and an element of feedback in any reform process taking place (Norris 2009: 1). However, if voters’ preferences are a first step in policy-making, then deputies have an important role in turning voter and party preferences into law. Moreover, parties are not unitary actors and the lack of deputy cohesion might help us understand the failure of electoral reform.

**Proposals for electoral reform in Portugal: An overview**

In 1974, after 48 years of dictatorship, Portugal began the so-called third-wave of democratisation.

Since then, apart from the 1991 reduction in the number of deputies in the Assembly of the Republic from 250 to 230, there have been no major changes to the Portuguese electoral system. Nevertheless, the debate over electoral reform has been ongoing since the transition to democracy (Meirinho 2004; Cruz 1998). Before analysing this debate, let us outline the major characteristics of the rules governing election to parliament.
Despite having a directly-elected president, parliamentary elections are the most important for the operation of the political system.

These elections are conducted under a closed-list proportional representation system in 22 multi-member constituencies (using the D’Hondt formula). The average number of deputies for each constituency was 11.4 until 1987, and 10.5 since then. There is a large imbalance in the size of districts, with the metropolitan areas being very large (Lisbon 48, Oporto 38) and the interior and emigrant constituency being very small (with several returning as few as two deputies).

Between 1976 and 2008 there were several debates on electoral reform encompassing a variety of options ranging from a change to the majoritarian two-ballot system (Amaral 1985) to maintaining the current system with minor adjustments.

We consider three dimensions in the analysis of electoral reform: the context, the type of proposal and the direction of change, and the main stated reasons for reform.

When considering the third dimension (‘the major reasons for electoral system reform’), we should bear in mind the criticisms of the electoral system’s operation have focused on three issues: the need to change the system to increase executive stability (during the 1974–87 period of cabinet instability), the allegedly excessive number of deputies (promoted by right-wing parties, particularly the Social Democratic Party) and the unfavourable conditions for a close deputy-voter relationship at the district level.

The first issue lost importance after 1987, a period during which the vote was concentrated into support for the
Socialist and the Social Democratic parties and which led both to a reduction in the fragmentation of the party system (since then the ‘effective number of parties’ is similar to that found in some majoritarian systems) and an increase in government stability.

Since 1992–97, the period in which more precise and structured proposals were presented, the debate on electoral system reform in Portugal evolved towards two other issues: reducing the number of deputies, and creating more favourable conditions for a closer relationship between constituents and their deputies (Meirinho 2004; Freire, Meirinho and Moreira 2008).

Several suggestions have been put forward in an attempt to overcome the problem of the alleged unfavourable conditions for a close relationship between deputies and their constituents. Since 1997 the preferred solution has been to create a mixed-member proportional system (proposed by the Socialists and the Social Democrats); however, many have complained this would lead to parochialism, clientelism and party political polarisation (Cruz 2000; Freire et al. 2002). The lack of consensus on the use of single-member constituencies was behind a recently commissioned study by the Socialist Party, which proposed a multiple tier system with small multi-member constituencies in the lower tier and preferential vote (Freire, Meirinho and Moreira 2008).

The main reason for reservations about single-member constituencies was perhaps also that behind the Socialist Party reservations about the preferential vote: they fear losing control of candidate selection.
Nevertheless, the debates have shown intra-party divisions, and the ‘fear of the unknown’, have contributed towards a failure to introduce reform, and we should remember this when analysing the survey data.

**Voters’ attitudes towards the political system**

Although we know from other country studies that electoral reform is mainly a top-down process, we also know voters’ discontent with the political system can play a role in the electoral change process. Reading the proposals for electoral change that the two major parties present from time to time, we find references to the need to improve the level of trust the Portuguese have in their political institutions, the progressive decline in identification with the current party system and the ever-increasing level of electoral abstention (Freire, Meirinho and Moreira 2008; Freire and Magalhães 2002).

In this section we will present a comparative and longitudinal overview of Portuguese attitudes to the political system.

Figure 8.1 shows Portuguese voter satisfaction with how the democratic system functioned from 1985–2008, and shows there has been a sharp decline since 2002. While generally remaining above the levels registered from 2002, the decline in satisfaction with democracy began in 1991 and, although there have been some vicissitudes, it has never recovered. The decline in 1991 could be related to the economic crisis following the 1986–90 boom: in fact, other downturns might also be connected to economic
difficulties and/or austerity packages (e.g. 1995–97, 2000, 2005–08). However, besides the more political-economic reasons, political reasons can also help explain the situation.

**Figure 8.1: Satisfaction with the way democracy works in Portugal**

![Graph showing satisfaction with democracy in Portugal](image)


Figure 8.2 shows Portuguese voters do not feel well represented by their deputies, and this feeling has been increasing since 2002. Nevertheless, while it has been shown dissatisfaction with the way in which Portuguese democracy works and that disaffection with political representatives is rising, this does not mean there is a reduction in the legitimacy of Portugal’s democratic
regime. The Portuguese are democrats—dissatisfied and disaffected, perhaps—but democrats nonetheless (Magalhães 2004).

Figure 8.2: How well deputies accurately reflect the views of voters, 2002–08 (% ‘very well’ and ‘fairly well’)


The data in Figures 8.1 and 8.2 shows a problematic evolution in the Portuguese situation in terms of both satisfaction with democracy and perceptions of the accuracy of the representation process. These are problematic indications from a public sphere that can be said to justify the need for political reform.

However, neither of these indications tells us about the Portuguese situation in a comparative perspective. Fortunately, both questions were asked in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems surveys. In Table 8.1 we see the
level of satisfaction with how democracy works in Portugal (53.0 per cent in 2002, 47.6 per cent in 2005 and around 30 per cent in 2008) is well below the average for the 33 countries
Table 8.1: Satisfaction with democracy and perceptions of representation in comparative perspective

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Satisfaction with democracy (a)</td>
<td>Deputies know what people think (b)</td>
<td>Deputies represent voters’ views (c)</td>
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<td>28.6</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>21.3</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>52.3</td>
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<td>70.8</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>40.4</td>
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<td>32.8</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>47.9</td>
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<td>56.1</td>
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<td>46.1</td>
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</tr>
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<td>31.1</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
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<tr>
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<td>–</td>
<td>46.2</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>33.9</td>
<td>25.6</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
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<td>63.1</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>48.5</td>
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<td>Portugal (date)</td>
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<td><strong>47.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>32.0</strong></td>
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<td>Russia</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>49.3</td>
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<td>United States</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean 1 (all) (d)</td>
<td><strong>59.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>57.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>29.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>51.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean 2 (e)</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Notes:** When there were two elections in one country in each CSES module we always use data from the most recent election. (a) The proportion of people who are ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ satisfied with the democratic regime, (b) proportion of those who believe deputies know what the people think (values 1 and 2 from a scale that goes from 1=deputies know what ordinary people think’ to 5=deputies don’t know what ordinary people think’), (c) those who believe voters’ views are ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ well represented in elections, (d) all countries, (e) countries with strong democratic regimes according to Freedom House ratings (i.e. excluding Korea, Peru, Russia, Thailand and Ukraine). **Sources:** (CSES 1996–2002; 2002–6).

included in Table 8.1, which shows 59.8 per cent for CSES Module 1 and 57.9 per cent for CSES 2.

The contrast is even greater if we exclude some countries with problematic regimes (e.g. S. Korea, Peru, Russia, Thailand and Ukraine). With these countries removed the new averages are 65.7 per cent and 60.9 per cent, respectively. The same can be said with respect to voters’ perceptions about how well their views are represented in elections (through deputies)’: the situation in Portugal is 37.9 per cent for 2002 and 25.1 per cent for 2008, while the average for the stronger democratic regimes is 52 per cent (CSES 2). Thus, the comparative perspective reveals reasons for being concerned with Portuguese attitudes towards the political regime: reasons supporting the need for political reform.

**Political reform and voter discontent with the political system**

The majority of respondents to our 2008 voter survey (60 per cent) disagree with the statement ‘voters have ample opportunity to participate in political decisions’. 52

More troubling is that 65 per cent believe ‘the democratic regime is about to lose the trust of the voters’,
while 51 per cent disagree ‘the legislation produced by the Portuguese parliament reflects the interests of the majority of the citizens’.

Support for the idea ‘parties are the essential link between voters and the political system’ remains high at 52 per cent, although 65 per cent believe ‘special interests have too much influence in the legislative process’. Additionally, 65 per cent believe ‘the law-making process is too complicated’, while 53 per cent think ‘parliament, and not the voters, should make the final decisions on law and policy’.

Finally, 63 per cent agree ‘a certain number of voters should be able to initiate a referendum’, and 47 per cent believe ‘quotas are a necessary measure to increase women’s presence in parliament’—both indicators of political discontent and support for political reform.

In order to analyse the relationship between voter discontent with the functioning of the political system and attitudes towards political reform, we re-coded several variables in order for higher values to correspond to both increased criticism and the perception of a need to open new channels for voter participation.

Using principal component analysis with varimax rotation, we found there are indeed three distinct factors (see Table 8.2).
Table 8.2: Factor analysis of voter attitudes towards the Portuguese political system (principal component analysis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables (+ critical positions; – non critical positions)</th>
<th>F1: Evaluation of the law-making process</th>
<th>F2: Evaluation of the political system</th>
<th>F3: Political reform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCS_A3_5 Special interests have too much influence on law making.</td>
<td>0.706</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS_A3_2 The democratic regime is on the verge of losing the trust of the voters.</td>
<td>0.651</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS_A3_6 Lawmaking process is too complicated.</td>
<td>0.583</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS_A3_4 The parties are not the major link between the voters and the state.</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS_A3_1 There are few opportunities for voter participation.</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.603</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS_A3_3 Legislation reflects the interest of the majority of voters.</td>
<td>-0.504</td>
<td>0.596</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS_A3_7 Parliament, not voters, should make final decisions on law and policy.</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.508</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS_A3_8 A certain number of voters should be able to initiate a referendum.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS_A3_9 Quotas are a necessary measure to address the under-representation of women.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.758</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variance explained 18.99% 17.63% 14.10%

Note: In order to analyse the relationship between voter discontent with the functioning of the political system and attitudes towards political reform, we recoded the variables in order for higher values to correspond to both increased criticism and the perception of a need to open new channels for voter participation. KMO = 0.641; Bartelett’s test – significance = 0.000.

Those who disagree with the statement ‘legislation reflects the interest of the majority of voters’, those who think the law-making process is too complicated and too influenced by particular interests, together with those who believe the democratic regime is on the verge of losing the trust of the voters, are all loaded on the same factor (F1). Thus, positive values in this factor mean a critical evaluation of the legislative process, which is why we labelled it ‘evaluation of the law-making process’.

A second factor (F2), labelled ‘evaluation of the political system’, is composed of those who believe ‘the parties are not the major link between the voters and the state’ and that ‘there are few opportunities for voter participation’. Those who believe legislation does not reflect the interest of the majority also load positively on this factor. There is yet a fourth variable: those who believe parliament, and not voters, should be the primary political decision-maker also load positively in F2.

The third factor (F3), labelled ‘political reform’, is composed of those who believe quotas are a necessary measure to increase the presence of women in parliament and those who claim voters should be able to call for referendums.

Having identified these three distinct factors, we are now in a position to perform a more nuanced analysis of the impact of voters’ opinions on both the functioning of the political system and the need to open new channels for participation on their level of satisfaction with the way democracy works in the country. Please note that the higher the value of the dependent variable (‘satisfaction with democracy’), the more discontent the respondents are.
Table 8.3: Explaining voters’ satisfaction with democracy (ordinary least squares regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standardised coefficients (β)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F1: Evaluation of the law-making process 0.344***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolution of the state of the economy -0.227***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party identification (Democratic Unity Coalition) 0.130**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2: Evaluation of the political system 0.156**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right values (index) 0.120*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity (church attendance) Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (area of residence) Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Bloc Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Centre Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 3: Political reform (quotas/referendums) Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libertarian–authoritarian values (index) Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R² 0.248</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Variable coding: Dependent variable=CCS_A1_R, satisfaction with democracy=rec.: Very satisfied; (4) not at all satisfied. Independent variables: (Perception of the) Evolution of the state of the economy (vis-à-vis the previous year): (1) a lot worst; (5) a lot better. Factor 1: higher values mean higher criticism towards the lawmaking process. Factor 2: higher values mean higher criticism towards the political system. Factor 3: higher values mean more support for political reform. Party Identification: 4 dummies: (1) for each party (Left Bloc, Democratic Unity Coalition, Social Democratic Party, Social Democratic Centre); reference group (0): Socialist Party. Values: higher values mean right wing (left-right) or authoritarian values (libertarian-authoritarian). Age: continuous variable ordered in an ascending fashion. Gender: (0) Male; (1) Female. Church attendance: (1) never; (6) once a week or more. Population: (1) < 2000 inhabitants; (5) ≥ 300000 inhabitants. Levels of significance: *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01, ***p ≤ 0.001.

Controlling for party identification, gender, age, religiosity, population and values (both left-right and libertarian-authoritarian), we find the first factor of our analysis (‘evaluation of the law-making process’) possesses
a highly significant positive correlation with dissatisfaction with democracy, that is, those more critical of the law-making process are also less dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Portugal (Table 8.3).

A negative correlation exists between the perception of the development of the economy and satisfaction with democracy: positive perceptions, lower discontent with democracy. The only party identification dummy variable that is significant is the Democratic Unity Coalition variable (with the reference being the Socialist Party).

The second factor in our principal component analysis, which is concerned with ‘the evaluation of the political system’ (higher values: more critical stance), is also positively correlated with a lower satisfaction with democracy.

Finally, left-right value orientations also appear to have some effect, with voters placing themselves more to the right also being less satisfied with democracy. Only the factor ‘support for political reform’ (quotas and referendums) have no significant impact.

Turning now to the voters’ preferences in terms of electoral system reform, we should emphasise the average voter’s idea of available electoral systems is rather crude (Curtice 2004), and many of the definitions inherent to their study are simply not applicable in a mass survey. However, from the voter survey answers we know 64 per cent of respondents believe the electoral system should be modified to allow people to vote more for candidates instead of parties (the so-called personalisation of the vote).

The idea of creating more favourable conditions for a closer deputy-voter relationship (i.e. for the personalisation
of the vote) lies at the heart of most proposals for electoral reform in Portugal since 1997. Therefore, we will now analyse in what way support for this idea at the voter level is related with discontent with the political system.

**Table 8.4: Explaining voter attitudes towards ‘reforming the electoral system to personalise the vote’ (ordinary least squares regression)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Standardised coefficients (β)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F2: Evaluation of the political system</td>
<td>0.185***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F3: Political reform (quotas/referendums)</td>
<td>0.157**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.127*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right values (index)</td>
<td>-0.158**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party identification Social Democratic Centre</td>
<td>0.138*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libertarian -authoritarian values (index)</td>
<td>-0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F1: Evaluation of the law-making process</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolution of the economy</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party identification Left Bloc</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Unity Coalition</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (area of residence)</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity (church attendance)</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Variable coding: Dependent variable=“the electoral system should be changed so that people can vote for a candidates instead of a party?”, with responses on a five point scale (1=totally disagree, to 5=totally agree). Independent variables: See Table 3. Levels of significance: * $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$

**Source:** Portuguese Mass Survey (2008), in Freire, Viegas and Seicereira (2009).

Using the same variables as in the previous regression, we see that even after controlling for several important variables (the views about the law-making process: F2,
economic perceptions, party identification, gender, religiosity and population) there is a highly significant positive correlation between negative evaluations of the political system (F1) and support for greater personalisation of the electoral system (Table 8.4).

Similarly, ‘the political reform’ F3 (support for quotas and referendums) also has a significant positive impact on the view the electoral system should be changed to give voters greater opportunity to choose among candidates on the party lists.

There appears to be a negative correlation between the age of the respondent and the dependent variable, with younger people being more in favour of personalisation. The ideological divide also appears to have some impact, with those with left-wing views being more supportive of the need to change the electoral system in order to be able to choose deputies individually.

The only party identification dummy variable with any significant impact in this model is the Social Democratic Centre (with the Socialist Party being the reference group), with those who identify with this party being more in favour of personalisation.

Finally, a very slight effect is detected in terms of the correlation between those on the libertarian side of the libertarian-authoritarian dimension, with those of a more libertarian bent also tending to support the personalisation of the vote.

With only 15 per cent of the variance explained, this model is far from impressive. Nevertheless, it provides us with some indications about the impact of several variables, namely those measuring discontent with the political
system, in relation to a particular change to the electoral system mentioned in the survey, which the parties have often proposed as part of their pledge for electoral reform: the personalisation of the vote.

Deputies’ and voters’ perspectives on the main principles for electoral rules

Rather less explored in the literature are the levels of deputy-voter congruence (or lack of it) around the topics of institutional reform. However, the lack of such congruence, either on the main objectives the rules of the game should accomplish or on the desirable direction for electoral reform can at least in part help explain some of the lack of success in achieving electoral reform.

Although the literature on electoral reform focuses on partisan attitudes, investigation of the levels of deputy cohesion (within and across parties) on electoral reform, particularly using survey data, is relatively under-researched. However, the levels of this cohesion (especially when it concerns parties with the power to change the rules), particularly when it is low, can help us understand the lack of success in reforming the electoral system.

This is why in this section we focus on the levels of deputy cohesion within and across parties, and the levels of deputy-voter congruence on matters related to institutional
Table 8.5: Electoral system preferences (I): voters and deputies (left-wing parties) 2008 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Left Bloc</th>
<th>Democratic Unity Coalition</th>
<th>Socialist Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voters</td>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>Diff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A government made up of a single party</td>
<td>28.6 (15.4)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A coalition government made up of more than one party</td>
<td>71.4 (84.6)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>28.6*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What do you prefer, single-party government or coalition government?

1. A government made up of a single party
2. A coalition government made up of more than one party

In some countries there are governments in office that rely on less than half of the votes of members of parliament. This form of government is called minority government. What do you think about it?

1. A government needs its own majority in parliament
2. A majority in parliament is less important

Different electoral systems pursue different political goals. If you had to choose between the following political goals, which one would you vote for?

1. Party proportions in votes and seats should closely match
2. The party that obtains most votes should receive more than half of the seats in parliament


Notes: In the cells under the label ‘Diff’ we present the difference between the percentage of voters minus the percentage of deputies in each cell. Thus, if the “diff” is positive, voters are more in favour of that option than deputies; if it is negative, it is the other way around. For each ‘Diff’ we tested the respective statistical significance using the ‘test for the difference of proportions’ and considering it to be significant if the value of the test (Z) is lower than -1.96 or higher than +1.96. The significant differences are marked with an asterisk. Some people might argue these topics are too sophisticated for most of the low educated voters and thus they might be making random responses. To control for that possibility, for each cell concerning the voters in parenthesis we show the proportion of more educated voters (secondary education or more) in each particular category.
Table 8.6: Electoral system preferences (I): voters and deputies (right-wing parties and all) 2008 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Goal</th>
<th>Social Democratic Party</th>
<th>Social Democratic Centre</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voters</td>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>Diff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do you prefer, single-party government or coalition government?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. A government made up of a single party</td>
<td>42.7 (45.9)</td>
<td>21.1 (16.7)</td>
<td>35.1*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>34.6*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. A coalition government made up of more than one party</td>
<td>57.3 (54.1)</td>
<td>78.9 (83.3)</td>
<td>35.1*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>-8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>34.6*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In some countries there are governments in office that rely on less than half of the votes of members of parliament. This form of government is called minority government. What do you think about it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Goal</th>
<th>Social Democratic Party</th>
<th>Social Democratic Centre</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voters</td>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>Diff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. A government needs its own majority in parliament</td>
<td>56.3 (59.4)</td>
<td>30.0 (42.9)</td>
<td>30.4*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>-45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>25.5*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. A majority in parliament is less important</td>
<td>43.7 (40.6)</td>
<td>70.0 (57.1)</td>
<td>30.4*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>25.5*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Different electoral systems pursue different political goals. If you had to choose between the following political goals, which one would you vote for?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Goal</th>
<th>Social Democratic Party</th>
<th>Social Democratic Centre</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voters</td>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>Diff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Party proportions in votes and seats should closely match</td>
<td>58.0 (57.6)</td>
<td>62.5 (40.0)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>37.5*</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-10.9</td>
<td>37.5 (46.0)</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(40.0)</td>
<td>(60.0)</td>
<td>(46.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>26.2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The party that obtains most votes should receive more than half of the seats in parliament</td>
<td>42.0 (42.4)</td>
<td>37.5 (60.0)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>(46.0)</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26.2*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: See Table 8.5.

reform—with a greater emphasis on electoral reform—and seek to understand in what way the levels of deputy cohesion and deputy-voter congruence can help us
understand why there were no changes to the electoral system, despite there being several proposals since 1997.

We begin with the levels of deputy-voter congruence and deputy cohesion on the main principles the (electoral) rules of the game should accomplish (Tables 8.5 and 8.6). In these two tables we consider the response of both voters and deputies to three questions closely related to the operation of any electoral system. For each question we begin with the analysis of deputy-voter congruence and then pass to the question of the level of party cohesion. Please note that to segment voters we used party identification,\textsuperscript{53} while to segment deputies we used the party list in which each deputy was elected.\textsuperscript{54}

For the first question, ‘What do you prefer, single-party government or coalition government?’, the questionnaire suggests two responses: ‘a government made up of a single party’ or ‘a coalition government made up of more than one party’. Please note that for all the questions, we tested for the statistical significance of the differences between deputies and voters (test for the difference in proportions): the significant differences are marked with an asterisk in Tables 8.5 and 8.6.

The majority of deputies (80.1 per cent) opted for single-party government, while the majority of voters (54.5 per cent) said they would prefer a coalition. This significant mismatch between deputies and voters is due to the fact the two major parties, which control more than 70 per cent of the seats in parliament, prefer single-party government, and only the deputies of the smaller parties prefer coalition government (Left Bloc 100 per cent, Democratic Unity
Coalition 100 per cent, Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party 87.5 per cent).

However, among the voters, supporters of the major parties are more divided than their representatives (with 50.7 per cent of Socialist Party and 57.3 per cent of Social Democratic Party sympathisers favouring coalition), which explains why there is a majority of voters supporting coalition.

We know from previous studies that voter attitudes and knowledge about electoral systems is not only rather limited, but also dependent on the format of the question (Fournier et al. forthcoming; Curtice 2004). For this reason, in parenthesis Tables 8.5 and 8.6 show the percentages for the more educated strata of the population (those who have completed more than the compulsory nine years of formal education). For the previous question, we see that except for those who identify with the Social Democratic Party the results add strength to the idea the majority of the population (in general and across parties) prefer coalition to single-party government.

The answers to the second question about principles (‘In some countries there are governments in office that rely on less than half of the votes of members of parliament. This form of government is called minority government. What do you think about it?’) point in a similar direction.

Overall, deputies (79.4 per cent) are much more in favour of majority government than voters (53.9 per cent), although both are now more in favour (significant difference). At the elite level, a majority of deputies from the Socialist Party and the parties to its right prefer majority
government (remember the Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party is a small party in government from 2002–05, while the parties to the Socialist Party’s left have not been in power). Only deputies from the parties to the left of the socialists prefer minority government.

At the voter level there are large divisions within each party, although the divisions are greater (and more often significant) between those who identify with the major parties (with Socialist and Social Democrat party supporters being more in favour of majority government), while the supporters of the smaller parties (Left Bloc, Democratic Unity Coalition and Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party) favour coalitions. Controlling for the voters’ level of education makes no real difference to the results, indicating their validity.

The third question on major principles (‘Different electoral systems pursue different political goals. If you had to choose between the following political goals, which one would you vote for?’) offers an alternative between a proportional (‘Party proportions in votes and seats should closely match’) and a majoritarian electoral system (‘The party that obtains most votes should receive more than half of the seats in parliament’).

Both deputies (82.6 per cent) and voters (56.4 per cent) are more in favour of proportionality although, paradoxically, the former are more so than the latter (significant differences). At the deputy level this can be explained by the fact the Portuguese system of proportional representation is not only disproportional (Freire, Meirinho and Moreira 2008: 28), but most of all it has returned three single-party majorities and two quasi-majorities. Recall
also that in Portugal proportional representation is a constitutional requirement.

Although deputies from the minor parties are more in favour of proportionality than their peers in the larger parties, the significant aspect is that among the latter there is a great deal of support for proportional representation (86.3 per cent of Socialist Party deputies and 86.7 per cent of Social Democratic Party deputies). Among the voters, and especially among those sympathetic to the smaller parties, the level of support for majoritarian rule (Left Bloc—32.4 per cent, Democratic Unity Coalition—48.6 per cent, Social Democratic Centre—37.5 per cent) may be the result of a lack of information.

However, apart from those who sympathise with the Democratic Unity Coalition and the Social Democratic Centre (who turned out to be more in favour of majoritarian rule than previously—62.5 and 60 per cent, respectively), all the other results remain unchanged after controlling for education.

The results from supporters of the Democratic Unity Coalition and the Social Democratic Centre are not easy to explain, but we should bear in mind these breakdowns are calculated using a limited number of cases.

*Deputies’ perspectives on desirable solutions for electoral reform*

Due to its inherent difficulty for the average voter, the last question concerning the desirable directions of electoral reform was only presented to deputies, meaning we are
only able to analyse the issue of party cohesion among deputies (Table 8.7).

Overall, deputies appear divided, providing answers spread across three main options. The first, which is also the most conservative, ‘maintain the actual system in country as it is, although perhaps with some adjustments’, receives 34.2 per cent. The second, which is the most recently discussed proposal (Freire, Meirinho and Moreira 2008), ‘maintain the fundamental aspects of the actual system in the country, but modify some components to create more favourable conditions towards a more personalised representation (as used in Sweden and Denmark)’, receives 27.4 per cent. The third, the proposal for a mixed-member proportional system (‘A personalised proportional system with two votes (as used in Germany’), which was until recently the most popular reform proposal, received the support of only 14.7 per cent of the deputies.

The remaining 23.7 per cent were split among four options. The lack of cohesion concerning the most preferred form of electoral reform is perhaps one reason why it has been so difficult to reform the Portuguese electoral system (since 1997).

Of course, we cannot use these results to explain what happened before 2008, but we know both from the press and from interviews with party leaders the lack of cohesion within the party elites in relation to electoral reform is not new (Cruz 2000; Freire et al. 2001; Meirinho 2004).

Moreover, there is a lack of cohesion both within and across the two major parties. For the Socialists, the top three solutions are: ‘maintain the fundamental aspects of the actual system in country, but modify some components
to create more favourable conditions for more personalised representation (as in Sweden and Denmark)’ (38.2 per cent), maintain the present system with perhaps minor changes (35.5 per cent), and a plurality single-member constituency system (10.5 per cent).

As for the centre-right Social Democrats, the top preferences are a mixed-member proportional system like that used in Germany (36.4 per cent), maintain the current system with minor changes (27.3 per cent) and a two-tier system along Scandinavian lines (18.2 per cent).

Thus, we see the major parties are not only divided within (with a strong preference for maintaining the actual system), they are also divided between themselves. Clearly, this lack of consensus on the direction electoral reform should take goes far towards explaining the failures of the reform process—especially if we assume this is not a completely new scenario.

Understandably, deputies from the smaller parties are divided between support for retaining the existing system and changing to a pure proportional system like that used in the Netherlands. Deputies from the Left Bloc split evenly, with 40 per cent supporting either option, while Democratic Unity Coalition Deputies are split 55.6 per cent and 22.2 per cent for the status quo and pure proportional representation, respectively, while among Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party deputies the split was 25 and 50 per cent, respectively.
Table 8.7: Deputies’ electoral system preferences (II)  
(%)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Left Bloc</th>
<th>Democratic Unity Coalition</th>
<th>Socialist Party</th>
<th>Social Democratic Party</th>
<th>Social Democratic Centre</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A personalised proportional system with two votes (as used in Germany)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A single member district system (as used in Britain)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A single member district system with two rounds (as used in France)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A pure proportional system (as used in the Netherlands)</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain the actual system in country as it is, perhaps with some adjustments</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain the fundamental aspects of the actual system in country, but modify some components to create more favourable conditions towards a more personalised representation (as used in Sweden and Denmark)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another system</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Portuguese Deputies Survey (2008) in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).

Of course, deputies representing these parties fear whatever change there may be (apart from a pure proportional system) might hurt them, so they tend to vote to keep things as they are. While they do not have the power to change the rules, unless they have the support of one of the major parties to achieve the two-thirds majority necessary to change the electoral system, their position reinforces the view there is a lack of cohesion among party deputies concerning the desirable forms of electoral reform.

Of course, divisions within parties can be overcome by the decision of a majority of party officials (and their leader); however, deputies retain an important role in this type of decision, and while they are so deeply divided
amongst themselves (especially within and across the two major parties) electoral reform will remain problematic.

**Concluding remarks**

As we said at the beginning, there is not much literature on the role of voters in electoral reform processes, and this lacuna is important because voters’ preferences are usually the first step in policy-making.

Also scarce is the analysis of deputy-voter congruence and cohesion on this topic—a lacuna all the more significant because legislators have a crucial role in turning the preferences of voters and parties into law.

Thus, building on unique survey data, we analysed the role of voters in the process of electoral reform in Portugal and the level of deputy-voter congruence and cohesion in respect of changes to the rules of the electoral game.

The chapter has mainly addressed electoral reform in Portugal: an issue that has been much debated since the transition to democracy in 1974. In the first cycle of these debates, from 1978–89, political actors presented three main reasons for reforming the electoral system. They argued it would increase executive stability, improve parliamentary efficiency by reducing the number of deputies and create more favourable conditions for the establishment of a closer relationship within the constituencies between voters and their representatives.

The first reason has lost much of its relevance since the 1990s, when the vote began to concentrate towards the two main parties with a concomitant increase in the level of
cabinet stability (without any significant change having been made to the electoral rules).

However, the other reasons retained their relevance during the second cycle of those debates, from 1990 to the present, and reflect the major criticisms made in respect of some characteristics of the present electoral system—particularly the closed list system and the existence of some districts returning a very large number of deputies.

Although several learned studies and press articles have shown the number of deputies in Portugal’s Assembly of the Republic is not large in comparison with other nations, the Social Democratic Party has always made a reduction in the number of deputies a central aspect of its electoral reform proposals.

With respect to the need to create more favourable conditions for a closer deputy-voter relationship at the constituency level, there is some consensus between the major parties. The constitution was even changed in 1997 to allow for a mixed-member proportional system (with single-member districts and a national constituency as compensation). However, according to several accounts past failures to reform the electoral system have been due to divisions within and between the main parties—not only regarding reductions to the number of deputies (which was proposed by the Social Democratic Party and rejected by all others with parliamentary representation), but also in terms of precise solutions for achieving the target of a closer relationship between the voters and their representatives (a mixed-member system with some single-member districts or a multiple tiers system with small multi-member constituencies—not single-member
constituencies—at the lower tier). Since at least 1997, several criticisms have been raised from within both the Socialist and the Social Democratic parties in relation to single-member constituencies.

Since one of the reasons for electoral reform presented by political actors (namely in their legislative proposals for change) was the growing problem of the relationship between voters and the political system (falling levels of turnout, declining levels of confidence in the political system and political actors, weaker identification with political parties) and one of the reasons for the failure to reform has been the lack of cohesion within and between (especially the two main) parties, this chapter has analysed levels of deputy-voter congruence and deputy cohesion in terms of the major principles of the electoral rules.

However, based on several voter surveys across time and the academic literature, we have revised some of trends in terms of the growing problem in the relationship between voters and the political system. We found there is an enormous level of voter dissatisfaction with the way Portugal’s democracy works as well as with the representative function performed by deputies.

Comparative survey data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems strengthens our conclusion. Furthermore, we found a great deal of support for opening new channels through which voters can participate in the political system. Even after introducing several control variables, we found ‘the (critical) evaluation of the political system’ and ‘the criticism of the law-making process’ are important predictors of the (mainly negative) sentiments in respect of the way democracy works in Portugal.
We also found voters’ ‘evaluations of the political system’ and their ‘support for political reform’ (via quotas and increased referendums) also helps explain support for greater personalisation of the vote: those who have a negative evaluation of the operation of the political system and/or who support political reform also prefer electoral change that would give voters more say in choosing their deputies (for example, preferential vote).

We know from some case studies the attitudes of voters towards the political system and the voters’ support for electoral (and political) reform can play an important role in explaining why some reforms were implemented; however, despite the large amount of dissatisfaction with the performance of the political system (which has been revealed in previous studies) and the support for opening new political participation channels (through reform of the electoral system)—which have been acknowledged in several reform proposals—no reform has taken place in Portugal.

Of course, this reveals that while voters’ attitudes are important they may not be crucial—at least while (the two main) parties have almost complete control of the process and while referenda on constitutional matters remain impossible—both of which are characteristic of Portugal.

There is a significant lack of cohesion within and across parties in respect of the path electoral reform should follow. We also discovered around 30 per cent of the deputies of the two main parties prefer the current system—albeit with minor adjustments—to any type of reform.

As for the smaller parties, afraid of being punished by electoral change, maintenance of the present rules or
change to a full proportional system (like in the Netherlands) are their two preferences. Of course, we cannot explain past failures with current survey data, but those divisions are in line with what we know from previous accounts, and we can therefore reasonably assume they are related to the these failures.

The lack of cohesion between and within the two main parties is a major obstacle to electoral reform. While we found both deputies (of all parties) and voters are mainly in favour of (constitutionally required) proportional representation, we found a significant mismatch between voters (who preferred coalition government) and the deputies of the main parties (who favour single-party majority government) on some fundamental rules of the political game.

This reveals that while the main parties might favour some seat maximisation with any future reform (even if they never state it publicly)—increasing the possibility of manufactured single-party majorities through the winner receiving a larger seat bonus—our data indicates it is not popular with the voters (even after we control for education levels). Reform in that particular direction could result in increased criticism of the political system from the voters.

We have shown the role of Portuguese voters in the process of electoral reform is both important and limited. We also show that within and between the two main parties, deputies are strongly divided over the direction reform of the electoral system should take, which might help us understand the difficulty in turning the voters’ and parties’ preferences into changes in electoral law.
Finally, we should stress it is not only electoral system reform that can help solve the voters’ discontent with the political system. There are several other problems behind voter dissatisfaction, and these can be solved with other type of reforms. For example, parties and politicians are not well connected with voters’ organisations, and politicians—once elected—often forget about their electorates, particularly in respect of electoral promises. Thus, the solution to these problems is not only electoral reform, but through making politics more attractive, strengthening the ties with individuals and organisations, and helping bring political institutions to the voters. In this respect, electoral reform is only one part of a resolution of these problems.
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Portugal’s 2006 quota/parity law: An analysis of the causes for its adoption

Michael Baum and Ana Espírito-Santo

Introduction

In recent years there has been a tremendous growth in the number of countries that have adopted gender quota policies as a means of redressing the persistent gender imbalance in political representation. As a matter of fact, more than half of the world’s political systems (at least 110 as of 2009) now use some form of ‘positive discrimination’ or ‘fast track’ quota strategy to help more women get elected (Dahlerup 2006: 218–26; Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005; The Economist 18 September 2008; International IDEA 2009; Krook 2006b), and most of these reforms have appeared within the last 15 years (Krook 2009; Krook, Franceschet and Piscopo 2009).

Not surprisingly, despite the controversial nature of quota policies, their relatively quick diffusion across various regions and types of political systems has led to a large and expanding research agenda focused on a wide array of important theoretical and policy questions (Dahlerup 2008; Krook 2009). Condensed to its essence, the literature on quotas has focused primarily on explaining
why quotas are adopted and/or why they have had differential effects on a wide range of potential dependent variables (Krook, Franceschet and Piscopo 2009: 2–3).

This chapter attempts to build comparative knowledge primarily in the former as it seeks to answer the question why quotas are adopted as an institutional reform in Portugal.

This type of reform is all the more puzzling since gender quota laws are almost always adopted, as in the Portuguese case, by overwhelmingly male legislators. So why do they do it? By following more or less explicitly the conceptual model provided by Mona Lena Krook (2009) as well as the seminal works of Drude Dalherup (2006) and Joni Lovenduski and Pippa Norris (1993; Norris and Lovenduski 1995) we seek to overcome some of the inherent problems of single-country case studies (Krook 2007).

In any case, we chose this path for two reasons: first, to date nothing has been published about the adoption of the Portuguese quota law, and second, it is too early to analyse the success of its implementation or other consequences that it might produce on citizens’ political attitudes in the future.

In Portugal, apart from existing research on the condition of women in general (Cabral 1997; Ferreira 1999), there are some other studies focusing on women’s status in politics (Baum and Espírito-Santo 2004; Bettencourt and Pereira 1995; Campos 2005; Espada, Vasconcelos and Coucello 2002; Silva 1993; Viegas and Faria 2001). However, there is a significant lack of scholarship on the implications of political institutions for

This study is based on two different sets of original primary data. The first set comes from a project coordinated by André Freire and José Manuel Viegas (2009), which includes a national public opinion poll of eligible voters nationwide conducted in 2008. The second set comes from a project developed by Ana Espírito-Santo in 2005, which provides content analysis of the manifestos presented by each party before each legislative election from 1976 to 2005 and semi-structured face-to-face interviews conducted with 19 people, most of whom were women who either currently serve or formerly served as deputies from all the parties analysed (Espírito-Santo 2006).

With respect to the role of opinion makers in the print media, we rely on an unpublished content analysis of newspaper editorials and coverage carried out by two Portuguese communication scholars (Silveirinha and Peixinho 2008).

The chapter is organised as follows. After a review of the literature on very recent studies on the adoption of gender quotas, we contextualise the Portuguese parity law. Then we dedicate one section to each one of actors/factors that played an important role in the adoption of the parity law. The main factors we identified are organised into four groups of variables: civil society factors such as the Portuguese print media and key opinion makers; state actors, such as the political parties and the President of the Republic; international and transnational actors, including the European Union and international organisations and
transnational parties; and finally, local political context variables, in this case Portuguese public opinion and the role of the electoral system. We then develop our conclusions in light of research findings on the adoption of quota laws in other countries.

Models of gender quota adoption

To date most of the research on the adoption of gender quotas has taken a case-study approach, focusing on their adoption in single countries or possibly their diffusion within a certain world region (Dahlerup 2006; Matland and Montgomery 2003). In what is almost certainly the most up-to-date effort to integrate this burgeoning case-study literature into a coherent conceptual framework, Mona Lee Krook (2009) takes a global perspective and organises her seminal literature review in such a way as to provide a useful template for our own analysis of the Portuguese case.

Krook (2009: 9–11) argues that studies of gender quota adoption have essentially followed four main accounts. First, many studies have found women’s groups are usually at the forefront of any push for quota measures. Such groups may include women’s sections within political parties, women’s movements outside of the parties within civil society, international women’s groups and even individual women close to powerful men (Kittilson 2006; Krook 2006a). Because women’s increased access to the political resources thought crucial for breaking the glass ceiling in politics have only provided for glacial progress to date, these groups view quotas are necessary as a ‘fast-
track’ strategy to significantly enhance women’s representation in politics (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005; Bacchi 2006).

The second account tends to focus on the role of (typically male) political elites and their strategic reasons for adopting quota measures. As Krook (2009: 9–10) reminds us, various case studies highlight the importance of contagion—as party elites often adopt quotas when one of their rivals adopts them (Caul 2001; Meier 2004).

Similarly, case studies from Brazil (Htun and Jones 2002) and France (Bird 2003) show elites may also use quotas as an empty gesture, ‘as a way to demonstrate a degree of commitment to women without actually intending to alter existing patterns of inequality’ (Krook 2009: 10). Alternatively, elites may sometimes use quotas ‘as a convenient means to achieve other ends, like maintaining control over rivals within or outside the party’ (Krook 2009: 10; Panday 2008). These stories of quota adoption remind us political elites often have conflicting motives for enacting such a reform.

A third set of studies suggests quotas are adopted when they mesh with ‘existing or emerging notions of equality and representation’ (Krook 2009: 10). One of the more consistent findings in the literature has been the correlation between quota adoption and left-wing parties, which are generally more open to measures designed to promote greater social equality—although Dahlrup (2006) cautions us about the numerous exceptions to this rule (Bonomi, Brosio and Di Tommaso 2006; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Opello 2006; Paxton and Kunovich 2003).
Others see gender quotas as just another tool that seems to fit well with more consociational types of democracies, to use Lijphart’s term (1999). These democracies tend to be associated with electoral systems favouring a more proportional form of representation for different cleavage groups in society: for example, those based on different linguistic, religious, racial or other categories (Matland and Taylor 1997; Matland and Montgomery 2003). While such studies are relatively loose in their association with one another, they can be said to share arguments that analyse quotas in terms of their degree of ‘fit’ with the specific features of the national political context—either institutionally or attitudinally.

A fourth account suggests international norms and networks help spread the gospel of gender quotas through transnational sharing. Krook suggests these norms can shape national quota debates in at least four ways (Krook 2009: 10–11). The one way that most clearly applies to the Portuguese case is through transnational emulation, which occurs where transnational non-governmental organisations share information about quota strategies with local women’s movements (and/or women’s groups within national political parties).

Thus, based in part on the approach identified by Krook (2007; 2009), Table 9.1 presents the actors we identify as having been involved in the quota adoption process in Portugal. Since these agents and factors interrelate with one another, their formal separation here is meant more as a heuristic device. For instance, the mass media and its key opinion makers might be expected to have a substantial impact on public opinion, and party elites clearly pay heed
to public opinion and civil society actors as they develop their strategies and positions, all three of which may be influenced by international actors.

We also recognise opposition parties, while not state actors per se, seek to eventually capture state power and are privileged social actors in the Portuguese context in ways other civil society actors are not. Finally, we are aware drawing a clear boundary between political parties and civil society groups is fraught with difficulties (USAID 2004; Ware 1997).

**Table 9.1: Actors/factors directly or indirectly involved in the quota adoption in Portugal**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil society actors</th>
<th>State actors</th>
<th>International and transnational actors</th>
<th>Political context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mass media and opinion makers</td>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>Transnational parties</td>
<td>Public opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President of the Republic</td>
<td>European and international organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td>Electoral system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With those caveats in mind, this chapter seeks to understand which actors played the most important role in the adoption of the parity law as well as the motivations behind the actions of each player. Before proceeding with that examination, let us briefly contextualise the Portuguese ‘parity’ law.
Contextualising the Portuguese law

The military coup of 25 April 1974 marked the end of 48 years of authoritarian rule in Portugal (1926–74) and led to the establishment of a democratic regime. Only after this date did women and men start having the same rights under Portuguese law. The principle of equality was guaranteed by the constitution, which became effective on 25 April 1976.

The fourth revision of the constitution (Sousa, Guedes and Mendes 1997) was particularly important for two reasons. First, among the state’s responsibilities, in article nine it introduced the duty ‘to promote equality between men and women’. Second, two major changes were made to article 109, which refers to the citizens’ rights to political participation. The reference to ‘direct and active participation of citizens in political life’ was changed to refer expressly to ‘men and women’ and it gave the law the possibility and even the duty to advance special measures of positive discrimination to ensure women’s political participation: ‘the law must promote equality in the exercise of civic and political rights and non-discrimination in terms of gender regarding access to public positions’ (Sousa, Guedes and Mendes 1997).

The first attempt to introduce a gender quota law followed in 1998 by the centre-left Socialist Party, which at that time controlled only 112 of the 230 seats in Portugal’s unicameral Assembly of the Republic (seventh legislature, 1995–99) (DAR 2009).

After the 1999 elections, the Socialist Party retained exactly half of the seats in the Assembly of the Republic

All of these bills argued for a fixed number of candidates of each gender on party nomination lists. However, in April 2006 the Socialist Party enjoyed a majority in parliament and its bill, along with three bills from the Left Bloc, passed on their general principles in the Assembly of the Republic with the support of all Socialist Party and Left Bloc deputies (DAR 2006b; 2006c).

These four bills were very similar. Both proposed the adoption of 33 per cent minimum representation of each gender at all three levels (local, legislative and European), and both used the word ‘parity’ in the title of the bills as well as in their content.

The word ‘parity’ was absent only from the first bill each party presented (1998 for the Socialist Party and 2000 for the Left Bloc), even if none of the bills proposed truly equal access to elective positions, which is the usual definition of ‘parity’ (Opello 2006: 8).

There were two differences between the Socialist Party and Left Bloc’s bills: while the former suggested the approval of a new law, the latter opted for changing the existing electoral law. The second difference is the introduction to the Left Bloc’s bills mentioned the importance of having a proportional electoral system for the election of women—an idea which the Socialist Party tends to be less committed to given ongoing debates about
the future of the country's electoral system (Freire et al. 2008).

Eventually, the consolidation of the four approved bills led to the publication of a decree by the Assembly of the Republic (DAR 2006d).63

Vetoed by the president in June 2006, who considered the sanctions envisioned by the decree as excessive, the decree was sent back to parliament and amended.64 The main amendments were first, an imposition of fines on parties with non-compliant lists instead of the initial outright rejection of such lists, and second, the insertion of an article requiring the parity law to be re-assessed in five years, based on its impact on gender balance in Portuguese electoral politics.

The bill passed again, although this time only with the support of the Socialist Party. The main reason for the Left Bloc’s decision not to sign it was the new less stringent punishment mechanism. The new decree was promulgated by the president in August 2006 and published on 21 August 2006 (DAR 2006e; 2006f).

According to the parity law, lists for the Assembly of the Republic, the European Parliament and the local elections are composed in such a way as to ensure a minimum representation of 33 per cent from both genders.

In order to guarantee this, the multi-member lists presented cannot contain in consecutive order more than two candidates of the same gender (what is frequently referred to as ‘the zipper principle’). The latter rule, however, does not apply to the composition of lists for the bodies of communities (freguesias) with 750 or fewer voters or for municipalities (municípios) with 7500 or
fewer voters. At the moment this accounts for 1800 freguesias (42.3 per cent) and 76 municípios (24.7 per cent).

Non-compliance with the quota will result in a 25–50 per cent reduction in public subsidies for the electoral campaign of said party or coalition. A 50 per cent reduction is applied when the presence of one of the genders on the lists is lower than 20 per cent, while when that presence is between 20 and 33 per cent the reduction is only 25 per cent. None of these punishment mechanisms applies if the list is shorter than three candidates.

**Analysing the actors’ roles**

**Civil society actors: The mass media**

Since the debate over gender quotas in Portugal was played out in the public sphere it is important to consider the role of the mass media (particularly television, the main channel through which most Portuguese receive their political news) and of key opinion makers.

By opinion makers we mean that class of paid editorial writers and political commentators who regularly appear in print and on television news shows, known in many countries as ‘public intellectuals’. While they have been a regular feature of the Portuguese media for some time, to date the role of these privileged actors in the gender quotas debate has not been well documented.

Our analysis relies on an unpublished conference paper by two scholars of Portuguese media and communication (Silveirinha and Peixinho 2008). The data for this paper
consists of all opinion articles published in the main Portuguese newspapers during 1999 (regarding the 1998 Socialist Party’s parity proposal) and in 2006 (on the parity law). Silveirinha and Peixinho’s dataset included 30 and 29 articles, respectively, for each year.

In respect of the two key moments of public debate on the matter of gender quotas in Portugal, in 1999 a total of 15 texts were opposed to the law, eight were in favour and seven were broader analyses without a clear position. In 2006 there was more balance: 15 texts were in favour of the quotas, 12 opposed them and two did not take a position (Silveirinha and Peixinho 2008: 5). Clearly the opinion-makers and print media editors provided a more receptive environment for gender quotas in 2006 than the first time this issue seriously entered the public debate.

According to this study, in both periods the issue was defined primarily in terms of the lack of women in Portuguese politics, though in 2006 more texts mentioned other forms of gendered discrimination in Portuguese society.

Curiously, several of the 2006 texts noted how many other countries around the world had adopted some form of gender quotas, while in 1999 opponents cited the relative dearth of such examples in Europe as a reason for opposing them. In other words, attention to what was happening outside Portugal appears to have had a significant influence on the debate in 2006, as many authors cited the need to avoid laggard status in these matters.

Perhaps more importantly, while in 1999 the term ‘quotas’ was the key word used, in 2006 ‘parity’ became the name of the law—despite the fact none of the bills
actually proposed a 50 per cent distribution of candidates by gender (Silveirinha and Peixinho 2008: 8). Previous research on Portuguese voters’ behaviour in referenda—for example on abortion and regionalisation—suggests language and framing matters greatly (Baum and Freire 2003; Freire 2008), and so this linguistic turn of phrase appears to have been useful for the supporters of gender quotas.

*State actors: Political parties*

Although both the Socialist Party and the Left Bloc were clearly involved in the adoption of the parity law, their roles were distinct.

Regarding the approval of the law itself, the most obvious difference between the parties is the Left Bloc did not support the amended version of the decree: namely, the one drafted after the president’s veto, which eventually became law. The imposition of fines on political parties with non-compliant lists instead of the rejection of such lists was not supported by the Left Bloc, which favoured stronger sanctions on non-compliant parties. Nevertheless, both parties have a past associated with the defence of greater female representation in politics in Portugal.

The Socialist Party was formally founded in 1973, during the Portuguese dictatorship. Since 1976 its strategy towards gender equality has evolved dramatically. During the first decade of democracy the average proportion of women occupying eligible places on the Socialist Party candidate lists and those actually elected did not reach five per cent. However, during the seventh party congress in
1988 an important measure for gender equality was implemented at the suggestion of Vítor Constâncio (Socialist Party leader June 1986–February 1988). The measure was an internal quota system of 25 per cent, which was approved for both the national party organs and all multi-member lists.

Although this measure had some immediate consequences on the number of women elected to national assembly and national party organs, it was not fully implemented until 1999. While this delay was probably linked to opposition within the party (which Constâncio mentioned while being interviewed), it may also have been indicative of the evolving depth of the commitment to gender quotas within the party prior to the mid-1990s.

Starting in 1995, however, the Socialist Party intensified its strategy to support the election of women, and officially defined itself as a party committed to increasing women’s presence in politics. The most important step in this direction was the defence—for the first time—of positive discrimination measures in the 1995 election manifesto (Partido Socialista 1995: 1–5). This then forced the party to fully implement its internal quota system at the next scheduled elections in 1999, resulting in a considerable increase in the proportion of women Socialist Party representatives in parliament.\(^69\)

Between 1995 and 2005, an average of 21.2 per cent of the Socialist Party deputies were women, while the average percentage of Socialist Party women candidates reached nearly 25 per cent.\(^70\) Moreover, on several occasions since 1998 the Socialist Party has presented draft legislation proposing the nationwide implementation of positive
discrimination measures to support the election of women. The last of these became the parity law.

Whereas the Socialist Party took more than ten years to really get behind the concept of gender quotas, the Left Bloc has been placing more and more importance on female representation within political structures ever since it was founded in 1999.

Over the last few years the Left Bloc’s intensified interest has been evident in the content of its election manifests as well as in the proportion of women the party has elected to the Assembly of the Republic. In relation to the latter, the Left Bloc has always had a sizeable proportion of women on its candidate lists (on average 39 per cent).

In the 2005 legislative elections, the Left Bloc elected eight deputies, four of whom were female, and as of the September 2009 elections, six of the Left Bloc’s 16 deputies are women. According to both Left Bloc deputies interviewed, this happened because the Left Bloc follows a ‘soft quotas’ measure of 33 per cent, as described by Krook et al. (2009: 784). As stated above, the Left Bloc has presented two bills since 2001—both of which were defeated—promoting greater gender balance in all multi-member lists. In 2006 the party presented another bill that, while defeated when put to a vote, was eventually incorporated into the parity law.

In Portugal, the more left wing a party is the higher the percentage of women it elects (see Figure 1). According to a questionnaire answered by Portuguese experts in 2003 (CSES 2009), on a left-right continuum (where 0=left and 10=right), the Left Bloc is the most left-wing Portuguese
party (1), followed by the Portuguese Communist Party (2). The Socialist Party occupies a more central position, although still slightly to the left (4). The two remaining parties are the more right wing Social Democratic Party (7) and the Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party (8).

First observable in the early 1990s, the tendency for left-wing parties to elect more women has become more pronounced since the 1999 elections (see Figure 9.1). The overall rate of feminisation of the Portuguese parliament has also steadily increased since that period, rising from 7.6 per cent in 1987 to 27.4 per cent in 2009 (CNE 2009).

More accurately, however, the influence of ideology was already evident at the beginning of the democratic period in the late 1970s.

When the topic of women’s political representation was far from reaching the visibility that it has at the moment, the Communist Party already had the highest proportion of women elected representatives among the parties. The Communist Party was also the first Portuguese political party to defend the importance of greater female participation in politics in its party manifesto (Partido Comunista Português 1979: 7). However, the Communists voted against all bills aiming at implementing quotas on the grounds the gender gap in political participation had socio-economic origins and that such quotas would only be a facade solution.

The remaining two political parties are the Social Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party.

The Social Democratic Party’s strategy towards women has rather undefined contours, not only because the party
suffered oscillations in strategy resulting from leadership changes, but also because it is a very heterogeneous party on this matter (people within the party have very different opinions).73 Despite this, the official Social Democratic Party position was (and is) opposed to quotas. In fact, the
Figure 9.1: Percentage of women deputies by party (1976–2009)
party voted against all bills related to the introduction of a national quota system (Ruíz Jimenez 2009).

The same applies to the more homogeneous Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party, the official stance of which against quotas was upheld by the women deputies interviewed. For them gender equality in politics was not an important issue for the party because there was no gender discrimination within the party. However, as Figure 9.1 indicates, the proportion of women deputies representing this party has always been very low (the exception being the 1995 elections).

Notwithstanding its rejection, several authors agree the 1998 Socialist Party bill on positive discrimination mechanisms for women contributed tremendously to increasing public exposure of this issue in Portugal (Ruíz Jimenez 2002: 293; Martins and Teixeira 2005: 83; Viegas and Faria 2001: 51). In fact, Figure 9.1 demonstrates that since the mid-1990s all political parties have seen increased female representation in their parliamentary groups. Both Ruíz Jimenez (2009: 240–1) and Viegas and Faria (2001) argue this is evidence of how those parties in government can set the agenda and exercise influence over the gender policies of parties in the opposition.

The Left Bloc’s actions have also probably had an influence on other parties, in particular the Socialist Party, in terms of raising greater awareness for the issue of women’s political representation. For both the Socialist Party and the Left Bloc deputies interviewed, their party was the main advocate of this matter in Portugal.

In Lovenduski and Norris’ view (1993: 14), ‘there is no party in which efforts to nominate more women have
occurred without an intervention by women making claims.’ Furthermore, Ruíz Jimenez, (2002: 470), in her comparative study of the Spanish Popular Party and Portuguese Social Democratic Party cases, concluded one of the predictors that makes the Popular Party less conservative in regards to ‘women’s issues’ is the fact it, unlike the Social Democratic Party, has an influential women’s organisation (Ruíz Jimenez 2002: 470).

Of the Portuguese political parties, all three on the left—the Left Bloc, the Portuguese Communist Party and the Socialist Party—have women’s organisations either in the form of an established section (the Portuguese Communist Party and the Socialist Party) or a working group (the Left Bloc).

The Socialist, Communist and Left Bloc deputies interviewed stated most of the evolutionary processes their parties have experienced in relation to women’s issues can be attributed to the actions of (some) women, irrespective of the individuals’ membership in women’s sections or organisations. Nonetheless, this type of influence is very hard to prove given its low profile and indirect character. Furthermore, most initiatives are carried out by men, since men assume the overwhelming majority of important political positions.

A good example of this difficulty is the quota system adopted by the Socialist Party in 1988. As mentioned above, Vítor Constâncio, who was then the president of the Socialist Party, proposed the adoption of this measure. However, it is unclear whether the idea was originally his or whether he was influenced by a woman or a group of women within the party. This assumption seems likely considering during the
1986 congress Socialist Party member Maria Belo proposed a motion raising this particular issue for the very first time.

Finally, there are no formal links between the few non-governmental organisations focused on gender discrimination issues and leftist political parties, although it is probably fair to assume a certain amount of ideological sympathy, especially with respect to the former’s efforts to enhance the visibility of gender discrimination issues within Portuguese society. Moreover, despite a formally bottom-up structure, women’s organisations within Portuguese left-wing parties are constrained by the relatively high degree of centralisation existing within these parties—particularly the Socialist Party (Van Biezen 2003: 69).

State actors: The president of the republic

The president played a key role in the adoption of the parity law since his veto of the first version of the decree led to a new version with gentler sanctions on non-compliant parties. In other words, without the president’s intervention the law would have been stronger. It would not include the clause to revisit the law in five years and instead of fines it would have provided for the outright rejection of non-compliant party lists.

The president considered the latter measure excessive, disproportionate and therefore inadequate to fulfil the objective of the law. In his opinion, draconian punishment mechanisms would threaten both the freedom of the parties and the dignity of the women elected (DAR 2006). He also cited the difficulties the original law would create for parties organising lists in the local elections, particularly in interior
municipalities where the electorate is numerically small and more elderly than large urban districts (Público 2 June 2006).

Given the president’s affiliation with the Social Democratic Party, which is officially opposed to quotas, his decision not to use all of the constitutional powers at his disposal to veto the law entirely or to send it for judicial review is to be noted. A precedent for doing so took place in France in 1982, when judicial review by the constitutional court managed to prevent parliament from passing a 25 per cent quota law (Opello 2006: 8). By contrast, President Cavaco Silva chose not to ask the court to study the constitutionality of the law, despite calls from opposition parties to do so. In any event, the fourth revision of the constitution in 1997 would probably have pre-empted the court from declaring the law unconstitutional.

Despite the presidential veto that weakened the law in the eyes of its defenders, one could argue some of the benefits of Portuguese semi-presidentialism were reinforced during this episode, with the president serving as a moderating influence and not a destabilising one for the government of the day (Freire 2001).

*International and transnational actors: Transnational parties*

This section is based on statements by 19 people, most of whom were women who either serve or previously served as deputies and who were interviewed in 2005 as part of a related project (Espírito-Santo 2006). There has been no analysis of the international examples referred to in these statements in order to confirm their accuracy. Only two
people, a Socialist Party and a Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party member, referred to party families or European parties as influences on their respective party’s strategy concerning the election of women. Since the Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party did not contribute to the adoption of quotas, we will refer only to the Socialist Party.

With respect to the question, ‘where did the Socialist Party get its inspiration to delineate its strategy concerning women?’, Sónia Fertuzinhos (past president of the Socialist Women’s Section) mentioned both the Socialist International and the Party of European Socialists. According to another Socialist Party deputy, Maria do Carmo Romão, many parties belonging to the Socialist International has women’s departments, which are also represented in the Socialist International.75

In the late 1970s the first women’s organisation within the Socialist Party—the Socialist Women’s Movement—was created. According to a report its founder Mário Soares (Socialist Party leader October 1976–June 1996) delivered to the third Socialist Party congress (1979: 103), the inspiration for establishing the group came from the Socialist International. This is the only policy measure with an origin that can be proved to have an association with this body; however, it is safe to assume the type of contact this organisation generates among the many usually quota-friendly social democratic parties has played at least some role in the way the party has evolved on this issue.

Irrespective of the Socialist International, the Socialist Party might have also been influenced by other foreign social democratic parties. During the interview Vítor Constâncio claimed he had been inspired by events in other European
countries, particularly Norway. Furthermore, in 2000 the Socialist Party attempted to implement the parity principle on a national level through their draft legislation, where a direct reference to the French case was made (Government Draft Legislation 2000: 14).  

International and transnational actors: European and international organisations

During the last 50 years, international organisations have played a crucial role in advocating equality between women and men (UNDP 1995; Rees 1998). Portugal has been affected primarily by three organisations: the United Nations, the European Union and the Council of Europe. Although it is very difficult to identify exactly which organisation was determinant for the adoption of quotas in Portugal, it is clear the evolution of the positions of both the Socialist Party and Left Bloc followed the evolution of those three organizations. In fact, of the analysed parties, the Socialist Party and Left Bloc are the only ones to have adopted strategies recommended by international precedents. This idea can be confirmed through an analysis of the parties’ strategies (the adoption of the parity democracy concept is the most paradigmatic example of this) and through the several references to international recommendations and guidelines contained in their draft bills as well as in their election manifestos (Espírito-Santo 2006).

In what specifically concerns the bills that eventually led to the parity law, it is striking to observe the Left Bloc’s bill clearly states the main international recommendations have underlined the need for concrete measures to guarantee the
parity of genders. It goes on by giving specific examples, namely the role of the Platform for Action of the 1995 Fourth World Congress on Women in Beijing, which suggested governments improve their electoral systems in order to ensure greater female representation. It also references the Council of Europe’s Recommendation 1269 (1995), which notes the democratic need for a greater sharing of responsibilities between genders in all spheres of life and society, including political decision-making.

Although the Socialist Party’s bill that led to the parity law did not include any reference to international organisations, the fact they were present in a previous Socialist Party parity bill leads to the same conclusion as in the case of Left Bloc.  

*Political context: Public opinion*

As stated above, several studies of quota adoption have suggested such positive forms of discrimination are enacted when they mesh with ‘existing or emerging notions of equality and representation’ (Krook 2009: 10). Moreover, as Inglehart and Norris (2003: 138) demonstrate, the level of a society’s support for the idea of gender-balanced political leadership and the percentage of women elected to national parliament tend to be correlated.

Freire and Viegas’ (2009) set of public opinion data helps us assess the extent of the acceptance of parity principles within the Portuguese electorate—not exactly when the law passed, but in 2008. This dictates some caution when analysing the data as the citizens’ attitudes may have been influenced by the passage of the parity law. We know
already from the study of Meirinho, Martins and Teixeira (2005), using data from a questionnaire applied in March 2005, that more than half of the national citizens (even more among women) were in favour of the implementation of a quota system in parliament.

To facilitate our discussion of the relevant data, we have organised the variables into the following three topics: 1) questions or statements about quotas or positive discrimination for women in general, 2) the nature of representation in general and 3) the nature of the Portuguese parliament and/or its parties (see Table 9.2).79

Clearly, since they have different numbers of item responses, these questions are not ideal in terms of comparability to one another. Nevertheless, Table 9.2 indicates that in terms of specific support for gender quotas and/or forms of positive discrimination more generally, Portuguese public opinion is sensitive to question wording. For example, while about one-third of respondents typically share a non-committal opinion on these items if given that opportunity, a clear plurality of electors thinks ‘quotas are a necessary measure to address the under-representation of women and increase their numbers in parliament’ (47 per cent agree overall—42 per cent men and 51 per cent women—while only 20 per cent of both sexes disagree with this idea).

Similarly, there is widespread support for the idea ‘mechanisms that can help increase the presence of women in politics should be created’ (74 per cent agree: 68 per cent men
### Table 9.2: Survey items by group and gender differences, 2008 national sample survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions/statements</th>
<th>Men % agree</th>
<th>Women % agree</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Phi/Cr.V</th>
<th>% missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quotas or positive discrimination for women in general</strong>&lt;br&gt;Quotas are a necessary measure to address the under-representation of women and increase their numbers in parliament. Quotas are not necessary. Women should be elected on merit. (4-item responses, no middle)</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The nature of representation in general</strong>&lt;br&gt;Mechanisms that can help increase the presence of women in politics should be created. Men can sufficiently represent the interests of women in politics. On the whole men make better political leaders than women do (4-item response, no middle)</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In your opinion, a deputy represents above all: Women, in the case of a female deputy and men in the case of male deputies</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The nature of the Portuguese parliament and/or its parties</strong>&lt;br&gt;The fact 80 per cent of deputies are men is a serious threat to democracy (4-item responses, no middle) Parties should have an equal number of men and women on their candidate lists Do you feel your parliament should have many more …Women parliamentarians</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

versus 80 per cent women), and ‘parties should have an equal number of men and women on their candidate lists’ (55 per cent agree—53 per cent men, 58 per cent women—only 10 per cent disagree).

In addition, of all the under-represented groups voters could have wanted more of in parliament, women were clearly the most favoured (75 per cent saying at least some more women), compared to youth (70 per cent), handicapped (47 per cent), blacks (38 per cent) and elderly (23 per cent).

Finally, 67 per cent of Portuguese reject the idea ‘men make better political leaders than women’, which suggests a generalised rejection of essentialist arguments about gender roles in politics. On the other hand, of all the items we looked at from this survey, this item had the strongest gender gap between respondents, with 78 per cent of women rejecting this opinion against only 55 per cent of men.

In light of all these items, one could argue there is widespread support for some positive forms of discrimination in favour of women, and that support for these measures is stronger among women than men. Thus, public opinion appears to be generally favourable to the parity law, confirming Meirinho Martins and Teixeira’s results (2005).

However, when the questions are worded differently a majority of voters are also willing to agree with the argument most often advocated by parties opposed to the quota law, that ‘quotas are not necessary, and women should be elected on merit,’ (55 per cent agree, no gender difference).

Overall, voters do not see a deputy’s role as being primarily about representing any specific gender group and a plurality agree male deputies can sufficiently represent
women’s interests. Furthermore, when asked if they agreed with the statement ‘the fact 80 per cent of deputies are men is a serious threat to democracy,’ opinion was evenly divided amongst the sample (48 per cent agree overall), although there was a fairly strong gender difference on this item, with only 37 per cent of men agreeing compared to 58 per cent of women (p=0.000; Phi.171). In other words, as with so many public policy issues, polling will only take political elites so far in terms of helping them gauge how voters feel about this issue.

The fact mass attitudes about gender discrimination in Portugal vary so much depending on the item suggests either the survey items themselves are flawed or the saliency of this issue area for Portuguese respondents is comparatively low and therefore more prone to inconsistencies than other public policy issues of greater concern. Nonetheless, despite these inconsistencies Portuguese respondents appear to be generally supportive of the idea of gender-balanced political leadership, which may indicate an environment in which ‘existing or emerging notions of equality and representation’ are not a serious obstacle to the new parity law.

*Political context: Electoral system*

Numerous studies have demonstrated a strong correlation between democracies with proportional electoral systems—in particular those with closed lists, large average district sizes and centralised party-list nomination processes—as the most favourable institutional environments for electing women to parliament (Darcy, Welch and Clark 1994; Htun and Jones 2002; Matland 2006; Vengroff, Creevey and
Krisch 2000). Moreover, these conditions also happen to be the most favourable institutional feature for the implementation of legal party quotas. In Matland’s words, candidate quote laws ‘are almost exclusively the realm of multi-member district electoral systems, usually proportional systems, but occasionally mixed systems’ (2006: 281).

Portugal fits the bill here in at least three out of the four facilitators as it has a proportional representation system with closed and centralised party lists (for most parties), although its 22 electoral districts for 230 deputies places it somewhat on the small side in terms of average district magnitude (Taagepera and Shugart 1989). Portugal’s average party magnitude— the number of seats in each party’s district delegation (Matland 2006: 284)—is also conducive to the effectiveness of Portugal’s new legal quota law.

Moreover, the Portuguese case confirms Matland and Studlar’s (1996) work on the logic behind contagion among parties. Their version of contagion theory suggests that as smaller but competitive parties, usually on the political fringe, start to actively promote women, larger parties will move to emulate them (1996: 712). This kind of contagion occurs in both majoritarian and proportional representation-style electoral systems.

However, as they demonstrated by comparing the Canadian and Norwegian cases, the process will be more effective in bringing women into office and spread more quickly in multi-member proportional representation systems. This is because proportional representation systems, like Portugal’s, tend to elect a greater number of parties into the system, which allows a space for smaller parties to innovate: for example, in terms of nominating more women
candidates. This typically pushes the mainstream parties that might have otherwise gone slower on the gender equity issue (read, the Socialist Party) to follow suit lest they be in danger of losing votes to an ideologically similar party on their left (read, the Left Bloc).

While it is true the Socialist Party began its process of introducing gender quotas for its electoral lists and national party organs in 1988, 11 years before the Left Bloc appeared on the scene in, it did so only half-heartedly until the late 1990s. We argue it finally started to draft legislation for legal gender quotas in 1998, and implemented its own voluntary internal quotas in 1999 at least in part due to strategic competition with the Left Bloc, which appeared more progressive on this issue at the time. With the Left Bloc pushing the Socialist Party over the past decade to become more strategically innovative on progressive social issues like gender equity, abortion and gay marriage, the Socialist Party has innovated, and more progressive laws in these domains are the result. If Portugal's electoral system were more majoritarian, we doubt such innovation by a mainstream party would have happened as quickly as it did. Nevertheless, strategic competition between leftist parties was not the only factor involved here, nor does it appear to be the most important explanatory factor.

Conclusions

The parity law was not an isolated action: it was passed as part of the Socialist Party’s election manifesto, and in many ways represented a natural evolution in its ideology. The
proof of this is it attempted to pass several similar laws during previous years.

Two questions consequently emerge. Why did the Socialist Party manage to pass the law in 2006 and not before? And what was the motivation for the Socialist Party to pass a quota law of this type?

In answering the first question one might naturally think the party’s 2006 proposal was somehow less rigorous than its previous quota proposals and this was the reason it passed. However, this was not the case, since all of the Portuguese quota proposals ensured a minimum 33 per cent representation of each gender. Therefore, the answer to the first question has to do with various contextual factors relatively new to the national political scene that facilitated its passage in 2006.

The answer to the second question—besides relying on characteristics inherent to the Socialist Party itself—has more to do with constant (the electoral system, for instance) or slower-changing features of the Portuguese context (public opinion, for example), which helped facilitate the party’s decision to pursue the adoption of a quota law.

The most important new contextual factor was the fact during the 2005–09 legislature the party enjoyed its first majority. Since legal gender quota proposals were no longer a novelty in Portugal, the active promotion of gender equality by the state had become enshrined in the revised 1997 constitution, and the quota law was part of the Socialist Party’s 2005 election manifesto. The prime minister could argue as never before the party now had a mandate from the electorate to proceed with this institutional reform.
Furthermore, the quota proposals that failed earlier laid the ground for the law finally passed in 2006. Evidence of this is found in the content of print editorials and media coverage during 2006, which was significantly more positive toward gender quota laws than the coverage carried by the same newspapers in 1999.

The Left Bloc was also pushing for (failed) gender quota legislation during the 1999–2002 legislative term, but it was a new party then with only two seats in parliament, and so arguably the Socialist Party could afford to ignore the possibilities for joint action. However, by 2005 the Left Bloc had eight seats and was increasingly perceived by the Socialist Party as a real threat on its left flank. Consequently, it stands to reason strategic electoral considerations on the Portuguese left also played a role in getting the Socialist Party to put the quota law into its 2005 manifesto and introducing it into law in 2006. The Portuguese case therefore appears to conform to the ‘contagion’ findings of other scholars (Caul, 2001; Meier, 2004; Lovenduski, 2005: 103).

Nonetheless, domestic actors and factors were not the only reasons for the law’s passage. Analyses of successful parity laws elsewhere suggest this policy area is particularly open to influences at the international/transnational level: namely, international emulation (Dahlerup 2008; Krook 2009; Murray, Krook and Opello 2009). The latter seems to apply to both questions previously raised. It was definitely important for the Socialist Party’s evolution on the normative debates regarding women’s political representation—if we think of the role of the Socialist International, of other European countries that had passed quota laws since the late-
1990s (such as France and Belgium) and of the recommendations of international organisations—since these were often mentioned in internal party documents. The more positive coverage of examples from other countries by the Portuguese print media in 2006 than in the late 1990s also suggests this emulation factor gained importance in the last few years and was therefore helpful for the law’s passage.

Two factors that made passage of the quota law easier included the country’s choice of electoral system (proportional, closed lists, centralised processes for electoral list development and relatively high barriers to party proliferation) and a general consensus regarding the desirability of having more women in politics. In terms of the electoral and party system variable, several earlier studies have shown how critical the electoral system variable can be for the passage of quota laws (Matland and Montgomery 2003; Murray, Krook and Opello 2009), and the Portuguese case conforms to this hypothesis.

In keeping with Krook’s (2009: 10) highlighting of how quota laws emerge based on ‘new or emerging notions of equality’, we argue that in 2006 Portuguese public opinion was fairly favourable to having women in politics and sympathetic to the idea of quotas. In other words, civil society had been primed on this issue in 2006 in a way that was not the case when the similar proposal was first circulated in 1998. In this sense, our findings are in line with those of Murray, Krook and Opello (2009: 5), who show French voters were similarly positive about parity concepts there and that party elites understood this.

However, the fact some of our survey questions elicited contradictory positions on gender quotas and/or other forms
of positive discrimination suggests gender quotas was not a very important issue for the average Portuguese voter in 2008 and, probably, 2006. This supports Ruíz Jimenez’s conclusion (2009: 250) ‘there is no electoral market for gender policies in Portugal—neither among women nor society at large.’ In terms of electoral importance, we agree; however, our data reveals that on some items Portuguese voters are actually quite supportive of the quotas/parity concept, a development of which the Socialist Party was probably aware.

While we do not have the kind of survey data that would tell us definitively whether the gender quota issue was more important for the average Portuguese voter in 2006 than it was in the late 1990s, we doubt it shifted markedly. Nevertheless, as others have observed (Ruíz Jimenez 2002: 293; Martins and Teixeira 2005: 83; Viegas and Faria 2001: 51), the failed effort to introduce quota laws in the late 1990s very likely helped raise public awareness of the issue, perhaps contributing to its greater legitimacy.81

In our view, the most important answer to the question about the motivation to introduce a quota law is the Socialist Party itself, specifically key decision-making elites therein. Our analysis shows the Socialist Party’s own ideology on this matter was gradually evolving over time. From 1988, when the party first introduced the concept of voluntary 25 per cent gender quotas for its own electoral lists through its defence of positive discrimination measures in its 1995 manifesto to the implementation in the subsequent 1999 general elections,82 the Socialist Party’s position was slowly but clearly evolving on this issue—in some ways much like the process described by Meier (2004) in Belgium. There, as
in Portugal, internal party quotas helped ‘open the way for legally imposed quotas designed to carry along parties reluctant to implement gender quotas’ (Meier 2004: 595).

While our analysis suggests the main inspiration for the Socialist Party’s evolution was more likely transnational emulation than a grassroots push from below, the respective roles of the Socialist Party women’s organisation and the Left Bloc, which started constituting a challenge to the Socialist Party’s left, should also be noted.

On the other hand, we need to be careful about assigning too much weight to the Socialist Party’s growing ideological commitment to gender equality. The fact it did not use the Left Bloc’s two votes in the 1999–2002 parliament to reach a compromise on one of the many gender quota proposals the two parties promoted during that period suggests either the party had a weak commitment to gender quotas at that time, or it feared it would be seen simply copying its new rival on the left—or both (Ruíz Jimenez 2009: 253; Viegas and Faria 2001: 40).

Although the Socialist Party used its majority in 2005 to push through its quota law, the appointment of only two women ministers (out of 16) to José Socrates’ 2005–09 majority government remains troubling (although this has since improved under the current minority Socialist government in which five of 17 cabinet members are women).

Case-studies from Brazil (Htun and Jones 2002), Belgium (Meier 2004) and France (Bird 2003) have shown elites sometimes use quotas as an empty gesture, ‘as a way to demonstrate a degree of commitment to women without
actually intending to alter existing patterns of inequality’ (Krook 2009: 10). So is this the case in Portugal as well?

Overall, we do not believe the 2006 parity law was just paying lip service to the problem. Although the law is not really enforcing parity and sanctions could have been tougher, its inclusion of the zipper principle means at least it guarantees a more balanced representation of both genders.

Irrespective of the importance of all the mentioned factors, we would like to underline the role of the party elites (both male and female) in the decision to proceed with the parity law, which represents continuity in Portuguese politics (Baum and Freire 2003). Because there is no powerful lobby or social mobilisation for the rights of women in Portugal, the role of the national non-governmental organisations in this debate was not crucial. Furthermore, they have been heavily influenced by transnational networks and actors.83

In general, our analysis of the Portuguese case supports several of Krook’s findings regarding the adoption of gender quota laws worldwide (2009: 218–26). First, just as in the democratisation literature, where ‘equifinality’ arguments (or theories emphasising multiple causation and the idea different variables or combinations of variables can lead to the same outcome) prevail, the same is true of the comparative research on gender quota adoption.

The Portuguese case seems to have been particularly influenced by international organisations and transnational networks that influenced party elites within two of the country’s left-wing parties, which in turn set in motion an evolution in the country’s normative debates about formal equality, democratic participation and the need for special measures for women.
Strategic motivations also appear to have played at least some part in the adoption of gender quotas by those parties that initially adopted quotas voluntarily, but they became even more important for explaining why those voluntary procedures were then extended to a quota law governing party lists in all legislative, European and local elections.

Our research confirms Krook’s stress on the importance of local political context and local actors and how changes in this context over time can lead to an environment that either facilitates quota adoption or make it less likely. In Portugal, a supportive public opinion environment (albeit one with low level of importance to most voters) and an electoral system serving to facilitate conditions for a political party that won an absolute parliamentary majority for the first time are factors enabling it to carry through on its election manifesto promise to deliver a gender quota law.
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Democratic deliberation: The attitudes of deputies and citizens

José Manuel Leite Viegas and Sandra Carvalho

Introduction

If we were to consider that the proliferation of theories of democratic deliberation that took place during the 1990s, not to mention the earlier contributions (Habermas 1962; Cohen 1989), we could say there is already a large number of theoretical and empirical texts on this subject, which allows us to assess the contribution of this political concept to studies on democracy.

It is therefore worth remembering the main aspects of the initial proposal, while keeping in mind the criticisms that have been made since then resulting in changes in the ideas about democratic deliberation.

For both Habermas (1962) and Cohen (1989), deliberation is defined as a model of discussion between several participants where each one argues in terms of the common good, taking into account the arguments of other participants, and where all seek consensus.

This normative model of discussion and debate, prior to reaching a common decision, assumes the various
participants in the debate have complete freedom of participation, that each is in an equal position in relation to the other and that they all strive to reach a consensus by accepting the best arguments, regardless of who made them.

These authors consider that with a wider and more valued participation by all and by having arrived at final positions that incorporate the best contributions this will tend to result in a gain of democratic legitimacy.

We must first recognise some dimensions of the concept of deliberation have already been considered by other currents of democratic theory. For example, the authors who value political participation, such as Benjamin Barber (1984), tend to view this theory as a partial development of wider conceptions of participation and democratic legitimization.

The principle of equality in citizen participation dates back to Ancient Greece. Freedom of expression is also a basic value of the modern liberal concepts dating back to the 17th-century liberals. Equally, the idea of ‘common good’ was not a creation of deliberation theories: in fact, we could argue it is very closely related to Rousseau’s concept of ‘general interest’ that was incorporated in some socialist and nationalist currents.

Can one conclude from what has been said that the theory of deliberation does not introduce novelty? Not exactly: not only are these values and political ideas organised in a coherent whole and directed towards a particular goal—the democratic debate. In deliberation theory some of them gain a slightly different meaning.

A good example of this can be attributed to the principle and value of ‘accommodation’ in democratic debate, that is
to say, the concern each participant in a debate has, or should have, in attempting to incorporate the positions of the other interveners in such a way as all views can be recognised in the final common position.

This principle of accommodation already existed in the theories and practices of the welfare state, in its pillar of social agreement; however, the principles of accommodation in deliberation theory and in social concertation theory are not the same (Steiner et al. 2004). In the case of the latter, the goal is to reach a final position acceptable to all through a process of bargaining between all of the parties involved: some points will be conceded in order to obtain gains elsewhere, or simply because there is a preference for reaching some form of agreement, even if it means accepting things that are viewed negatively, rather than reaching no agreement.

The same disposition to take the points of view of others into consideration exists in deliberation theory, but only to the extent that the validity of their arguments is recognised. It is to be expected that common interest will prevail over particular interests and that everyone recognises the contributions each one can provide for the defence of this common goal.

With these cornerstones of democratic deliberation’s initial proposal, we now consider the main criticisms, which can be summarised in three points.

In first place, some authors question the inclusion in the definition of deliberation of the demand participants invoke the ‘common good’ in defence of their positions, claiming this goes against the liberal principles of a pluralist society (Warren 2002). This demand tends to blur the differences of
interests and legitimises hegemonic forms of the ‘common good’ to the detriment of marginalised or dominated groups (Sanders 1997; Levine and Nierras 2007).

A second objection these authors raise concerns the demand participants make their arguments in a rational manner, based on empirical evidence or logical inferences, winning the position with the best arguments. The critics highlight the fact politics is confrontation and conflict, not an academic discussion. Those who are dominated or marginalised need to give their testimony, present their life stories and not become entangled in a logic of deliberation that demands resources of argumentation they often lack. On the other hand, deliberation excludes the manifestation of emotions and identities that are factors in the mobilisation and disclosure of the unjust conditions in which the dominated and marginalised groups find themselves.

The third objection is expressed in the rejection of the consensus that should guide the deliberative debate. This condition is almost a corollary of the first demand in that it calls for the arguments of each participant to be organised in consideration of the common good. What is criticised is this unity of purpose, established from the very beginning, which takes form in the realisation of the consensually accepted position, resulting from the application of the best argument principle.

In recent years, these criticisms have led some authors who work in this area to introduce some changes to the initial proposal.

The deliberation proposal made by Chambers (2003) and others, such as Carpini, Cook and Jacobs (2004) and Mansbridge et al. (2006), who have followed his lead, takes
into consideration some of the published critiques. It is interesting to see which points of the proposal are maintained, which are changed and which are cast aside.

As Chambers states, ‘deliberation is debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, new information and claims made by fellow participants. Although consensus need not be the ultimate aim of deliberation, and participants are expected to pursue their interests, an overarching interest in the legitimacy of outcomes (understood as justification to all affected) ideally characterises deliberation’ (Chambers, 2003: 309).

We begin with the points remaining at deliberation’s heart: (1) the principle that discussion is open to all contributions, (2) respect for other participants and their opinions, (3) the willingness of all participants to take into account the positions of others and (4) the search, although not compulsory, to reach a consensual outcome.

This definition has set aside the rational arguments, demanding only ‘reasonable positions’, allowing them to invoke specific interests whilst maintaining the goal of seeking a consensual solution.

The principle of ‘accommodation’ is present when ‘reasonable positions’ are invoked; however, this statement remains quite vague. The idea becomes clearer when it is said ‘participants agree to review their positions in light of the discussion and the contributions of other participants’. This ‘review of positions’ is clearly included in the principle of accommodation, but without demanding each person’s
reasons need be strictly rational, since the logic of the best argument is absent.

Taking into consideration these new formulations, what is our understanding of the best definition of the concept of democratic deliberation?

In first place, we recognise there are aspects that are not open to question: (1) deliberation refers to discussions and debates within a group prior to any decisions being made, (2) participants are free and are considered equal in terms of rights to intervene, (3) each participant respects the others and takes their positions into consideration in reaching their own position and (4) everyone seeks to establish a platform of common understanding.

Chambers (2003) admits participants in a deliberative debate will use private reasons to support their argument, stressing, however, that they must seek to legitimise their positions by showing its contribution to the common good.

In fact, we believe the absolute abandonment of the search for common understanding, whether or not we call it ‘common good’, and the reasons behind it would strip the concept of deliberation of all meaning. The acceptance of private reasons, or private interests, corresponds to the broadening of the range of admissible arguments rather than the rejection of the interest to invoke the common good.

What is set aside in Chambers’ definition is the logic of the prevalence of the best argument. We believe that on this point the previous principle should be followed—that is to say instead of eliminating this dimension, one should broaden its meaning. We hold the logic of the prevalence of strict argumentative rationality is not in question, but the prevalence of the contribution that, before taking into
account all the accepted evaluation criteria, is presented as the best argument.

As noted above, democratic deliberation corresponds to a normative model of group discussion and debate prior to taking a common position. In our view, its realisation will depend on the rules established for the debate—which themselves are subject to evaluation in light of this normative proposal—but ultimately depends on the attitudes of the participants, closer or more distant from the principles informing this model of deliberation.

According to the contributions from social psychology, the different attitudes are based on different values, feelings, beliefs and experiences. This concept establishes the bridge between the individual dispositions and socially shared ideas, helping us to understand differences of opinion and behaviour.  

We can consider, as Eagly and Chaiken (1993: 1), that an attitude is a hypothetical construct referring to the ‘psychological tendency to express a favourable or unfavourable evaluation of a specific entity’, with the qualification ‘hypothetical construct’ indicating attitudes are not directly observable: in other words, they are latent variables that may explain the relationship between the situation in which people find themselves and their behaviour. We are, therefore, in the field of psychological processes inference.

In this chapter we propose to analyse these dispositions, or attitudes—in respect of the principles and rules of democratic deliberations, seeking to examine the positions of the deputies of the different parties and comparing them with the positions of the electorate.
Aims and methodology

This chapter has three main aims: 1) to analyse the attitudes of deputies and citizens in relation to the different dimensions of democratic deliberation, as noted above; 2) to compare these attitudes and 3) to examine to what extent party identification and educational attainment, in this latter case, of the electorate in general, influence or contribute to explaining these attitudes.

First we need to explain why we are studying these two groups—deputies and voters—what our goals are and who the individuals are who are chosen from each group.

Parliaments are deliberative bodies par excellence in representative democracies. Within them are represented different currents of political and ideological opinion through parties. For this reason, parliaments are the political institutions in which political debate and discussion, as well as confrontation and understanding, have a privileged place.

As noted above, we can analyse the deliberative nature of a political institution simply by looking at the established institutional rules; however, while this aspect is important, in itself it does not allow us to establish the proximity or distance of parliamentary debates from the normative model of deliberation. For this we need to know the extent of the deputies’ support for this model. For this reason we have established the study of deputies’ attitudes towards democratic deliberation as an objective of this work.

Deputies are not only the agents of democratic deliberation, they are also the voters’ representatives. Here lies the interest in also studying the attitude of citizens towards democratic deliberation: on one hand, the analysis
will allow us to assess if there is support for this model of discussion and debate, while on the other will allow us to compare their attitudes with those of the deputies.\textsuperscript{85}

To analyse these attitudes we need to establish the scale of the democratic deliberation concept and then determine what methodology we need to follow in order to achieve our stated goals.

The dimensions to be considered in our empirical analysis proceed from what was said regarding the fundamental core of deliberative democracy. Therefore, we will analyse the attitudes of deputies and citizens towards the following aspects, or dimensions, of deliberation:

1. Respect and consideration for the positions held by others.
2. Protection of the common good.
3. Attempts to incorporate the views of others into one’s own position.
4. Openness to widening the participation of others.

Since it has not been mentioned previously, this last point merits explanation.

As we have said, parliament is both an institution of deliberation and of political representation. The political currents defending democratic deliberation also speak of the need for everyone affected by any particular matter to be able to participate in the debate. At the extreme, democratic deliberation only exists in a direct democracy, and not in representative democracy.

On the other hand, there are those who analyse the deliberative processes within closed bodies, such as juries,
parliaments and various types of assemblies, without incorporating any dimension of openness.

We believe current concepts of deliberation have to be separated from past experiences in which the deliberative bodies were closed and elitist, as with the United Kingdom parliament before the reforms of the 19th century, and accept the examination of deliberation in representative democracies will benefit from addressing themselves to the democratic bodies of political power, in which parliament occupies a prime position.

In order to reconcile these two positions we propose a new dimension to the study of deliberation within political bodies: openness to citizen participation. This openness corresponds to broadening representation as well as to listening to those interested in the deliberative process.

The dimensions mentioned were measured through several attitudinal and behavioural indicators. These indicators, which will be introduced below, are included in a survey applied to a sample of 1350 voters in mainland Portugal. Another survey, largely including the same questions, was conducted with 143 deputies in the Assembly of the Republic. 86

Attitudes of deputies and citizens towards democratic deliberation

Having arrived at this point it is now important to challenge the theory with empirical data. Below we will present the comparative data obtained from the surveys of the deputies and the citizens in relation to the four points outlined above: 1) respect and consideration for the positions held by others, 2) protection of the common good, 3) attempts to incorporate
the views of others into one’s own position and 4) openness to widening the participation of others.

We will also observe the effects of such variables as level of educational attainment and party identification on attitudes towards the previously established dimensions of democratic deliberation.

It is necessary to begin by stressing one aspect related to educational attainment. Taking into account the deputies’ relatively high level of educational attainment (98 per cent attended university and 93 per cent have a degree), we seek to find out if differences in attitudes of respect and consideration for the opinions of others can be attributed to the large difference in the average level of educational attainment of deputies and citizens. The analysis will focus particularly on the citizens, who have varying levels of educational attainment.

**Figure 10.1: Position of deputies and citizens (respect and consideration for the positions of others) (%)**

![Graph showing the position of deputies and citizens](image)

*Source:* Portuguese mass and MPs surveys (2008), in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).
Respect and consideration for the positions of others

With this being one of the main pillars upon which the model of democratic deliberation rests, we sought to operationalise the concept in an indicator in which the respondent is asked to position himself using semantic differentiation on a scale from 0–10, in which ten represents maximum support for this dimension of deliberation (‘in democratic debate each must listen to the other without interruption, take what is said into consideration and only then express their position’) and zero represents the opposite (‘in democratic debate each may interrupt the other in order for the discussion to be more lively’). This latter position takes into account the criticisms of this aspect of democratic deliberation. Respondents were asked to answer the following question: ‘There are many opinions on what the rules of democratic debate ought to be. On a scale from 0–10, which of these responses most closely reflects your own view?’

In order to better visualise the differences we created Table 10.1 in which the variable is aggregated into three positions, with 0–4 being those who most oppose deliberation, five representing the intermediate position and 6–10 representing those who most support democratic deliberation.

For both the deputies and the citizens, the greatest proportion of responses was at the higher end of the scale. In the case of deputies, the proportion of responses at this end was 74 per cent, while for citizens it was 55 per cent. This means that for both groups there is a tendency towards support for the view ‘in democratic debate each must listen to the other without interruption, take what is said into
consideration and only then express their position’, although it is more pronounced in the case of deputies.

**Table 10.1: Attitude of deputies and citizens (respect and consideration for the positions of others) (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>1350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Portuguese mass and MPs surveys (2008), in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).

**Note:** Percentages rounded to nearest whole number.

This type of data almost always raises suspicions concerning the social desirability of the responses and the lack of any relationship with daily life practices. Because of this, we also sought to understand to what extent this intention to listen to others is translated into respect and consideration for the arguments of others.

For this we used another indicator in the questionnaires. Respondents were asked how often they changed their minds: ‘After discussing political, economic and social matters with members of your family, friends and work or school colleagues, how often do you change your opinion, either fully or partially, after having listened to others?’ The response options were as follows: (1) often, (2) sometimes, (3) seldom or (4) never.
The first point to note is related to the number of citizens who stated they do not usually discuss politics (31 per cent, compared to one per cent of deputies). As for the remainder, for both the deputies and citizens who discuss politics with family, friends or colleagues, we found different response profiles (Figure 10.2).

Only one per cent of citizens say they often change their minds, as opposed to 13 per cent of deputies. A total of 73 per cent of citizens claim to seldom or never change their mind, while only 19 per cent of deputies seldom change their mind and none at all admit to never changing their mind, as shown in the following table.

Table 10.2: Frequency with which deputies and citizens change their opinions following a discussion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Seldom</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>0.559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>906</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>0.766</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Portuguese mass and MPs surveys (2008) in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009). Notes: Percentages rounded to nearest whole number. 1.2 per cent and 30.7 per cent of deputies and citizens, respectively, ‘do not discuss political matters in these social environments’, while 2.2 per cent of citizens responded ‘don’t know/no reply’.

The results of the average comparison test confirms that the differences between the averages of the two groups is statistically significant (t=17.727, p < 0.001). Based on this data we are able to state deputies have a tendency to be more open to changing their opinions after discussing politics, economics or social issues with friends, family or colleagues than citizens. Therefore, the behavioural measure supports earlier results, that in this dimension, deputies are closer to the deliberation model than citizens.
Table 10.3: Attitude of deputies and citizens (respect and consideration for the positions of others) (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale positions</th>
<th>0–4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6–10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>Deputies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Bloc</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Unity Coalition</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Centre</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Portuguese mass and MPs surveys (2008), in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009). **Note:** Percentages rounded to nearest whole number.

**Effects of party identification**

We will now investigate the effects of party identification, by which we mean to compare the attitudes of deputies and citizens of different parties in relation to respecting and having consideration for the positions of others.
Table 10.4: Attitude of the deputies and citizens (respect for the opinions of others) (average and standard deviation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Citizens</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>(a) Average</td>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>(b) Average</td>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>(a)-(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Bloc</td>
<td>4 5.0</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td></td>
<td>36 6.2</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Unity Coalition</td>
<td>8 5.1</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td></td>
<td>344 6.6</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party</td>
<td>76 7.7</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td></td>
<td>296 6.1</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.61*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>45 6.8</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td></td>
<td>21 6.6</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Centre</td>
<td>8 6.8</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td></td>
<td>86 6.1</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>141</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>783</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Portuguese mass and MPs surveys (2008) in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009) Note: *p < 0.001.

Here also we aggregated the positions of the initial scale into three positions identical to those used before in order to facilitate visualisation. The data reveals some distance between the attitudes of deputies elected on the lists of the several parties and those of the citizens who are sympathetic to those parties. This is true in all cases (Left Bloc, Democratic Unity Coalition, Socialist Party, Social Democratic Party and Social Democratic Centre), but particularly so in the case of the Socialist Party, where the distance is greatest—79 per cent of Socialist Party deputies
believe in respecting the positions of others, compared to 54 who say they support the Socialist Party.

Deputies elected for the Left Bloc, the Democratic Unity Coalition, the Social Democrats and the Social Democratic Centre are less likely to place themselves in the 6–10 positions than the citizens who claim to support them: Left Bloc, deputies 33 per cent, citizens 54 per cent; Democratic Unity Coalition, 44 and 61 per cent respectively; Social Democratic Party, 79 and 81 per cent respectively and Social Democratic Centre, 50 and 52 per cent respectively.

Table 10.4 reinforces the results. Comparing the average values of the deputies’ and citizens’ responses we note the greatest difference exists in the case of the Socialist Party, and that this difference is statistically significant (p < 0.001).

Effects of level of educational attainment
With respect to the effect of an individual’s level of educational attainment on this dimension of democratic deliberation, focusing only on citizens for the reasons outlined above, we note there are no differences in attitudes as a result of differences in educational attainment. We can conclude, therefore, that educational attainment does not explain these attitudes.

In order to assess the attitudes of deputies and citizens in relation to defending the common good, we use the respondents’ position using a semantic differentiator as our indicator. The scale is from 0-10, with ten representing maximum support (‘participants in a political deliberative assembly should defend proposals according to their contribution to the common good’) and zero representing the opposite position (‘participants in a political deliberative assembly must defend proposals according to their own
interests, or the interests of those they represent’). The definition of this latter position takes into consideration the liberal critiques of the idea of protecting the common good. The question thus posed was: ‘Should those who participate in political deliberation defend their proposals by taking their own interests into account, or should they defend their proposals in terms of their contribution to the common good. Which perspective is closer to your own view?’

**Figure 10.3: Attitude of citizens by educational attainment (respect and consideration for the opinions of others) (average values)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Attainment</th>
<th>Attitude Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th year</td>
<td>6.2464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th year</td>
<td>6.0901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th year</td>
<td>6.2705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>6.2584</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Portuguese mass survey (2008) in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).

*Protecting the common good*

The distribution in Figure 10.4 shows substantial differences between deputies and citizens in their approach to the idea of protecting the common good. Deputies had an average response of 8.0 (standard deviation 2.25), while the average
for citizens is significantly lower at 5.2 and with a wider dispersion (standard deviation 3.03). The average comparison test confirms the difference between the two groups is statistically significant (t=-13.372, p < 0.001).

**Figure 10.4: Position of deputies and citizens (protecting the common good) (%)**

![Graph showing the position of deputies and citizens](image)

**Source:** Portuguese mass and MPs surveys (2008), in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).

**Table 10.5: Attitudes of deputies and citizens (defending the common good)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>0–4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6–10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>1350</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Portuguese mass and MPs surveys (2008) in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009). **Note:** Percentages rounded to nearest whole number.
Table 10.5 provides a better illustration of our finding. While on the one hand the position of the citizens is more evenly distributed across the scale, in 49 per cent of cases a positioning closer to the idea ‘defending proposals in accordance to their contribution to the common good’ prevails. On the other hand, 91 per cent of the deputies’ responses are positioned in this same interval, indicating they clearly reject the idea of defending proposals according to their own interests or the interests of those they represent.

**Effects of party identification**

In seeking to compare the attitudes of deputies and citizens who support different parties in respect of the idea of defending the common good we created Table 10.6 which shows the responses aggregated into three positions as before, in order to provide a better visualisation of these differences.
Table 10.6: Attitudes of deputies and citizens (protecting the common good) (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale positions</th>
<th>0-4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6-10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>Deputies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Bloc</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Unity Coalition</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Centre</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Portuguese mass and MPs surveys (2008), in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009). Note: Percentages rounded to nearest whole number.

The largest statistically significant average differences are seen in relation to the Socialist Party, although there are also differences—albeit smaller and less statistically significant—in relation to the Democratic Unity Coalition and the Social Democratic Party. The results for the Left Bloc and the Social Democratic Centre are not statistically significant—which might be explained by the lower number of deputies from those parties that responded to the survey.
Table 10.7: Attitudes of deputies and citizens (protecting the common good) (average and standard deviation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Citizens</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Difference (a)-(b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Average (a)</td>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Average (b)</td>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Bloc</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Unity Coalition</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.1*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>3.0**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>1.5***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Centre</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>783</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Portuguese mass and MPs surveys (2008), in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009). Notes: * p = 0.058, ** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.01.

Effects of level of educational attainment

Turning now to the level of educational attainment as an explanatory variable of the positioning of citizens in respect to the protection of the common good (Figure 10.5), we note that there are not significant differences. That is to say, we can assume from this data that the level of an individual’s educational attainment does not affect their attitude towards this dimension of democratic deliberation.
Figure 10.5: Attitudes of citizens according to level of educational attainment (protecting the common good) (average)

![Bar Chart]


Seeking to incorporate the opinions of others

In order to measure the position of deputies and citizens in this dimension we created an indicator in which the respondents were asked to place themselves on a semantic differentiation scale. This scale ran from 0-10, with ten representing support for greatest accommodation (‘in a democratic debate each participant must be concerned with seeking to incorporate the contributions of others’) and zero representing least support for accommodation (‘in a democratic debate there must be confrontation and every participant must explain and defend their own ideas’). Again, here the definition of the latter view takes criticisms of this particular aspect of deliberation into account. The question
used here was: ‘In a democratic debate there must be confrontation, but there should also be an understanding between participants. Which of these, on a scale of 0–10, is closest to your view?’

**Figure 10.6: Position of deputies and citizens (need to accommodate the positions of others) (%)**

![Diagram showing the position of deputies and citizens on a scale of 0–10. The responses are concentrated near the middle of the scale, equidistant from the extremes.](image)

**Source:** Portuguese mass and MPs surveys (2008) in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).

The responses to this indicator—of the acceptance or rejection of the principle of accommodation—reveal the existence of a great deal of similarity between the positions of deputies and citizens, as shown below. We also see that the responses of both the citizens and the deputies are concentrated near the middle of the scale, equidistant from the extremes.

*Openness to participation*
This dimension was assessed through the degree of agreement of the individuals in relation to three indicators created for this purpose and which are believed to be intimately associated with the opening the process of democratic deliberation to others. These indicators were as follows: (1) ‘listening at all times to citizens or associations can result in politicians making no reforms at all’, (2) ‘the debates in parliament contribute to inform the citizens’ and (3) ‘groups of independent citizens should be allowed to present candidate lists for election to parliament’. We used a Likert scale (without an intermediate point) in which the possible responses varied between ‘completely disagree’, ‘disagree’, ‘agree’ and ‘agree completely’.

First indicator

The distribution of deputies and citizens in respect of the first response is shown in Figure 10.7.

It is important to stress that for this question around 22 per cent of citizens surveyed said either they did not know or they simply did not reply. Rather, all of the deputies responded by choosing one of the four options as requested.

Most of the citizens who replied to this question (78 per cent of the sample), accounting for 57 per cent of the valid replies, agreed or agreed completely with the view that ‘listening at all times to citizens or associations can result in politicians making no reforms at all’. While he deputies tend to disagree with this statement (67 per cent), with 22 per cent of them completely disagreeing with it (Table 10.8), the
average score for deputies was 2.2 (standard deviation 0.84), while for citizens it was 2.6 (standard deviation 0.77).

**Figure 10.7: Position of deputies and citizens (listening at all times to citizens or associations can result in politicians making no reforms at all) (%)**

![Bar chart showing the comparison between deputies and citizens on their willingness to open participation to others.](image)


The average comparison test confirms the differences between the two groups are statistically significant ($t=6.589$, $p < 0.001$), meaning we can state with a good degree of confidence that citizens reveal less willingness than deputies to open participation to others, at least based on data from this indicator.
Table 10.8: Attitudes of deputies and citizens (openness to participation - listening to others) (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Completely disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Agree completely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>1049</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Portuguese mass and MPs surveys (2008) in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009). Notes: Values rounded to nearest whole number. 22.3 per cent of the citizens either did not respond or said they did not know.

Effects of party identification

The next step was to observe the differences between the deputies and citizen supporters of different parties in respect of broadening participation and, more precisely, of listening to others.

The data presented in Table 10.9 shows the existence of some distance between the attitudes of deputies elected on the list of a party and those citizens who state they support that same party. The greatest differences were found with the Democratic Unity Coalition, the Left Bloc and, to a lesser extent, with the Socialist Party, while the differences with the Social Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Centre were not statistically significant. There is also a tendency for deputies of all parties to disagree and for citizens to agree with the idea that ‘listening at all times to citizens or associations can result in politicians making no reforms at all’.
Table 10.9: Attitudes of deputies and citizens (openness to participation - listening to others) (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale positions</th>
<th>Completely disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Agree completely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>Citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Bloc</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Unity Coalition</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Centre</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These differences can also be observed in the averages of the responses of deputies and citizens in each party (see Table 10.10). Comparing the average values obtained for deputies and citizens, we note the greater differences that exist for the Left Bloc and the Democratic Unity Coalition—differences that are statistically significant ($p<0.01$ and $p<0.001$ respectively). However, note the smaller, yet significantly significant, difference in the case of the Socialist Party ($p<0.001$). The differences in relation to the Social Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Centre were not statistically significant.
Table 10.10: Attitudes of deputies and citizens (openness to participation—listening to others) (average and standard deviation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Citizens</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Difference (a)-(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Bloc</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Unity Coalition</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.2**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.4**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Centre</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>141</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>783</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Portuguese mass and MPs surveys (2008) in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009). Notes: *p < 0.01, **p < 0.001.

Effects of level of educational attainment

In this case, we are unable to say whether educational attainment has an effect on the openness to participation as measured by the indicator ‘listening at all times to citizens or associations can result in politicians making no reforms at all’. What we see is that there are no differences in attitude resulting from the fact individuals have varying levels of educational attainment (Figure 10.8).
**Figure 10.8:** Attitudes of citizens according to level of educational attainment (openness to participation—listening to others) (average)

![Bar chart showing attitudes of citizens according to level of educational attainment.](image)


**Second indicator**

The second indicator against which the respondents were asked to position themselves refers to the debates in parliament: ‘debates in parliament contribute to informing the citizens’.

The data in Figure 10.9 also reveals some of the differences in the perception deputies and citizens have regarding parliament’s role in informing citizens. Despite both groups largely agreeing with the view that debates in the Assembly of the Republic do contribute towards informing citizens, we note that deputies are more likely to strongly agree (75 per cent) than citizens (65 per cent). However, we also note the spread of public opinion, with 47 per cent agreeing with the statement and 18 per cent completely
agreeing, while 74 per cent of deputies agreed. The average value for both groups was 2.8 (with a standard deviation of 0.48 and 0.81 for deputies and citizens, respectively).

**Figure 10.9: Position of deputies and citizens (openness to participation—parliamentary debates contribute to inform) (%)**


**Third indicator**
The third indicator, ‘groups of independent citizens should be allowed to present candidate lists for election to the Assembly of the Republic’ reveals profound differences between deputies and citizens (Table 10.10).
Table 10.11: Attitudes of deputies and citizens (openness to participation—parliamentary debates contribute to inform) (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Completely disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Agree completely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>1212</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Portuguese mass and MPs surveys (2008) in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009). Notes: Values rounded to nearest whole number. 0.6 per cent of the deputies refused to respond, while 10.2 per cent of citizens either did not know or did not reply.

Figure 10.10: Position of deputies and citizens (independent lists to the Assembly of the Republic) (%)

Again, it is important to note that 20 per cent of the citizens surveyed either did not respond to this question or said they did not know, while all of the deputies surveyed gave one of the four valid responses.

The results obtained showed us that, on the one hand, 84 per cent of citizens agree with the view groups of independents should be able to present lists of candidates for election to the Assembly of the Republic, while 64 per cent of deputies opposed this idea. The average value for deputies was around 2.3 (standard deviation 0.79), while the average value for citizens was around 3.0 (standard deviation 0.67).

It should also be noted that the difference in the average responses of the two groups is statistically significant (t=11.252, p<0.001). This means that there is statistical support for the view that citizens are generally more supportive of groups of independents being able to present lists of candidates for election to the Assembly of the Republic, while deputies are normally opposed.

Table 10.12: Attitudes of deputies and citizens (openness to participation—lists of independents to the Assembly of the Republic allowed) (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Completely disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Agree completely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>1212</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Portuguese mass and MPs surveys (2008) in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009). Notes: Values rounded to nearest whole number. 20.4 per cent of the citizens questioned either did not respond or said they did not know.
**Effects of party identification**

We went on to verify whether the differences between deputies and citizens sympathetic to the different parties could explain the observed discrepancies in relation to broadening deliberative participation and, more specifically, in relation to the possibility that groups of independent citizens are able to present candidate lists for election to the Assembly of the Republic. Table 10.13 shows the distribution of the data for each political party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale positions</th>
<th>Completely disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Agree completely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>Citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Bloc</td>
<td>0 9</td>
<td>25 9</td>
<td>50 35</td>
<td>25 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Unity Coalition</td>
<td>63 0</td>
<td>25 12</td>
<td>13 62</td>
<td>0 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party</td>
<td>16 2</td>
<td>43 13</td>
<td>33 67</td>
<td>8 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>4 0</td>
<td>60 5</td>
<td>31 33</td>
<td>4 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Centre</td>
<td>25 1</td>
<td>75 14</td>
<td>0 58</td>
<td>0 28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What we can say is that the distance between the attitudes of deputies of each party and the citizens who say they are sympathetic to these parties is maintained. This is true for every party with the exception of the Left Bloc, where convergence is greater in the direction of concordance (although in this case without statistical validity, as we shall see).

**Table 10.14: Attitudes of deputies and citizens (openness to participation—lists of independents to the Assembly of the Republic allowed) (average and standard deviation)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Citizens</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Bloc</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Unity Coalition</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Centre</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>141</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Portuguese mass and MPs surveys (2008) in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009). **Notes:** *p < 0.001.

Table 10.14, which presents the average values for both deputies and citizens according to their political party,
reinforces the results already obtained. By comparing the results for both groups we see that there are statistically significant differences for all parties except the Left Bloc. In all other parties the citizens tend to support the idea of groups of independent citizens being able to present lists of candidates for election to the Assembly of the Republic—a position opposed by most deputies. The difference in the positions is most noticeable with deputies elected for and citizens supportive of the Democratic Unity Coalition.

*Effects of level of educational attainment*

**Figure 10.11: Attitudes of citizens according to level of educational attainment (openness to participation—lists of independents to the Assembly of the Republic allowed) (average)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th year</td>
<td>3.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th year</td>
<td>3.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th year</td>
<td>3.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>2.801</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again, in respect of the respondents’ level of educational attainment, their replies to the statement ‘groups of independent citizens should be allowed to present candidate lists for election to the Assembly of the Republic’ show no differences in this respect, that is to say that this variable does not interfere with the attitude at stake.

Figure 10.11 shows levels of educational attainment have no significant effect. We therefore conclude that, as before, the level of educational attainment is not a variable that can explain the attitude of citizens in this dimension of democratic deliberation.

Conclusions

Democratic deliberation describes a normative model of discussion and debate, prior to collective decision-making, with rules and values. As we have stated above, its implementation requires the participants in the debate to be willing to accept these principles. The aim of this chapter was precisely to examine the attitudes of deputies and the public in relation to the deliberation dimensions: deputies because the Assembly of the Republic is the central body for deliberation within a democracy; citizens because it is they who, in the final analysis, give the political system its legitimacy.

The first conclusion to be drawn is that both the deputies and the citizens showed themselves to be mainly in favour of the procedures and principles of democratic deliberation, particularly in the dimensions of respect and consideration for the opinions of others. On the other hand, they also showed themselves to be more divided when defending the common good. With respect to the dimension of
accommodation neither group seems to have a predominant position.

Our main findings can be summarised as follows:

*Respect and consideration for the positions of others.* Both groups, although deputies slightly more so, believe that in a democratic debate each person must listen to the others without interruption, take what was said into consideration and only afterwards express an opinion. The behavioural measure data supports this idea. The analysis in terms of party identification revealed there to be greater distance between Socialist Party deputies and sympathisers than is true for other parliamentary groups and their electorates. Socialist Party deputies were also more likely to believe that ‘in democratic debate each one must listen to the other without interruption, take what is said into consideration and only then express an opinion’ than citizens sympathetic to the Socialist Party.

*Defence of the common good.* One of the most significant differences was detected in relation to the defence of arguments invoking the common good or those defending specific interests: deputies were more inclined than citizens towards arguments invoking the common good, and clearly distance themselves from the idea of defending proposals seeking to protect particular interests or the interests of those they represent. In relation to this dimension, the analysis in terms of party identification showed also a larger distance between the attitudes of Socialist Party deputies and their electorate than exists in the other parties with parliamentary representation and their
electorates, despite the existence, again, of a significant distance between the attitudes of Social Democratic Party and Democratic Unity Coalition deputies and their electorates. In other words, deputies of the Socialist Party, have a greater belief in the need to defend the common good than their voters. In other words, deputies of the Socialist Party and, to a lesser extent, those of the Social Democratic Party and the Democratic Unity Coalition have a greater belief in the need to protect the common good than their voters.

1. Openness to participation (listening to others).

Citizens are less open than deputies are to the idea of listening to others (citizens or associations) in all situations. Citizens tend to agree, more so than deputies, that this behaviour could result in politicians making no reforms at all. On this issue, the distance between deputies and citizens is more significant within the Left Bloc, the Democratic Unity Coalition and, to a lesser extent, the Socialist Party. That is to say that deputies elected from the lists of these three parties are more open to the idea of listening to the electorate and associations than those who vote for these parties.

2. Openness to participation (lists of independent citizens to parliament allowed)

Another divergence was found in respect of attitudes towards allowing lists of independent candidates for election to the Assembly of the Republic. Citizens were clearly favourable to this possibility while deputies were clearly unfavourable. Insofar as this affects democratic deliberation,
the distance between deputies and the electorate is most significant with the Democratic Unity Coalition, the Social Democratic Party, the Socialist Party and the Social Democratic Centre. Deputies elected on Left Bloc lists were closer to the party’s sympathisers, although the limited number of responses returned by this party’s deputies means this statement cannot be statistically supported. Finally, we should note that in this aspect of openness to participation, deputies were commenting on a matter that is very close to them.

Convergences were found at the level of the principle of accommodation; that is, attitudes relating to the attempt to incorporate the views of others into one’s own position. Both deputies and citizens were equally divided in their support for the two ideas expressed in the scale: confronting and affirming independent interests and seeking to accommodate the opinions of others. We believe that for this dimension we should probably have had a larger set of indicators.

Another convergence emerged in the dimension of openness to participation. Both groups largely agreed with the idea debates in the Assembly of the Republic contribute to inform citizens. Nevertheless, as stated above, the idea that always listening to the opinions of all interested parties could block reforms is more present among citizens than deputies.

It is also worth noting that while party identification emerges as an explanatory variable of the attitudes of both groups in relation to deliberation, the same cannot be said in relation to level of educational attainment. With respect to this latter aspect, we can consider the hypothesis that differences in attitudes between deputies and citizens should have more to do with characteristics that are specifically
related to the deputies’ political careers and less to do with
the fact they achieved higher educational levels than the
general population. It would be interesting to explore this
hypothesis in greater detail.

Returning to party identification, the results obtained do
not allow us to say the political elite positions itself further to
the left than the electorate (Dalton 1985; Thomassen 1994;
1999; Thomassen and Schmidt 1999). Our findings do not
provide sufficient clarification in this respect.

In relation to the idea that the political elite is more
supportive of the norms, rules and democratic procedures
than the electorate (Putnam 1976; Etzioni-Halevy 1993; Dye
and Zeigler 2006), and if we view their attitudes towards
democratic deliberation as a good indicator, then we can say
our results provide some degree of support to this idea.

Finally, we cannot end without emphasising the fact that
in this study, both deputies and citizens may have expressed
socially desired responses. Therefore, it would be interesting
to use different methodologies that are closer to actual
behaviours, and not only, as here, to the attitudinal
predispositions, and to compare them with the current
findings.
References


Short bios of editors and authors

André Freire
André Freire is an assistant professor (political science) with agrégation/habilitation. He is head of the bachelor degree in political science, ISCTE—University Institute of Lisbon, member of the scientific committee of both the master and doctoral degrees in political science at ISCTE—University Institute of Lisbon (Department of Political Science and Public Policies), and a senior researcher at CIES-ISCTE—University Institute of Lisbon. His research interests include electoral behaviour, political attitudes, political institutions (especially electoral systems), political elites and political representation. He has published several books, book chapters, and papers in academic journals, including the International Political Science Review, Party Politics, Comparative European Politics, West European Politics, European Journal of Political Research, Journal of Legislative Studies, Journal of European Integration, Journal of Political Ideologies, Electoral Studies, South European Society & Politics, Pôle Sud – Revue de Science Politique, Ibero-American Journal of Legislative Studies, etc. Among his recent papers (or special issues he coordinated) in academic journals are:


André Freire, Marco Lisi, Ioannis Andreadis & José Manuel Leite Viegas (2014), Organization of the Special Issue “Political Representation in times of Bailout: Evidence from Portugal and Greece”, South European Society and Politics, Vol. 19, nº 4,


André Freire and Ana Belchior (2013), “Ideological representation in Portugal: MPs-electors linkages in
terms of left-right placement and substantive meaning”, *Journal of Legislative Studies*, 19 (1), pp. 1-21.

He has also participated in the following international research projects:

**CCS** - *Comparative Candidate Survey* – (Member of the *Steering Committee* & National Coordinator of the Project). Dates: 2008-present date. [http://www.comparativecandidates.org/node/3](http://www.comparativecandidates.org/node/3)

**TEV** - *True European Voter – Cost Action “ISCH Action IS0806”* (Member of the *Steering Committee*, Member of the *Management Committee* & National Coordinator of the Project). Dates: 2010-2014. [http://www.cost.esf.org/domains_actions/isch/Actions/the_true_european_voter](http://www.cost.esf.org/domains_actions/isch/Actions/the_true_european_voter).


**PARENEL** – *Parliamentary Representation at the National and European levels* – (Member of the *Steering Committee* & National Coordinator of the Project). Dates: 2007-2014. [http://www.legipar.sciencespobordeaux.fr/PDF/PARENEL_EN.pdf](http://www.legipar.sciencespobordeaux.fr/PDF/PARENEL_EN.pdf)


ECS - *European Candidate Survey*, (2009 & 2014) renamed PIREDEU


CSES - *The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems* - (National Coordinator of the


Freire’s full CV can be seen here:


Freire is the Principal coordinator of the Project «Elections, Leadership and Accountability»: [http://er.cies.iscte-iul.pt/](http://er.cies.iscte-iul.pt/)
José Manuel Leite Viegas
José Viegas is an associate professor (political science) with agrégation/habilitation, He is head of the department of political science and public policies, ISCTE—University Institute of Lisbon and a senior researcher at CIES-ISCTE—University Institute of Lisbon. He is a member of the scientific committee of the master’s degree and director of the scientific committee of the doctoral degrees in political science at ISCTE—University Institute of Lisbon. His research interests include electoral behaviour, political attitudes, democracy, democratic deliberation, citizenship and civic associations. He has published several books, book chapters, and papers in academic journals about those topics.
Among his recent publications in English are:


He has participated in several international research networks, including:
PARTIREP (Party Representation in European Democracies)
Ana Espírito-Santo is a post-doctoral research fellow at the Social Sciences Institute at Lisbon (ICS-UL). She has a Ph.D. from the European University Institute in Florence (2011) on the consequences of a more gender proportionate political environment on the political attitudes of citizens. Her research interests include gender and politics, the impact of the electoral systems, and research methodology. Nowadays she is assistant Professor at ISCTE—University Institute of Lisbon (Department of Political Science and Public Policies).

Ana Maria Belchior is an assistant professor at ISCTE—University Institute of Lisbon and senior researcher at CIES-ISCTE—University Institute of Lisbon. She has been involved in research on several national and international projects related to the themes of democracy and globalisation, political participation, democratic representation and political congruence, and has published her findings in diverse national and international journals.

Carlos Cunha has a Ph.D. in political science, is executive chair of the faculty at Dowling College in Oakdale, New York, and is a research associate at CIES-ISCTE—University Institute of Lisbon. He wrote The Portuguese Communist Party’s Strategy for Power, 1921-1986,
Garland (1992), *Culture and Customs of Portugal* (with Rhonda Cunha), Greenwood (2010) and has published numerous articles, book chapters, and reviews on various aspects of Portuguese politics, specialising in the use of new media in the nation as well as the Portuguese Communist Party.

**Catherine Moury** is an assistant professor at the New University of Lisbon. Her research focuses on institutional change in the European Union and on coalition governments, about which she has published in journals such as *European Journal of Public Policy, West European Politics* and *Party Politics*. She is the author of *Coalition Government and Party Mandate: How coalition agreements constrain ministerial action* (Routledge, 2012) and *Changing rules of delegation: A contest of Power for comitology* (with A. Héritier, C. Bisschoff and C.-F. Bergström, Oxford University Press, 2012). Her article “Explaining the European Parliament’s right to appoint and invest the commission: Interstitial institutional change”, published in *West European Politics* in 2007, has been awarded the Vincent Wright Memorial Prize and the Gulbenkian Prize for the internationalization of Social Science.

**Filipa Seiceira** has a degree in sociology and a master’s degree in communication, culture and information technologies from ISCTE—University Institute of Lisbon. She is currently a research assistant to the project “Party Pledges and Democratic Accountability: The Portuguese Case in a Comparative Perspective” at CIES-ISCTE—University Institute of Lisbon. Her areas of interest are political participation, political communication and new information technologies.
Michael Baum is an associate professor of political science at the University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth and co-chairman of the Iberian studies group at Harvard University’s Center for European Studies. Nowadays, Michael Baum is a member of the FLAD (The Luso-American Foundation) executive board. His research on Portuguese democracy has focused on institutional reforms, such as regionalisation and the implementation of gender quotas, as well as issues related to participation, national identity and civil society. Besides numerous book chapters, his work has appeared in *West European Politics*, *the European Journal of Political Research* and *South European Politics*, among others.

Manuel Meirinho is full professor of political science at the Technical University of Lisbon, Institute for Social and Political Sciences (ISCSP-UTL), of which he is also president. He has published nationally and internationally in his fields of expertise (political participation, electoral systems, political representation, etc.).

Luís de Sousa has a Ph.D. from the European University Institute in Florence with a thesis on political corruption in Europe. He was assistant researcher at the Social Sciences Institute in Lisbon (ICS-UL), and he is now assistant professor at the Aveiro University, Aveiro, Portugal. He is also one of the members of the executive board of Transparency International, Portuguese branch. He has published nationally and internationally in his fields of expertise, namely political corruption and European integration.

Susana Santos has a Ph.D. in the sociology of communication from ISCTE—University Institute of Lisbon, she is currently a post-doctoral fellow at CIES-ISCTE—University Institute of Lisbon and scientific
secretary of the Portuguese Journal of Social Science. She has published nationally and internationally in her fields of expertise (communication studies and voluntary associations).
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Notes

1 Leaving aside some of the more theoretical studies in the areas of the history of ideas or political theory, particularly on models and concepts of political representation. For more, see Pitkin (1967), Manin (1997) and Vieira and Runcimann (2008). In Portuguese see Meirinho’s literature review (2008) and the collection of classic texts by Aurélio (2009).

2 Integrated into a much larger team, these authors were also pioneers of the study of electoral behaviour with their proposal for a ‘socio-psychological model’ (Campbell et al. 1960). For more on this model see Freire (2001a: ch. 2).

3 However, it should be noted that many studies of political representation use as indicators the placement of parties or of the representatives, rather than the placement of the deputies in relation to the different themes or with different scales while using the average placement of the parties in relation to the different themes or scales (for example, the left-right scale). In such cases, the sources for estimating the average placement of the parties are varied and include expert surveys, the content analysis of party manifestos and electoral programmes and the perceptions of the electorate regarding the positions of the parties, etc.

4 Although Portugal has been included in some comparative studies of the correspondence of the political positions of the electorate and their representatives, particularly in studies that use the average voter and party positions on a left-scale (or when analysing European-wide issues they may use the pro-anti European integration scale) to study congruence. For example, Schmitt and Thomasson (1999) and Powell (2002). See also Huber and Powell (1994).

5 Both surveys and their respective databases are available to all interested parties in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).

6 See www.comparativecandidates.org and the German candidate survey at www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/projekte/gcs/homepage_e.html. On the PARENEL project see spirit.sciencepobordeaux.fr/Parenel.htm.
This chapter is a more developed version of another article. See Teixeira, C. P. and Freire, A. (2010), ‘Decline, transformation and (mis)trust in parliaments: A longitudinal and comparative perspective’, *Ibero-American Journal of Legislative Studies/Revista Ibero-americana de Estudos Legislativos* 1 (1): 24–37. The authors would like to thank the journal’s editorial board, particularly Professor Magna Inácio and the journal’s editor, Professor Fabiano Santos, for permission to publish this version.


Examples include: improvements in living standards, the growth of the welfare state, the restructuring and outsourcing of the workforce, increasing social and geographic mobility, unstoppable urbanisation and the consequent move from a communitarian style of social organisation to one that is more corporate (individualised and secularised) and also the substantial improvements in the levels of education and knowledge of large sections of the population.

Carlos Cunha, who is a faculty member at Dowling College, New York, and a member of CIES-ISCTE, would like to thank Dowling College for its support from the Release Time and Travel and Research Fund Programs. Filipa Seiceira is a member of CIES-ISCTE.

This analysis is based on the results of the study ‘Portuguese MPs in comparative perspective: Elections, leadership and political representation’ conducted at CIES-ISCTE (Freire, Viegas and Seiceira, 2009) in which we were in charge of researching deputies’ use of information and communication technologies. In this project a questionnaire was applied to Portuguese deputies serving in the tenth Legislature (230 deputies), in a personal, direct interview.

The information-seeking index is constructed with the mean of the responses to the ‘search for specific information on issues or persons’ and ‘search for general information’. The information communication index combines the mean of the responses to the topics ‘internal communication’, ‘external communication with others’ and ‘external communication with constituents’. We omit ‘political campaigning’ for the reasons discussed previously. Both indices vary between 1 (never
use information and communication technologies) and 7 (always use them).

12 Due to the variable characteristics and distribution we carried out a Kruskal-Wallis test between the variable party and each one of the indices. The results were: ‘search for information index’—K-S (4) = 3.111, p = 0.539, p > 0.05; ‘communication index’—K-S(4) = 1.252, p = 0.869, p > 0.05.

13 Due to the variable characteristics and distribution, we carried out a t-test between the variable ‘gender’ and each one of the indices. The results were: ‘search for information index’— t (138) = -1.847, p = 0.07, p > 0.05 (since the p-value is quite close 0.05, the data will be analysed with some reservations) and ‘communication index’—t (134) = -0.295, p = 0.768, p > 0.05.

14 For this analysis the variable age was re-coded in three groups: under 35 years, 35–49 and over 50. Due to the variable characteristics and distribution, we conducted a Kruskal-Wallis test between the age recoded and each one of the indices. The results were—‘search for information index’—K-S (2) = 10.829, p = 0.004, p < 0.05, ‘communication index’—K-S (2) = 23.866, p < 0.001

15 The project ‘Parliamentary elites and information technologies’ was conducted at ISCTE-Lisbon University Institute, in conjunction with the European Action on Government and Democracy in the Information Age (GaDIA), funded by the European Commission’s ‘European Cooperation in the field of Scientific and Technological Research’ (COST) Action #A14 – Working Group 1/ Cyberdemocracy. The quantitative methodology consisted of a data set from a questionnaire sent to all Portuguese deputies in spring 2001 to which 34.8 per cent of the 230 deputies responded.

16 It should be noted the questions on information and communication technologies use from the 2001 survey were replicated in 2008, so comparability is total.

17 www.change.gov is still accessible, but as of 21 March 2009 reads: ‘Thank you for visiting Change.gov. The transition has ended and the new administration has begun. Please join President Barack Obama at
Whitehouse.gov.’ Access to the original site is still possible as of this date by clicking on the lower-right corner.

18 change.gov/page/content/discusshealthcare, accessed 6 December 2008 and 21 March 2009 (but discussion had closed by March).


21 We refer here to the reactions of some trade unions to the Sócrates (2005–09) government’s proposed education, health, justice and public administration reforms.

22 It was not possible to include these indicators in the public survey questionnaire in 2008.

23 The t-test values for the participation of deputies in sports clubs are: (t (139) = -1.698, p = 0.092, p < 0.10).

24 Cramer’s V is a measure of association based on the chi-squared statistic, and varies between 0 (no association) and 1 (perfect association).

25 A coalition of the Portuguese Communist Party and the Green Party (Os Verdes).

26 André Freire and Ana Belchior are both professors at ISCTE-Lisbon University Institute and senior researchers at CIES-ISCTE. This text was first published as André Freire & Ana Belchior (2013), “Ideological Representation in Portugal: MPs-Electors Linkages in Terms of Left-Right Placement and Substantive Meaning”, Journal of Legislative Studies, 19, No.1 (March 2013), pp. 1-21. The authors would like to thank the editor of JLS, Lord Philip Norton, and Talyor and Francis for their permission to republish the paper here. See http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/fjls20/current#.VNEK-_l_slI

27 This is only one theory about voting behaviour, which only partially explains the variance in the vote from country to country and election
to election. This is more likely to happen to more sophisticated voters, and especially when the clarity of policy alternatives presented to voters by parties is greater.

28 For both electors and deputies, the question about left-right self-placement was as follows (11-point scale): ‘In politics, people sometimes talk about the “left” and the “right”. If you can, where would you place yourself on a scale from 0–10, where 0 means the most left and 10 means the most right?’

29 ‘Can you please, very briefly, indicate what political “left” and “right” means to you nowadays?’

30 Because of limitations of space we are unable show this data.

31 We also used principal component analysis, and by constraining the results to two factors we found that for voters and deputies the first factor is similar and includes indicators of socio-economic left-right issues and items related to authoritarian issues (in the case of deputies all the items have positive loadings, while in the case of voters some items have negative loadings), and that factor two is slightly different for voters and deputies: it includes both socio-economic issues (for both groups), items about globalization (voters) and about immigration and democratic reform (deputies). The principal component analysis also revealed the importance of socio-economic and libertarian-authoritarian issues for both voters and deputies and highlighted the need to compare the same dimensions across the two groups. The indices are both theoretically anchored and, in most cases, have good (or reasonable) Cronbach’s alphas.

32 Because of limitations of space we are unable show this data.

33 For a better evaluation of the role of political sophistication we divided the voter sample to include only those with either intermediary secondary education or above average media exposure (see Freire and Belchior 2011), and replicated the ordinary least squares regressions in Table 5.3. The results show more sophisticated voters are more like deputies than unsophisticated voters, but the changes are small. Thus, it is fair to conclude political socialization is much more important than political sophistication in terms of media exposure and education.
Due to expected invariance regarding the level of deputies’ knowledge we do not control for this variable in this case.  
See further references and the disks containing the data in Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).  
Due to space restrictions the data is not shown; however, it can be furnished by the authors on request.  
To split the voters into parties we used party identification instead of voting intention to increase the number of cases (the number of ‘party identifiers’ was larger than those willing to participate in a possible election). Nevertheless, using voting intention produces the same results.  
For voters, the socio-economic left-right index includes all variables in Table 6.3 except ‘globalisation should be promoted’, and after removing this variable the Cronbach’s alpha is 0.725, while for deputies the socio-economic left-right index includes all variables in Table 6.3 except ‘economic growth is more important than balancing the state budget’, and after removing this variable the Cronbach’s alpha is 0.580. For voters, the authoritarian-libertarian index includes all variables in Table 6.4 except ‘immigrants should be required to adapt to the customs of Portugal’, and after removing this variable the Cronbach’s alpha is -0.276, while for deputies the authoritarian-libertarian index includes all variables in Table 6.4 except ‘women should be given preferential treatment when applying for jobs and promotions’, and after removing this variable the Cronbach’s alpha is 0.636.  
The original questions are: for electors’ political knowledge (additive index): ‘How often do you follow political issues in the media: that is, in the 1) newspapers, 2) radio, 3) TV or on 4) the internet?’ (four variables summed up and divided by four) (1=never, to 5=everyday; thus, we consider a high level of information for values 3–5 in the index, and with low levels of political information for values 1–2.9 in the index), Education is measured in terms of the highest level of education attained. Social class corresponds to an index that adds profession and professional status (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992) (1=bourgeoisie, 2=higher-level professionals, 3=mid-level
professionals, 4=clerks and salesmen, 5=manual workers). This variable is then used as a set of dummies with ‘manual workers’ as the reference category. Religiosity is measured by church attendance (1=never, 6=once or more a week).

40 This text first appeared in the Portuguese Journal of Social Science 10 (1): 23–41, with the title ‘Comparing deputies’ and voters’ support for Europe: The case of Portugal’. The authors would like to thank the editor of the PJSS & Intelect for their kind permission to reproduce this text here. See http://pjss.iscte.pt/index.php/pjss

41 A referendum was also held in Ireland, where 70 per cent voted in favour

42 As Eurobarometer polls show, public support for European integration flagged throughout the 1990s and has stayed at a much lower level to this day

43 Even if national parliaments still play a marginal role in the European Union decision-making process, and if all deputies do not have the same degree of involvement in European affairs, we cannot ignore the unprecedented level of Europeanisation in recent years. Not only have we witnessed the creation of special European affairs committees in all national parliaments, responsible for co-ordinating parliamentary scrutiny of and involvement in European Union matters, and for monitoring government representatives in the Council and the European Council, we have also seen changes in the behavioural patterns found among national deputies (Auel and Benz 2006).

44 The utilitarian perspective posits that citizens’ support for integration is positively related to the benefits they receive from European Union integration (Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel and Palmer 1995). The identity perspective posits that Europeans who hold negative attitudes towards immigration are more likely to view other European nations unfavourably and are therefore less likely to support European integration (Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005; McLaren 2001; 2002). Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to test another important explanatory variable: the materialist/post-materialist values of the individual. According to Inglehart’s theory of value change, post-
materialist voters are more likely to favour European integration (Inglehart 1977).

45 The Socialist Party was created in exile a year before the 1974 revolution. In practice, however, the party owes much of its existence to the post-1974 democratisation context.

46 Contrary to many other party systems in which parties appear as voluntary and often unregulated civil society associations, in Portugal the parties are constitutional entities and are strictly regulated.

47 The successful entry of the Left Bloc into the Portuguese party political system contrasts sharply with the brief and unsuccessful life of the Democratic Renewal Party, a small party created in 1985 with the support of the last military president, General Ramalho Eanes. Both the Left Bloc and the Democratic Renewal Party made the moralisation of political (and economic) life their major political quest. The former has been able to mobilise a series of fracturing issues in Portuguese party politics and consolidate its electorate, while the later was successful in helping the minority Social Democratic Party government fall in 1987 at the cost of the loss of its ephemeral electoral support and the return of the Social Democrats with the first absolute parliamentary majority by a single party in Portugal’s democratic history.

48 Thinks more European political integration is necessary. The five question are: ‘Do you think that Portuguese membership is a good thing?’, ‘Do you think unification of the European Union should be pushed further?’, ‘Are you satisfied with European Union democracy’? and ‘Do you think that the reform treaty is a good text?’

49 The tests were run using the party the citizen intended to vote for, or the party they had voted for in the previous election. We did not observe any significant change to the correlations.

50 A shorter version of the present chapter paper was published as ‘Freire, André & Meirinho, Manuel (2012), “Institutional reform in Portugal: From the perspective of deputies and voters perspectives”, Pôle Sud – Revue de Science Politique, N° 36, 2012/1, pp. 107-125.. We would like to thank Pôle Sud and its editors, William Genieys and Jacques Fontaine, for their kind permission to reprint the paper here. See http://pole-
The authors also thank Filipa Seiceira for her help in data analysis, Professor Helena Carvalho (ISCTE-IUL) for her kind assistance with the statistical testing, the participants in the ECPR Joint Sessions panel concerning ‘Electoral system reform’ (Lisbon 2009) for their useful comments and suggestions, and Stewart Lloyd-Jones for the English revision. The critical assessments of Pôle Sud’s anonymous referees also helped improve this paper.

We present weighted data for both surveys. For further details about sampling and a full access to the datasets, see Freire, Viegas and Seiceira (2009).

Data not shown due to limitations of space; however, the information is available from the authors on request.

This solution allowed us to maximise number of respondents vis-à-vis both past and intended vote for 2005 and 2008, respectively.

Meaning that in a very small number of cases we are dealing with deputies who belong to another party or who are independent.

In respect of the former, the proposals by the parties for reform almost always begin by referring to some ‘political malaise’ among the voters to justify the need to change: there is a large disconnect between the voters and the political system, which is related to support for electoral reform. In respect of the latter, despite all indicators suggesting there is a ‘political malaise’ and the awareness electoral reform might help resolve this, no significant reform has yet been introduced.

First published in West European Politics, special issue on gender parity and quotas in European politics. Both the authors of this paper and the editors of the book would like to thank West European Politics, Taylor and Francis and the editor of this special issue for permission to reprint the paper here. The authors would also like to thank all of those Portuguese deputies and political actors who agreed to be interviewed for this project, in particular the Helena Pinto for responding to email follow-ups and data requests. We also thank the National Committee of Elections and the political parties for the data they provided. Lastly, we wish to thank our anonymous reviewers, as well as Jocelyn Praud and Stewart Lloyd-Jones for their insightful comments, all of which made
the paper significantly better. Of course, all errors of fact or interpretation are the authors’ alone.

57 By gender quota policies we mean any of the specific means political systems adopt to increase the number of women elected to political office. The three main types of quota measures are reserved seats, voluntary party quotas and legislative quotas made into law, whether as part of electoral law or as a constitutional obligation. For a review, see Krook (2009: 6).

58 As of 2009, 26 European countries had adopted either voluntary or mandatory quota laws. Although quota laws such as the parity law in Portugal have tended to be most predominant in Latin America (Matland 2006), they are quickly making inroads in the European context as well, with six countries having adopted legal quotas to date. Surveys were conducted 7 July–22 September 2008.

59 All interviews took place 21 July–18 August 2005.

60 In fact, the Left Bloc presented three bills instead of one, because they preferred to dedicate one bill to each political layer (legislative, European, local) (DAR 2006c).

61 In most national contexts the term gender quota is usually reserved for efforts to guarantee representation (on candidate lists or in elected assemblies) at some proportion less than 50 per cent, while parity is usually reserved for efforts to promote a democratic principle providing for the equal presence of both genders in elected assemblies, or at least the equal access of both genders to elected position. This was not the case in Portugal. When we refer to the law as the ‘parity law’ we are using the name it was given in the Portuguese context, both officially and unofficially, despite the fact none of the quota law proposals sought equal representation for both genders.

62 Once a bill has been passed (when it is renamed a ‘decreed of the Assembly of the Republic’) and is sent to the president for enactment.

63 We discuss the president’s role in the veto and then passage of the parity law in more detail below, in the section where we analyse the roles of state actors.
Each municipality is composed of a few or many communities. Each of these geographical divisions has its own political body and its own electoral list.

This information was provided in an email from the directorate-general of electoral administration.

From the 22 electoral districts that exist in Portugal, three elect only two deputies.

An earlier embryo of what would become the Portuguese Socialist Party was actually founded in Geneva in November 1964.

In 1999, the internal quota system began being applied to the national party organs. In 2003 the internal quota system changed from 25 per cent to 33 per cent minimum representation of each gender.

Between 1995 and 2005, the proportion of women Socialist Party members elected rose by an average of 23.3 per cent, while between 1976 and 1995 it had risen by approximately 13 per cent.

That is to say it is not written into the party statutes.

The Portuguese Communist Party consistently elected the largest proportion of women in all legislative elections, apart from the 2005 and 2009 elections, when it was overtaken by the other left-wing parties.

Two leaders, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa (March 1996–February 1999) and Durão Barroso (May 1999–June 2004) are associated with a period characterised by a greater degree of concern with gender than either the preceding or succeeding periods. In fact, some of the deputies interviewed were pro-quotas while others were anti.

Due to space limitations, and the fact these organisations are relatively weak in Portugal, we omitted our discussion of these groups in this analysis. However, this information is available upon request.

The Socialist Party has been a full member of the Socialist International since 19 April 1973.

A similar law was introduced in France the same year.

This concept of a ‘parity democracy’ was launched by the Council of Europe in 1989, and both the Socialist Party and the Left Bloc have embraced it—at least in theory.
Namely, Law proposal 40/VIII (DAR II série A 59/VIII/1, 15 July 2007 [1884-1891]).

We ran some factor analyses on these items to see the extent to which they fell into the same dimensions of responses as we had theorised, but the results—except for the abortion items—were somewhat underwhelming. The diffuse nature of the phenomena makes clear aggregations of question items somewhat difficult.

The only exception was the Socialist Party’s 1998 proposal for a 25 per cent minimum representation of each gender in the first election after the passage of the law and 33 per cent thereafter.

A similar process of public issue awareness occurred between the first national referendum that sought to liberalise women’s access to abortion services in 1998 and the second referendum on abortion ten years later (Freire 2008).

See our extended discussion of this party’s evolution on the gender quota issue above.

Three non-governmental organisations were visible in the favouring of the adoption of the 2006 parity law: the Women’s Alternative Union and Response, the Portuguese Platform for Women’s Rights and the Portuguese Network of Young People for Gender Equality. We did not develop our analysis on the non-governmental organisations due to lack of space.

For more on attitude models (that focus on the impact of attitudes on behaviours) see for instance, Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), Ajzen (1988) and Fazio (1995).

Studies of the similarities/homologies of attitudes, values and representations between representatives and those they represent have been developed in relation to other aspects since the 1990s, particularly in the seminal works by Esaiasson and Holmberg (1996), Schmitt and Thomassen (1999) and Miller et al. (1999), while the recent work by Belchior (2007; 2008) has been an important contribution in the Portuguese context.

The Assembly of the Republic has 230 deputies. (Freire, Viegas and Seiceira 2009).
This variable, party identification, was created from the item that referred to the ‘list on which you were elected’ in the case of deputies, and the ‘party to which you feel closest’ in the case of citizens. In this way we were able to generate a new variable that facilitated a comparative analysis in terms of party sympathy. The five main Portuguese parties (i.e. those with parliamentary representation)—the Left Bloc, the Democratic Unity Coalition, the Socialist Party, the Social Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party—were considered.
Annex

Supportive Reviews

Hermann Schmitt

Chair in Electoral Politics
University of Manchester
Manchester M13 9PL, UK
hermann.schmitt@manchester.ac.uk

Research Fellow and Professor
MZES, University of Mannheim
A5, 6 (Gebäudeteil A)
D-68159 Mannheim
hermann.schmitt@mzes.uni-mannheim.de

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Supportive Review of Political Representation in Portugal, eds. André Freire and José Manuel Leite Viegas

A quarter of a century ago, in June 1986, the Belknap Press of Harvard University Press published a voluminous book which was co-authored by Philip E. Converse and Roy Pierce. Its title was Political Representation in France. This book at the time was a landmark study (and still today is a point of reference for many of us). No matter whether one agreed or disagreed with the methodology and the main findings – no scholar interested in the empirical assessment of the process and the effectiveness of political representation could ignore it.
25 years later, Political Representation in Portugal is published by Freire and Leite Viegas. The very choice of the title symbolizes the ambition of the volume. And indeed, this book is a comprehensive account of the most impressive empirical research program into political representation that we have seen in a long time. Surveys among voters and members of parliament, later also among candidates standing for office in national parliamentary elections, were designed in such a way that their comparative analysis can shed light on the support base of representative democracy among both elites and the mass public in modern Portugal (Part I of the book); on the effectiveness of the “representational bond” between electors and elected (Part II); and on the institutional and behavioural foundations of the democratic process in contemporary Portugal (Part III). This is an important book, a “must read”, for any scholar of electoral democracy, in Europe and beyond. It offers stimulating new insights in the Portuguese electoral process, and suggests new avenues for comparative studies. It is exactly this kind of scholarship that one would wish to see realized more often.
I have carefully read the manuscript “Political Representation in Portugal: The Years of the Socialist Majority, 2005-2009” edited by André Freire and José Manuel Leite Viegas.

Freire and Leite Viegas are renowned specialists of both Portuguese politics and legislative studies. I have been reading their articles and listening to their papers in conferences for years; I have always appreciated by their ability to balance a deep knowledge of facts, literature and methods, with an ability to draw general conclusions from the Portuguese case and to contribute to general debates.

Through the years, Freire, Leite Viegas and the contributors to this book have made Portugal one of the advanced democracies where legislative studies are meeting the international standards, regarding the quality of the data gathered and the sophistication of the analysis. It is no surprise that the ISCTE team is involved in all the main international comparative projects dealing with MPs, parliaments and elections.

This manuscript confirms the leading role played by this team in the study of political representation in Portugal, as well as in the international debates on topics like political representation, analysis of the impact of electoral rules, MPs identity and behaviour, citizens’ view on representation. I am impressed by the global coherence of the
manuscript which derives from a long-term research project: it is by no way a collection of papers on a theme, but the result of a highly organised collective work. This coherence is mirrored by the fact that each chapter is co-authored by two members of the team, and that most authors contribute to several chapters.

The global structure of the book seems adequate to me. It covers the topic in a quite systematic way (decline of parliament, relationship between MPs and citizens, congruence of their respective views regarding ideology, policy preferences and institutional reform) and, at the same time, leaves room to explore less researched questions (E-democracy, compared involvement of citizens and MPs in associations, attitude of MPs regarding the EU, crossed views of MPs and citizens on democratic deliberation).

Each chapter is built with rigour, giving elements of background on the scientific discussion and on the Portuguese case, explaining research goals, methods and hypotheses, presenting data (notably through numerous tables and figures) and drawing clear conclusions from the empirical work. The authors show that they are involved in the more recent international debates about methodology, theories and findings, and that they are willing to favour comparison with other national contexts.

Generally speaking, I am impressed by this volume. For having worked on legislative studies in France for more than 10 years, and tried to develop and structure them, I would expect the publication of such a comprehensive book on political representation in France. Portuguese colleagues show with this piece that they are among the leading scholars on the topic of democracy and parliamentary representation, regarding the soundness of their data and their ability to use them to participate in key-debates.
In my mind, this book deserves thus, without any doubt, to be published and widely diffused and advertised.

Olivier Costa
CNRS Senior Research Fellow
Visiting professor at the College of Europe, Université Libre de Bruxelles and University of Geneva